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Abstract
Effectiveness and Acceptability of Congestion Pricing
Urban congestion is a pervasive and growing problem in developed and developing coun-
tries. The lack of excludability for scarce urban space, specically roads and parking spaces,
creates a common resource problem yielding a congestion externality that generates many
external costs. Marginal social cost pricing has long been advocated as a means of alleviat-
ing market failures resulting from such negative (environmental) externalities. Congestion
pricing comes in numerous forms (e.g., tolls on roads or express lanes), but has only been
sporadically adopted despite congestion being a growing problem. The literature argues that
concerns on equity and fairness issues and revenue redistribution are major hurdles of mak-
ing an eective congestion pricing policy politically feasible and publicly acceptable. This
dissertation investigates the eectiveness and acceptability of congestion pricing schemes in
dierent contexts and examines whether individual beliefs in addition to the objective wel-
fare eects determine voter acceptability. The rst chapter employs laboratory experiments
to examine the evolution of voting behavior after individuals become accustomed to the
congestion problem and the congestion pricing policy, and the nature of the experience from
the congestion policy. The congestion pricing policy exogenously creates inequitable out-
comes which in some cases makes some people worse o. The second chapter develops and
examines a three-player bottleneck congestion game and examines the ex-ante and ex-post
welfare implications of an ex-ante ecient tolling policy. The third chapter examines the
eectiveness and acceptability of tolls in the three-player bottleneck congestion game using
laboratory experiments where equity concerns are endogenously determined. The results
ii
suggest policymakers should be open to and considerate of the equity eects, the character-
istics and beliefs of their constituents, and how to earmark revenues before implementing
eciency enhancing environmental policies.
iii
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Urban congestion is a pervasive problem in developed and developing countries. The
lack of excludability for scarce urban space, specically roads and parking spaces, creates
a common resource problem yielding a congestion externality that generates many external
costs. Many economists recommend that policymakers facing natural physical constraints of
expanding capacity consider incentive-based mechanisms to mitigate congestion. Congestion
pricing is argued to mitigate congestion by lowering travel time costs and therefore improving
overall eciency. The theoretical understanding of improving societal welfare by imposing
an externality correcting tax (or toll), equaling the marginal external (congestion) costs at
the ecient level, has been around since Pigou (1924). However, such Pigouvian policies
can create negative distributional eects, making many policymakers and the public averse
to such welfare enhancing incentive-based policies.
Given basic assumptions and conditions, and if government puts revenue aside, then
Pigouvian tolls or congestion pricing on a road will achieve a Pareto ecient outcome, but
will make all individuals worse o (Hau, 1992). The government will be the only entity that
will made better o from the increased revenue. According to Hau (1992), the individuals
paying the toll will incur an additional cost of the toll, which may surpass the value-of-
time savings so they are worse o. And the motorists priced o the road to an inferior
o-peak time, inferior mode of travel, or dierent route to avoid paying the toll are also
worse o. Additionally, the individuals already on other roads are worse o if congestion
arises from motorists using their route as an alternative to avoid paying the toll. The welfare
improvement from the congestion pricing policy relies upon how the government spends or
1
reallocates the toll revenues. After redistribution, inequities will usually remain, creating
winners and losers.
Despite the eciency gains, equity and fairness concerns as well as a general lack of
knowledge of the eciency gains may be reasons why congestion pricing is not implemented
more in practice. Congestion pricing has been sporadically applied by either using cordon
zone pricing of a central business district, variable pricing (or peak pricing) of toll roads,
variable pricing of high occupancy toll (HOT) lanes (i.e., express lanes), and/or responsive
pricing to manage parking demand. The lack of further implementation of such pricing can be
explained by the barriers of political feasibility, public acceptability, and general knowledge
of the Pigouvian objective of the congestion pricing instrument. The equity concerns seem
to dominate. Even under the assumption of heterogeneous time preferences where high-
values-of-time users are better o with the toll by decreasing their travel time, the other
users are made worse o by being incentivized to make less preferred travel decisions (Small
and Verhoef, 2007). Further, users that might be made better o from the toll may still not
nd the toll acceptable, as was the case when tax aversion of eciency improving Pigouvian
taxes were observed empirically by Kallbekken et al. (2011) and Cherry et al. (2013). Beliefs
and idiosyncratic behaviors may be signicant factors.
In a review of literature on how to address equity concerns of road pricing, Levinson
(2010) nds recycling collected toll revenues can address such concerns. Yet a tradeo
exists between alleviating fairness and equity concerns and improving system eciency when
considering or designing a pricing policy. Policymakers have to weigh the political feasibility
of a congestion policy and whether it will be politically acceptable. Levinson (2010) remarks
that the perception of equity is highly subjective and satisfying certain groups is necessary
2
to obtain acceptability of a congestion program. Furthermore, these subjective perceptions
of the objective eects of a congestion policy may be driven by beliefs and idiosyncrasies
of individuals. In a review of issues inuencing the implementation of road user charging,
Ison and Rye (2005) identify the need to have a clear strategy when raising and earmarking
revenues, handling equity and exemptions, and gaining trust from the general public as
crucial to the implementation of any road user-charging fee. They also detail other key
issues relating to the implementation of road user charging such as having a sympathetic local
environment regarding the timing and severity of congestion and the technology requirements
and privacy concerns of the type of charging scheme.
There is a need for both a theoretical framework and empirical evidence that demon-
strates the eectiveness of congestion pricing, the expected welfare eects from congestion
pricing, as well as the likelihood of acceptability. The empirical data ought to control for
individual beliefs when examining individual subjective perceptions to the objective eects
of a congestion policy. A lack of empirical evidence of the eectiveness of congestion pricing
policies reinforces the perception of the political infeasibility of introducing such policies,
thus handicapping and preventing congestion pricing policies from being implemented more
in practice. Only with a better understanding of the foundations of congestion pricing can
the potential benets be condently and openly communicated so that congestion pricing
will be more likely to be implemented and accepted in practice. Moreover, there is a need to
better understand what drives an individual's acceptability of congestion pricing than just
welfare predictions.
3
This dissertation proposes to theoretically illustrate the potential benets of congestion
pricing and empirically explore the eectiveness and behavioral motivations for the accept-
ability of congestion pricing. It contributes to the literature by investigating theoretically and
empirically the behavioral motivations for why barriers to implementing eciency-enhancing
congestion pricing policies currently exist. Three research questions motivate the three chap-
ters of the dissertation:
• Does experience of congestion pricing predict acceptability or do personal traits
predict acceptability?
• What makes congestion pricing eective and why would anyone be opposed to such
an eciency-enhancing policy?
• What motivates an individual to want to opt in or opt out of a congestion pricing
policy when equity eects are endogenously determined?
The rst question is addressed in Chapter 2 using empirical data generated from a labora-
tory experiment. Chapter 3 use a game-theoretical approach to answer the second question.
And Chapter 4 addresses the third question by generating empirical data in a laboratory
experiment using the model described in Chapter 3. All three chapters address how im-
portant equity concerns are to overcoming the hurdle of public acceptability of congestion
policy. Chapters 2 and 4, in addition, investigate whether personal attributes or self-interest
determine the acceptability of a congestion pricing.
The dissertation will incorporate and build upon the immense existing theoretical and
empirical transportation literature (Small and Verhoef, 2007). Much of the literature on
congestion pricing in transportation uses the bottleneck congestion model rst introduced
by Vickrey (1969) that examines departure times for a single route. It has been improved
4
upon recently by Arnott et al. (1990b), and it illustrates the tradeo motorists face between
travel time and schedule delay (arriving early or late). The model provides theoretical predic-
tions of outcomes and welfare implications with and without congestion pricing. It has been
developed to incorporate heterogeneous users in travel time preferences, scheduling prefer-
ences, parking, and other additions. Other transportation literature examines route-choice
behavior in transportation networks empirically and sometimes in laboratory environments
(Small and Verhoef, 2007; Anderson et al., 2008; Hartman, 2012).
These chapters contribute to the growing literature of investigating the acceptability of
incentive-based environmental policies. Congestion pricing is not limited to transportation,
but has numerous applications such as tables at popular restaurants, ski lift lines, tickets
to popular events, as well as the management of environmental and natural resources. The
experiments from Chapters 2 and 4 contribute to the modest but growing literature of ex-
amining congestion pricing using laboratory experiments. Moreover, the two experiments
make a signicant contribution by incorporating the cultural cognition thesis research (Ka-
han et al., 2011, 2012). Kahan et al. (2012) nd that public divisions over the risk of climate
change stem from values of characteristic of groups with which they identify rather than com-
prehension of the problem itself. Kahan et al. (2011) examine how cultural cognition shapes
individuals beliefs about the existence of scientic consensus relating to climate change, the
disposal of nuclear waste, and the eect of permitting concealed possession of handguns. The
data collected from the experiments in Chapters 2 and 4 are used to match an individual's
cultural cognition measures as well as other belief measuring altruism and sensitivity toward
the environment to their voting behavior (acceptability) of congestion pricing. I argue that
grouping individuals based on their answers to these sensitive questions that gauges their
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Source: Figure 5 from Börjesson et al. (2012).
Figure 1.1. Interactions Between Attitudes, Travel Behavior And The Ob-
jective Eects Of The Charges
personal beliefs is more dependable, accurate, and transferable method of understanding
behaviors than individuals self-identifying themselves by political ideology or party.
Understanding what determines an individual's opinion on congestion pricing and how
their opinion evolves is important for policy-making. Figure 1.1 depicts a ow diagram from
Börjesson et al. (2012) that suggests how attitudes toward congestion pricing are determined.
It shows that individual characteristics and preferences (e.g., personal beliefs) can aect
attitudes, but there may be a feedback loop from the perceived (subjective) eects from
experiencing congestion pricing. This feedback may evolve over time. Chapters 2 and 4
investigate the evolution of this feedback loop.
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The culmination of these chapters will provide economists and policymakers the behav-
ioral motivations on why there exists an apprehensiveness to implement potentially eciency-
improving congestion pricing. This dissertation will incorporate both theoretical approaches
of looking at route-choice decisions and departure-time decisions to answer the primary re-
search questions. Chapter 2 uses a two-route network in a laboratory experiment to examine
the eectiveness of congestion policy on route-choice decisions and the evolution of accept-
ability of a toll (congestion pricing). The chapter makes a contribution by providing an
innovative experimental design that allows for incentive-compatible observations of the evo-
lution of approval rates (acceptability) when inequities are exogenous imposed. Chapter 3
formally develops a three-player bottleneck congestion game with and without congestion
pricing. The chapter critically examines the game theory perspective rst introduced by
Levinson (2005) and adds to the literature by describing and illustrating the endogenous
welfare eects and principles of congestion pricing of a three-player game instead of a two-
player game. Having more than two players creates unique congestion scenarios that do
not exist in a two-player game framework. Chapter 4 applies the three-player bottleneck
congestion model developed in Chapter 3 to a laboratory experiment. The experiment ex-
amines the performance of group departure times and the acceptability of congestion tolls
when inequities are determined endogenously. Chapter 4 compares theoretical game theory
predictions to empirical results as well as investigating the motivations on why individu-




Acceptability of Congestion Pricing: Worldviews
Versus Experience
2.1. Introduction
Urban congestion is a growing problem that creates many external costs. Congestion
pricing is seen as a potential solution. Although congestion pricing, with correctly set prices
works in theory and in textbooks, it is only sporadically implemented in practice. Barriers
such as public acceptability, political feasibility, a general understanding of the congestion
problem, and uncertainty of the eectiveness of congestion pricing instruments prevail de-
spite growing congestion costs. According to the 2012 Urban Mobility Report (Schrank et al.,
2012) 5.9 billion hours were lost in 2011 from the additional travel time from congestion in
the United States and 2.9 billion gallons of fuel were wasted. This increased fuel consump-
tion in turn released an additional 26 million metric tons of carbon dioxide, which is the
equivalent to six times the annual greenhouse gas emissions that is estimated to be saved
by the removal of conventional vehicles by the current eet of hybrid and electric vehicles in
2013 (Hall, 2013). The Urban Mobility Report estimates average annual costs of congestion
in 2011 to be $818 per United States commuter compared to an inated-adjusted cost of $342
in 1982.1 Despite the various successes highlighted in a recently sponsored United States
Federal Highway Administration technical report of metropolitan areas eectively managing
congestion (Mahendra et al., 2012), congestion pricing policy proposals remain hindered by
equity and fairness concerns.
1Time-delay costs are found to be the largest external costs from congestion when compared to other external
costs borne by users and non-users of vehicle travel (Small and Verhoef, 2007)
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Congestion pricing is argued to be an ecient tool to tackle the congestion problem and
lessen its costs by optimizing road use (and congestion). The theoretical understanding that
adding a congestion tax, or toll, on a road can improve outcomes has been around since Pigou
(1924), and since then the welfare impacts have been studied extensively (Small and Verhoef,
2007). Set at the correct level, congestion pricing equals the marginal external congestion
cost a traveler creates so that all trips made provides benets as least as great as its social
costs (Small and Verhoef, 2007). Examples of congestion pricing policies used in practice
include cordon zone pricing of a central business district, variable pricing (or peak pricing)
of toll roads, variable pricing of high occupancy toll (HOT) lanes (i.e., express lanes), and
responsive pricing to manage parking demand.
Despite the potential eciency improvements, congestion pricing creates distributional
and fairness concerns since some groups are made worse o (Hau, 1992; Small and Verhoef,
2007). Referring to the classic short run bottleneck congestion model, Hau (1992) mentions
that under normal trac conditions and if the road pricing revenue is put aside, then
an optimal toll achieves an ecient outcome but would denitely make society worse o.
However, in a review on how equity concerns of road pricing, Levinson (2010) nds that such
welfare and equity concerns can be addressed by the way collected toll revenues are recycled
back into society. Yet a tradeo exists between alleviating fairness and equity concerns via
redistribution of revenue and improving system eciency when designing a pricing policy.
Policymakers have to weigh the political feasibility of a congestion policy. Levinson (2010)
remarks that the perception of what constitutes equity is highly subjective and satisfying
some subsets of the general population is necessary to obtain acceptability of a congestion
pricing policy.
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The lack of public acceptability may stem from a general misunderstanding of the Pigou-
vian objective of a congestion pricing instrument and the uncertainty surrounding the eec-
tiveness of congestion pricing since the public have never been accustomed the eects of the
policy. Many papers investigate the public acceptability of incentive-based mechanisms that
deal with congestion (Schade and Schlag, 2003; Marcucci and Marini, 2001; Ison and Rye,
2005; Winslott-Hiselius et al., 2009; Larson and Sasanuma, 2010; Anas and Lindsey, 2011;
Kallbekken et al., 2011). A 2013 study exploring the public opinion of congestion pricing
was carried out by the National Capital Region Transportation Planning Board in partner-
ship with the Brookings Institute using deliberative forums in Washington, DC.2 The study
found that participants were generally unaware of how transportation is funded and that
the federal gasoline tax has not been raised in twenty years and is not indexed to ination.
Moreover, other studies have shown tax aversion of eciency improving Pigouvian policies
have been observed empirically (Kallbekken et al., 2011; Cherry et al., 2012). There appears
to be a general reluctance to raise usage taxes. Yet the implementation of congestion pricing
in practice has had mixed outcomes in its eectiveness and acceptability. Congestion pric-
ing has been successfully implemented and accepted in Stockholm, London, and Singapore,
while it has failed in places like Edinburgh, Hong Kong, and Manhattan.
Although observing both the performance and acceptability of congestion pricing at
an individual level in the real world would be ideal, such data collection would be too
costly and almost impossible to implement. Falk and Heckman (2009) argue that laboratory
experiments complements other empirical methods and data sources in the social sciences.
Laboratory experiments allow for a low nancial and political cost alternative. They create
2What Do People Think About Congestion Pricing? National Capital Region Transportation Planning Board
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments. September 2013. http://www.mwcog.org/uploads/pub-
documents/pl5cWl820131118131930.pdf
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a controlled environment that can examine actual incentive-compatible behavior and can
be used to examine how policies would perform and be accepted in the real world. Instead
of implementing a politically risky and potentially expensive pilot programs, policymakers
would be interested in utilizing such laboratory investigations to guide their policy making
when campaigning for successful and publicly acceptable congestion pricing policies.
This chapter examines why there is a decient use of congestion pricing by answering
three questions regarding the eectiveness and acceptability of congestion pricing. These
questions are addressed by employing a two-route congestion game that contains inequitable
outcomes. That is, the welfare and behavioral eect of a toll varies by individual and to a
varying degree where the toll can sometimes make some individuals worse o. First, does
congestion pricing (a toll on a congestible route) work in the lab? Second, does experience
inuence acceptability? Third, do individual attributes determine the acceptability of tolls
and does this acceptability evolve when an individual becomes accustomed to the problem
and policy?
The two-route congestion game emulates a tragedy of the commons where groups of six
individuals with heterogeneous time preferences choose between two routes where one route
is shorter but congestible and the other route has a longer but constant travel time. Subjects
make decisions on which route to take based on their value of time and expected travel time
costs. Travel time costs are a function of the individual's route-choice and the route-choices
of the other members in their group. Groups participate in three rounds of 10 periods of
making route-choices where only one of three rounds is randomly selected to count towards
a subject's monetary earnings. Groups experience the game with and without tolls whilst
deciding using three potentiality binding referendum votes on whether the last round should
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have a toll. Votes occur before and after experiencing the game and congestion problem
without tolls on the congestible route, and then after the second round when everyone has
experienced the game with and without tolls. Groups see all voting outcomes only after the
third vote is cast, and that is when one of the three votes is selected to be binding using a
random selection process. The votes are important; they provide a measure of the evolution
of the acceptability of the toll by rst obtaining an initial stated preference of tolls given
exogenous characteristics, and then any changes in attitudes from being accustomed to the
congestion problem and the congestion pricing policy.
A 2× 2 treatment experiment design is utilized to address the above research questions.
Dierent expected welfare eects from the toll are varied based on how much toll revenue is
redistributed lump-sum: all individuals should either all be better o by varying amounts
(100% revenue redistribution) or some individuals are made better or worse o by varying
amounts (40% revenue redistribution). The other variation of treatments is aimed at an-
swering the last two research questions on voting behavior by investigating an individual's
reaction if they observe the welfare eects and inequities from the toll of all members of their
group. One treatment has, before the third vote, information on the individual's average
total costs between the rst two rounds and how much their costs change from the toll. The
alternative treatment discloses the same performance information for the individual, but also
discloses ranked performance information of all six members in the group. Individuals might
react and vote dierently and not in their self-interest if they see the toll creates inequities.
At the end of the experiment, survey responses from questions that gauges an individual's
cultural worldviews (Kahan et al., 2011), altruism, and views of the environment (Kotchen
and Moore, 2007), their political ideology, as well as other demographic information were
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collected. These responses are paired with an individual's voting behavior to investigate
whether individual beliefs predict an individual's evolution of acceptability of congestion
pricing. This chapter contributes to the literature by both being the rst the test the eect
of a toll on congestion performance of heterogeneous users, and by designing an experiment
to allow for the observation of the evolution of acceptability using incentive-compatible votes.
The results show that the tolls achieve the objective of reducing congestion and increasing
societal welfare. Given their externally endowed preferences, no robust pattern of subjects
voting based on their self-interest for the rst vote was observed. Being accustomed to
the congestion problem and the toll matters in determining the acceptability of a toll, and
that self-interest, unsurprisingly, appears to be a major determinant after individuals are
accustomed to the problem and are provided a measure of the toll's eects on their costs.
However, some individuals did not vote in their own self-interest. Lastly, personal attributes
and beliefs were not a major determinant on initial feelings of congestion pricing; however,
these attributes did become signicant after everyone became accustomed to the congestion
problem.
These results provide experimental evidence to the lessons of understanding the issues
inuencing the implementation of road user charging as outlined by Ison and Rye (2005).
Such (laboratory) experimental methods contribute to the literature and help policymakers
understand that positive or negative experiences of the congestion policies matter. A conges-
tion pricing instrument and the redistribution of toll revenue ought to be carefully designed
to make it acceptable so that the majority of the eected population benets. Personal
attributes matter, but appear to matter only after an individual has a chance to be accus-
tomed to a problem. Whether initial attitudes on congestion pricing are based on personal
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beliefs, cultural worldviews, and group association remains an open question. Moreover, the
controlled environment in the experiment does not examine whether acceptance may rely
on outside inuences such as local political party aliation and their position on congestion
pricing, an individual's geographical location and proximity to congestion tolls, and local
opinions.
Provided in the following sections are a review of eld and experimental literature on
the performance and acceptability of congestion pricing (Section 2.2), an explanation of the
theoretical two-route congestion model used in the experiment (Section 2.3) and the design
of the experiment (Section 2.4). Section 2.5 provides the empirical results, and the chapter
concludes with Section 2.6.
2.2. Literature Review
2.2.1. Field. The experience in Stockholm provides a telling story on how the eciency-
enhancing eects of a Pigouvian toll policy and of the experience the policy led to an evolution
of public opinion and eventual success of the program. After a one-year pilot program in 2006,
a referendum to keep the congestion policy permanent overcame an initial negative view and
passed. Before the pilot program a poll showed 36 percent favorability, after the pilot the
referendum to keep the congestion policy permanent passed with 51.3 percent of inhabitants
of the city of Stockholm approving, and a 2011 poll showed more than seventy percent
approve the tolls (Winslott-Hiselius et al., 2009; Börjesson et al., 2012). The referendum
passed despite some regressive eects of the policy identied by Karlström and Franklin
(2009), who assessed the horizontal and vertical equity eects of the Stockholm Trial. Anas
and Lindsey (2011) nd that road pricing is more likely to be accepted in cities like Stockholm
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which have good existing public transport since those that do not pay tolls will gain if toll
revenues are earmarked towards public transportation.
Congestion is seen as a growing problem in many cities, yet many attempts for conges-
tion pricing on roads and urban areas have failed. Proposals for cordon zones in Manhattan,
Chicago, and San Francisco are occasionally considered but never get full interest from polit-
ically minded policymakers. San Francisco's demand-response parking pilot program started
in 2011 and it used variable (responsive) pricing to manage demand of on-street and o-street
parking. The program did achieve some of its intended objectives of decrease occupancy and
cars cruising for parking, but the program still has many critics and the acceptability of the
program is unknown.3 However, a November 2014 proposition that changes transportation
and parking priorities in San Francisco (Measure L) to prevent policies used by the parking
pilot program was rejected by 62.9 percent of voters.4 The experience in Hong Kong, Edin-
burgh, and Manchester provides cautionary tales of implementing congestion tolls. Voters
in Edinburgh in 2005 and Manchester in 2008 rejected proposals for cordon zone schemes.
(Gaunt et al., 2007; Anas and Lindsey, 2011). Gaunt et al. (2007) reviewed self-reported
questionnaires and found the principal determinant of voting behavior in Edinburgh was car
use. They nd that the pricing scheme was seen as too overly complex and that car owners
did not understand the potential benets.
The experience in Hong Kong was similar to the Stockholm experience except the elec-
tronic road pricing program was repealed. Despite having a 21-month long trial run starting
in July 1983, Hong Kong had several contributing reasons for why their electronic road pric-
ing system failed even though the reported benet-cost ratio of the policy was a ratio of 14 to
3SFpark Pilot Project Evaluation. June 2014. http://sfpark.org/about-the-project/pilot-evaluation/.
4http://www.sfelections.org/results/20141104/. Accessed March 10, 2015
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1 (Hau, 1990): a weakening economy, the distributional concerns from some vehicles receiv-
ing exemptions, the lack of public outreach, and distrust of government's promise of fullling
earmarks. Even with the positive objective results from road pricing reducing congestion by
time of day and location, the policy could not overcome the hurdle of public acceptability.
However, Ison and Rye (2005) nd in the literature discussing the Hong Kong experience
that the severity of the congestion problem was exaggerated, making for the wrong backdrop
to implement a successful policy.
People also have mixed feelings of congestion pricing mechanisms like HOT lanes and
responsive pricing for parking. HOT lanes are often touted as Lexus lanes for their regres-
sivity. Others believe that increasing the prices of road-use or parking makes the system less
fair and equitable. In parking for example, some would prefer a system of underpriced parking
where all income groups have a chance to search and nd aordable parking.5 Policymakers
sometimes alleviate these concerns at the expense of eciency by allowing exemptions to
some groups. Other ocials avoid issues of income inequality created by pricing altogether
by having quota policies instead using high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes (i.e., carpool
lanes) as opposed to HOT lanes. For example, unlike the priced cordon zone in London, the
cordon zone in Jakarta, Indonesia, is based on passenger occupancy of the vehicle and not
prices.6
Equity issues can be addressed with intelligent mechanism design that provides both the
right incentives and the allocation of collected revenues achieve desired equitable ends (Levin-
son, 2010). When discussing comprehensive pricing of roads, Levinson (2010) suggests that
5Leon Neyfakh, The case for the $6 parking meter, Boston Globe. January 15, 2012.
6Sandy Hausman, Poor Indonesians make money in Jakarta's trac as jockeys, Public International Radio.
September 8, 2011. http://www.theworld.org/2011/09/poor-indonesians-make-money-in-jakartas-trac-as-
jockeys/
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revenue recycling oers a way of alleviating adverse equity impacts of drivers having to avoid
a toll by switching modes, destinations, or time of day. Many strategies of allocating revenue
to relieve inequity and also increasing public acceptability have been suggested (Levinson,
2010). Small and Verhoef (2007) nd evidence that British citizens prefer revenue earmarked
towards nancing public transportation, while people in the U.S. prefer road construction
or tax reduction. Eliasson (2009) comments that unlike the predicted theoretical outcomes
and the imperfect nature of pricing schemes in practice, the benets from congestion pricing
do not necessarily guarantee they will outweigh the set-up and operating costs.
Public acceptability and opinion may also depend on initial understanding of congestion
tolls and public outreach and education. In 2013 the Metropolitan Washington Council of
Governments conducted a study using deliberative forums titled: What Do People Think
about Congestion Pricing? The authors of the study elicited the opinions of 300 people on
several types of congestion pricing before and after an information session and a deliberation
on congestion problems and current and projected states of transportation funding. Many
participants were unaware of how transportation is funded and the current revenue shortfall
from the federal gasoline tax not being raised in two decades. This nding provides a
glimpse on how people understand and value the problem when accustomed to it. The
study found that although acceptability increased after the deliberations (39 percent to 49
percent), negative feelings also increased (29 percent to 33 percent). The actual change
was 32 percent of people had neutral feelings towards congestion pricing and that reduced
down to 18 percent at the end of deliberations. More information and education about
congestion pricing did indeed change acceptability; these stated preferences, however, did
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not have actual outcomes at stake. The opinions of participants in our experiment, however
are incentive compatible, with money at stake.
2.2.2. Experimental Studies. Laboratory experimentswhere subjects are compen-
sated based on their performanceprovide a low-cost method of collecting data to test con-
gestion theories that would otherwise be infeasible or too costly in the real world. Several
laboratory experiments have examined route-choice, mode-choice behavior and how conges-
tion pricing, information disclosure, and a new link in transportation system aect user
travel behavior, specically, testing the Pigou-Knight-Downs, Downs-Thomson, and Braess
Paradoxes (Hartman, 2007, 2012; Ziegelmeyer et al., 2008; Selten et al., 2007; Anderson
et al., 2008; Denant-Boemont et al., 2009; Morgan et al., 2009; Dechenaux et al., 2013). No
laboratory congestion experiments that I know of incorporate voting or measures of public
acceptability. However, there are several laboratory experiments that examine factors im-
pacting acceptability of environmental policies (Kallbekken et al., 2011; Cherry et al., 2012,
2013).
Of the experimental literature, the most relevant laboratory congestion experiments on
congestion pricing use two-route networks to investigate the Pigou-Knight-Downs paradox.7
Anderson et al. (2008) and Hartman (2007, 2012) investigate the eects of an ecient toll
and information disclosure of past entrants and do nd similar results regarding the eect
of information and that the toll has their intended eects. Hartman (2006) also examines
travel behavior when individuals have heterogeneous preferences. Some experiments using
two-route networks are not interested in the eects of pricing but other observations from
congestion. For example, Selten et al. (2007) nd that route-choice decisions over a long
7Charles Holt provides a publicly accessible classroom experiment that demonstrates the eectiveness of
tolling in a congestion/entry game. (http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/)
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period of time, 200 periods, improve with the presence of information feedback on previous
road times. Most of these two-route experiments are with subjects with homogeneous values
participating in large groups of 12, 15, or 18 subjects. This experiment will have a smaller
group (six in a group) and will be rst to compare route-choice behavior of heterogeneous
individuals with and without a toll.
Recent laboratory experiments examining public acceptability of Pigouvian have provided
contributions on the factors that contribute to the (un)acceptability of Pigouvian policies.
Cherry et al. (2012) found that experience of a trial run of a Pigouvian tax increases the
acceptability of the tax and that the positive experience can overcome misperception and
biases. Kallbekken et al. (2011) found that a lack of understanding of the workings and eects
of a Pigouvian tax instrument does not inuence the opposition of such policies. These
experiments also observed Pigouvian tax aversionopposition to taxes that can increase
individual and social welfare. The existence of this aversion challenges the behavioral notion
that people act on their own self-interest. This result reveals a barrier in implementing
potentially ecient policies. This research contributes by examining personal attributes that
may aect acceptability as well have a context where a policy either creates all winners
or winners and losers with unequal outcomes. Explaining why someone does or does not
vote on their own self-interest by identifying and matching a person's voting behavior and
their beliefs motivates this research.
2.3. Theoretical Model
A two-route congestion model is used where Route A is congestible while the other route,
Route B, is not. The travel time of Route A, TTa, depends on the number of Route A users,
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x, and is found by:
(1) TTa = a+ bx
where a and b are time parameters.
The travel time, TTb, of Route B is constant at c. The user equilibrium without tolls
follows Wardrop's rst principle, which states that for a origin-destination (OD) pair all used
routes (those with positive ows) should have equal average cost, and there should be no
unused routes with lower costs (Small and Verhoef, 2007). That is, the user equilibrium is
when the travel times of the two routes are equal. This occurs when the number of Route
A entrants equals x∗ = (c − a)/b. But the user equilibrium is not optimal; there exists a
marginal external congestion cost, b, that increases the total travel time of previous Route
A entrants that users are not accounting for. The social planner minimizes total travel time,
TT , of N users by solving
(2) Min
x
TT = x(a+ bx) + (N − x)c
The optimal number x∗∗ of Route A users is exactly half than the user equilibrium, x∗,
where x∗∗ = (c−a)/2b. This is where the externality or marginal social cost (MSC), b, of each
additional user is equal to the time savings of taking Route A over Route B. The marginal
private cost is assumed to be zero making the marginal social cost, b, being identical to the
the marginal external (congestion) cost. Implementing the optimal toll follows Wardrop's
second principle, which states that in a system optimum, all used routes for an OD-pair have
identical marginal costs equal to the marginal benets for that OD-pair, and there are no
unused routes with marginal costs lower than this (Small and Verhoef, 2007). The toll is
20
equal to additional travel time Route A users have to pay to achieve the system optimum.
By substituting x∗∗ in the time savings of using Route A also known as the user's marginal
private benet (MPB), c− a + bx, an optimal toll (measured in travel time) of (c− a)/2 is
obtained.8
Putting dollar values on time follows the same theoretical framework and allows for tolls
to take on a monetary value and to have users with heterogeneous values of time. With
travel time monetized, the social planner then can minimize total social costs rather than
travel time. That is, each user's travel time is multiplied by their respective values of time.
If using heterogeneous values of time, it is ambiguous what ecient toll to use. It is also
ambiguous whether the toll should be based on the group's average value of time or the value
of time of the marginal user entering Route A. The toll can take on multiple values as long as
it achieves the social planner's objective of obtaining the optimal number (or intended users)
of Route A intended users, which minimizes system wide total travel costs.9 Furthermore,
the method and rate of revenue redistribution to individuals may aect their incentives and
undermine the social planner's objective.
Having a small group of users, where N is less than x∗, with heterogeneous time pref-
erences generates inequitable impacts from the toll. Anderson et al. (2008), Hartman (2007,
2012), and Selten et al. (2007), did not use a small group of users and instead used groups
larger than the predicted number of users entering the congestible route without a toll, x∗.
8The Hartman (2007, 2012) experiments have a treatment where subjects have to physically wait the extra
time.
9The marginal external congestion costs of large populations are typically assumed to be convex. The small
group environment in the lab makes it dicult to design a transportation system that achieves pure strategy
Nash equilibria for both institutions with and without a congestion toll without creating enormous dierences
in player endowments. Having a non-convex linear marginal external congestion costs function still creates
large dierences in travel times between Route A and Route B users, but for the purpose of answering the
stated research questions, these dierences will be unreasonably large if marginal external costs are convex.
The current model and experimental design creates conditions sucient to answer the proposed research
questions.
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As predicted by the equilibrium condition stated by Wardrop's rst principle, users will then
x∗ users will enter Route A where all users will have the same travel costs. However, by
having N users less than x∗ ensures welfare impacts of a toll before revenue redistribution
and for users to clearly identify and understand the congestion problem since no user will
have the incentive to enter Route B without a toll. The experiment uses N = 6, a = 4,
b = 1, c = 12 as the parameters of the congestion game. The six individuals are split into
users with high values of time 12, 11, and 10 tokens per minute and users with low value of
time 4, 3, and 2 tokens per minute. These values of times, the congestion toll, and redistri-
bution rates are selected for the intended welfare eects and the existence and uniqueness
of pure strategy Nash equilibria both with and without the toll.10 These parameters create
the possible travel time outcomes displayed in Table 2.1. A user's travel cost is then their
travel time multiplied by their value of time.
Consider the intuition for the possible travel outcomes detailed in Table 2.1. Without
a toll, Route B is always inferior to Route A and all six users will use Route A creating a
total travel time of 10 minutes for each of the six users, or 60 total minutes. The theoretical
optimal outcome is for four entrants, or for 4 people to use Route A and two to go Route
B. However, with the experiment's given values of times for the six participants (2, 3, 4,
10, 11, and 12 tokens per minute), the optimal level is for the three high-value users to use
Route A and the three low-value users to use Route B. The user equilibrium yields a total
social travel time cost of 420 tokens, while the travel time cost minimizing value is 339. The
price of anarchy (the ratio of user equilibrium and social optimal) in terms of travel costs, a
10The predicted pure strategy Nash equilibrium if N > 8 is for eight users to enter Route A, however a Nash
equilibrium exists in mixed strategies. By having N less than eight ensures a unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium and should allow all individuals have the same experience without a toll.
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Table 2.1. Possible Travel Time Outcomes (N=6, a=4, b=1, and c=12)
Total Travel Time
(in minutes)







measure of ineciency compared to the social optimal is 1.234. This measure states that the
theoretical predicted user equilibrium without any intervention is 23.4 percent inecient.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the two-route problem by showing the marginal benet and marginal
costs for each Route A entrant for heterogeneous users with values of times of 12, 11, 10, 4,
3, and 2 in descending order. Notice the time externalitythe marginal social cost increases
for each additional user entering Route A. The externality that is imposed on users currently
taking Route A is reected by the decline in the marginal benet function. Users do not
internalize this externality, therefore all six users will use Route A since they will gain positive
marginal private benets. However, to incentivize users in the system to obtain the social
optimal, a toll should be placed 50 ≥ toll > 16 ignoring any cost adjustments users may
make from revenue redistribution.
In this two-route network with heterogeneous users, an ecient toll reduces total group
costs but makes some users worse o. Notice that without any revenue redistribution, the
increased costs from a toll paid by those three highest-value users entering Route A is still
socially superior in minimizing total costs than the user equilibrium without any toll revenue
redistribution. However, the three low-value of time users taking Route B are worse o from





















1 2 3 4 5 6
1
Figure 2.1. Graphical Representation of MPB and MSC
redistribution can compensate some or all of those losses. As described in the next section,
I chose a 21-token toll and manipulated the level of lump-sum redistribution (100% or 40%)
to obtain the desired welfare eects for addressing the objectives of this study.
2.4. Experimental Design
To answer the three research questions, an environment is designed so that both, route-
choice decisions and voting behavior, can be examined. Subjects are assigned to groups of
six for the entire experiment, and each subject makes a total of 33 decisions. Table 2.2
summarizes the timeline of the experiment. Subjects participated in three ten-period stages
in which they make route-choice decisions. There is no toll in the rst stage, while in the
second stage a 21-token toll is imposed for those users using Route A. It is up to the group of
six to determine whether there will be a toll in the third stage. At the end of the experiment,
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10 Periods 10 Periods 10 Periods
No Toll Toll Toll or no toll
one of the three stages is randomly chosen to determine the subjects' monetary payos. This
gives each vote more signicance compared to if the monetary outcomes were determined by
the sum of the performance of all three stages.
As seen in Table 2.2, participants are given a chance to vote three times to determine
what happens in the third stage. The vote elicits an individual's acceptability of a toll
before experiencing the congestion problem, after experiencing the congestion problem, and
nally after experiencing what happens after the toll. The design emulates the experience
in Stockholm 2006, with the second vote resembling the pre-trial olls and the third vote
as the equivalent to the after-trial referendum. The rst vote, however, tries to gauge an
individual's stated preference of an abstract environmental tax (i.e., their knee-jerk reaction
to an environmental policy). A group's voting outcomes are not revealed until after the third
vote is cast. At that time, the experimenter has a volunteer roll a die to determine which of
the three votes count for all groups in the session.11 Each vote is then potentially binding,
which provides an incentive-compatible measure of how an individual feels about the toll.
Since there are groups of six, a volunteer is asked to pull from a deck of cards to determine
what the tiebreaker would be if any group in the session has a 3-to-3 tie for chosen vote.
The design mitigates any endogeneity concerns for how an individual performs in Stage 1
and 2; the examination of voting behavior ends after the 20th period with the exception of
11A session's binding stage is chosen using the same process at the entire experiment and after survey
questions have been answered.
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Table 2.3. Treatments
Information on how the toll
aects individual average
costs before 3rd Vote
Information on how the toll
aects individual average




8 group of 6 subjects 8 group of 6 subjects
40% Redistribution
(Winners and Losers)
8 group of 6 subjects 8 group of 6 subjects
the survey given at the end of the experiment. The third stage exists primarily as a possible
binding outcome that can elicit both an individual's stated and revealed preferences.
The experiment follows a 2 × 2 design that varies the welfare impacts of the toll and
the disclosed information of the eect of the toll. As shown in the theoretical section, the
level of the toll and the redistribution rate can vary to achieve intended welfare eects of
the toll (see Table 2.3). There exists two settings: one where all participants are better
o and are all winners with the toll (100% toll revenue redistribution) and another where
there are winners and losers of the toll (40% toll revenue redistribution). To motivate
research questions on voting behavior, a treatment varies the information that is disclosed
immediately before the third vote. In one session the individual sees their average total
costs of Stages 1 and 2 and the percentage change in costs, in the other they see their cost
information as well as the same information for all six individual group members ranked
by highest cost reduction. Observing varying outcomes of other members of the group may
entice some individuals to value their experience dierently and vote counter to what they
otherwise would have.
The earnings of individuals depend on their decisions and their value of time. Each
individual is privately provided their endowment for that period. However, the language in
the experiment focuses on (adjusted) cost reductions rather than changes in earnings. Most
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of the discussion of congestion pricing is on the reduction in costs and not on the increase
in consumer surplus or earnings.
Table 2.4 reports the net earnings calculations without the toll and the theoretically
predicted welfare eects by individual values of time and redistribution rates. These welfare
impacts assume rational agents and are the dierences in net earnings when comparing the
Nash equilibria with and without the 21-token toll. Note that without a toll, all earnings
are the same for all individuals and the welfare impacts with the toll are not perfectly
correlated with an individual's value of time. Individuals with the lowest values of time are
not the worst o with a toll. Although the experiment's model considers value of travel time
preferences and not schedule delay preferences, van den Berg and Verhoef (2011) nd that
with heterogeneity in value of schedule delays the welfare impacts of rst-best pricing are
not perfectly correlated with value of time; welfare impacts depended on relative values of
schedule delay and travel time preferences. Similar to this model's prediction, they nd that
those with intermediate values of times were the worst o.
Table 2.4 suggests that self-interested individuals should always vote for the toll when
there is 100% redistribution since everyone gains, while in treatments with 40% redistribution
the individuals with a value of 3 and 4 tokens per minute should always vote against the
toll. The level of the toll and the given parameters were selected because of their specic
welfare eects as seen in Table 2.4 and to observe how sensitive individuals are to them.12
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). Subjects are given and read aloud the Instructions that also had practice questions
12Parameters where individuals had a value of time of 10, 9, 8, 4, 3, and 2 tokens per minute and toll of 24
tokens with a one-third redistribution rate or to have a higher toll of 28 tokens for the current experiment
was considered. The current experiment's parameters of value of time of 12, 11, 10, 4, 3, and 2 tokens
per minute and a toll of 21 tokens with a two-fths redistribution rate was selected because of their more
interesting inequality eects. All these parameters achieve a binding toll that obtains cost-minimizing social
costs.
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Table 2.4. Individual Welfare Eects From The Toll (In Tokens)










































(-16.0%) (-21.3%) (+76.8%) (+102%)




(-14.7%) (-20.5%) (+64.8%) (+90%)




(-13.2%) (-19.5%) (+52.8%) (+78%)




(+9.5%) (-6.3%) (-15.2%) (+10%)




(+6.0%) (-15.0%) (-7.2%) (+18%)




(-1.0%) (-32.5%) (+0.8%) (+26%)
*Participants are unaware of the endowment values of other individuals in their group.
that emphasized the possible outcomes of route-choice decisions and the congestion problem.
To prevent anchoring, no question showed a positive (or negative) individual welfare impact
of the toll.13 At the beginning of the experiment individuals knew their endowment, their
value of time, and how their value of time compared to the values of other group members.
All subjects knew that these values would not change throughout the entire experiment.
In each period of a stage, subjects were asked which route to take: Route A or Route B.
Before each decision, subjects were provided the possible time outcomes listed in Table 2.1
as well as their private travel costs without considering a toll for each possible outcome, and,
if applicable, the level of the toll and redistribution rate. After a decision is made, subjects
received feedback on which route they took, the number of Route A users, their travel time,
and their travel costs for that period, and if applicable, the period toll revenue generated,
their share of toll revenue, and adjusted travel costs after redistribution. Subjects were also
given the option to see their history of previous decisions and number of entrants of Route A
13A copy of the Instructions for the 100% revenue redistribution treatment is provided in Appendix A.4.
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Figure 2.2. Screenshot Of Route-Choice Decision Feedback
entrants (see Figure 2.2). Anderson et al. (2008) found that providing information disclosure
on previous entrants during a period allowed for more stable equilibria. Selten et al. (2007)
nd that information feedback on the previous period slightly reduced variation around the
equilibrium. Following the Börjesson et al. (2012) ow chart in Figure 1.1 from Chapter 1,
the aim of this study is to observe the evolution of public acceptability of toll over time given
the toll has its intended objective eects on route-choice decisions.
Subjects participate in three referendum votes; each vote elicits the acceptability of toll
before and after being accustomed of the congestion problem and the implementation of
a toll. The rst vote occurs after the Instructions are read and subjects are given their
endowed values. The congestion problem of what happens when an additional person uses
Route A is objectively explained as well as shown in the instruction's practice problems.
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The Instructions state that the toll is set at a level that optimizes the use of Route A.14 The
redistribution rate is also stated in the Instructions. The experimenter suggests subjects
consult Table 2.1 (given in the Instructions and shown on the laboratory projector) of possible
travel time outcomes before their rst vote. Subjects discover the level of the toll at the
rst referendum vote as well as their endowed values: value of time and where their value
of time is distributed among the group of six the level of the toll. Since before the third
vote individuals are provided information, the treatment with the ranked group information
also displays performance based on values of time. By having subjects know the size of their
value of time relative to the values of the group members throughout the entire experiment,
subjects are then reacting to the performance information rather than a discovery of the
heterogeneous information of the value of times of the other group members.
If all subjects acted as if they had perfect knowledge of the game, any simulated route-
choice decisions and votes would be obvious since all would have knowledge of Table 2.4.
However, this experiment resembles the Stockholm experience and provides a controlled
environment to examine how personal characteristics and experience (accustomation and
performance measures) aect feelings toward an environmental tax.15 The results may pro-
vide policymakers an idea of the barriers to public and political acceptability of a toll on
whose opinions are worth targeting and communicating before the implementation of a toll
and which individuals are positively or negatively aected after tolls are implemented.
14Optimize throughput at free-ow speeds was language used for explaining the toll policy goals
of California 91 Express Lanes in Orange County. The Orange County Transportation Authority.
http://www.91expresslanes.com/policies.asp. Accessed March 24, 2014.
15The laboratory setting is absent of any partisan political language and anchoring, and also does not include
geographical preferences. Someone living outside a tolled zone would be expected to have a dierent voting
preference than someone inside a tolled zone living in a central business district.
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2.5. Results
In April 2014, 192 undergraduates from Colorado State University were recruited from
Principles of Economics courses, yielding 32 group observations of 30 periods and 6336 total
individual experimental observations including 576 voting observations (192 for each of the
three votes). A session lasted seventy-ve minutes and the average compensation was $18.74
with a range of $11.75 to $30.25. One token in the experiment equals $0.06. Eight groups
of six subjects participated in each of the four treatments. The average age was 19.3 with
93 females participating. At the end of the experiment, all subjects answered a survey that
elicits demographic information and beliefs on several dimensions. The data are used to
answer three research questions investigating the performance of the toll and whether the
eect of accustomation can predict the acceptability of the toll.
2.5.1. Question 1: Does congestion pricing (a toll on a congestible route)
work in the lab? The objective of the toll is to reduce the number of entrants of Route
A users to only three, with those three entrants being the individuals with the highest values
of time. Recall that the toll incentivizes the low-value users to use Route B to minimize
their travel time costs. Without the toll, all six individuals should enter Route A, since as
was seen in Table 2.1, a travel time of 10 minutes is always less than 12 minutes. Table 2.5
reports the average number of Route A entrants and percentage entering Route A by type of
individual (all individuals, individuals with high values of timethose that should use Route
A regardless, and individuals with low values of timethose that should switch to Route B
with a toll) for the three 10-period stages. The average number of Route A entrants in Stage
1 without a toll is near 6 with an average of 5.61 entrants. The same is true for those groups
who self-selected to not have a toll in Stage 3 and which have an average of 5.88 Route A
31
entrants. The stages with a toll reduced the number of Route A entrants. In Stage 2 the
average number of entrants is 3.62 and in Stage 3 those groups that self-selected to have a
toll have an average of 3.54 entrants.
Table 2.5 also reports statistical signicance of two-sample mean tests, which measure if
the samples of two stages are statistically dierent. The declines in Route A entrants are
statistically signicant when comparing Stage 1 and Stage 2 and the endogeneous treatment
in Stage 3. Note that the optimal number of Route A users that minimizes total travel time
is four users, but with the heterogeneous values the travel-cost-minimizing level is when the
three highest-value users enter Route A. The reported average numbers of Route A entrants
with and without a tolls shows that despite some noise subjects mostly behaved according
to theoretical predictions. Subjects could be still learning the game in the early periods of a
stage and their best response or the noise could also be from idiosyncratic behavior such as
altruism.16
The results do indeed show that the users with the lowest value of time use Route A less
intensely with a toll. The average percentage of times an individual entered Route A are
reported in Table 2.5. The users with the lowest values of time shift to Route B when there
is a toll and the result is more apparent when comparing the endogenously selected no toll
and toll cases in Stage 3. In Stage 2, the users with the lowest value of time enter Route A
31.4% of the time, but when examining the last ve periods of Stage 2, the percentage of
those users entering Route A drops to 21.5%. As expected, users with the highest value of
16Indeed, when focusing on the last ve periods of a stage the results are closer to the theoretically predicted
outcomes. In regards to the idiosyncrasies of subjects, one subject in the 40% redistribution and no ranked
information treatment who had a value of time of 2 tokens per minute left the following comment regarding
their strategy: I made most of my decisions based on the idea that I wanted to make money myslef (sic) but
understood that when other[s] sacriced, I gained. So i (sic) tried to make decsions (sic) for myself about
70% of the time and help others on the other 30%. This type of altruistic behavior greatly beneted the
group; this person took the longer route at an additional travel cost of 4 tokens ($0.24) while beneting the
other ve in Route A by 40 tokens ($2.40).
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Table 2.5. Number Of Route A Entrants And Percentage of Individuals
Entering Route A
Population
No Toll Toll No Toll Toll
(Stage 1) (Stage 2) (Stage 3) (Stage 3)
Total entering Route A (out of 6)
Group of 6 5.61 3.62*** 5.88 3.54***
(320 obs.) (320 obs.) (80 obs.) (240 obs.)
Percent Entering Route A
All Individuals 93.50% 60.4%*** 97.90% 59.0%***
(1920 obs.) (1920 obs.) (480 obs.) (1440 obs.)
Low Value 92.90% 31.4%*** 99.20% 21.4%***
(2,3,4) (960 obs.) (960 obs.) (240 obs.) (720 obs.)
High Value 94.20% 89.4%***,^^^ 96.7%^ 96.7%^^^
(10,11,12) (960 obs.) (960 obs.) (240 obs.) (720 obs.)
Two-sample t-tests: ***, **, *, represent that when comparing samples across (single border)
columns of either Stage 1 and Stage 2 or within Stage 3 samples of a given population are
statistically dierent at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively; ^^^, ^^, ^, represent that
when comparing samples across adjacent (single border) rows of Low Value and High Value
individuals for a given stage are statistically dierent at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
time entered Route A almost every time, roughly greater than or equal to ninety percent of
the time across all three stages. The results suggest that individuals had similar experiences
without the toll and that the toll achieved most of the objectives of changing group behavior.
The eciency, or lack thereof, of the controlled transportation system by redistribution
rate can be measured using what is referred to as the price of anarchy (Skinner and Carlin,
2013). The price of anarchy is a ratio of user equilibrium to the social optimal of travel
times or travel costs. As was seen in Section 2.4, the social optimal of x∗∗ = 3 when
the three entrants have the highest value of time yields a minimized social time cost of 339
tokens. The predicted user equilibrium without a toll is 420 tokens, therefore the theoretically
predicted price of anarchy is 1.239. The system will be ecient if the user equilibrium is
339 resulting in a price of anarchy of 1. Table 2.6 gives the average price of anarchy by
redistribution rate. That is, when there is a toll the theoretically predicted price of anarchy
for 100% redistribution is 1 while with 40% it is 1.112. Since 60% of the toll revenue
33
Table 2.6. Measures of Ineciencies Using The Price of Anarchy
Social Optimal (SO)=339
(Parentheses: SO with 40%









All 1.218 1.143*** 1.235 1.116***










• Two-sample t-tests: ***, **, *, represent that when comparing samples across (single border)
columns of either Stage 1 and Stage 2 or within Stage 3 samples of a given population are statistically
dierent at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively; ^^^, ^^, ^, represent that when comparing samples
across adjacent (single border) rows of redistribution rates for a given stage (not in parentheses) are
statistically dierent at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
• Values without parentheses are measures relative to the predicted social optimal at total cost
of 339 tokens. Measures in parentheses assumes a higher social optimal considering the minimum
possible system cost of a system with a toll with 40% redistribution, 376.8.
is leaving the system the outcome is perceived as inecient. However, as seen in Table
2.6, and to not account for the 60% loss of revenue, a second price of anarchy measure of
the 40% redistribution rate is provided which uses a social optimal value of 376.8 tokens
instead. The experiment never identies where the revenue is allocated other than the rate
of redistribution to the subjects. Small and Verhoef (2007) mention studies that revenue
allocation being identied as a key determinant of the acceptability of congestion pricing.
As seen in Table 2.6, the toll improves the eciency of the transportation system with
the greatest improvement being observed when 100% of the toll revenue is allocated. The
improvement in eciency is smaller with 40% redistribution which can be explained by
welfare leaving the system.17 Assuming that revenue for the 40% case will be eventually
redistributed back to society, the outcome can be viewed as achieving a similar eciency
improvement as the 100% redistribution rate. Although the average results do not show
17Theoretically, any method of reallocating the toll revenue will achieve the same group travel time outcome
since these are transfer payments from the experimenter to users. Yet the method of relocation and which
group receives the transfer payments may aect the acceptability of the toll. Additional treatments could
examine the acceptability of the toll by dierent redistribution targeting across users.
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that the toll achieved the most ecient outcome on average (all price of anarchy measures
are statically dierent than 1), the improvement in eciency of the system across both
redistribution rates should aect users' acceptability, measured in votes, after experiencing
system with and without the toll.
Answer to Research Question 1: The toll improves social eciency in the lab by adequately
reducing Route A entrants to those users with the highest value of time.
2.5.2. Question 2: Does experience influence acceptability? Subjects partic-
ipate in three referendum votes; each vote elicits the acceptability of toll before and after
being accustomed of the congestion problem and implementation of a toll. The rst vote
occurs before any route decisions are made and gauges their initial taste of a toll given the
redistribution rate and the subject's exogenously imposed value of time. This vote occurs
after the Instructions are read. The congestion problem of what happens when an addi-
tional person uses Route A is explained as well as a practice problem also re-emphasizes the
congestion problem.18
Before casting their rst vote, the subject is given information regarding their value of
time and how that value of time is distributed among the group of six, the level of the toll,
and the redistribution rate. The redistribution rate is also stated in the Instructions. Before
18None of the practice questions asked how a toll would aect a user's costs. A question on the eect
of the toll could show an individual either worse o, better o, or indierent with a toll. Not including
a toll question eliminated the possibility of anchoring a subject's opinion by eliminating the exercise of
them manually comparing the welfare eects of the toll. Given a subject's value of time, their distribution
among their group, the redistribution rate, I wanted their vote to elicit their subjective opinion of tolls.
Regarding the description of the congestion problem, the Instructions state: As was shown in [Table 2.1],
each additional user of Route A increases the travel time for everyone else using Route A. For example, the
travel time for everybody when three people use Route A is 7 minutes per person. If instead four people
use Route A, then the fourth person increases the travel time for each of the original three people from 7
minutes per person to 8 minutes per person (and this fourth person also has a travel time of 8 minutes). In
other words, by choosing Route A instead of Route B, this individual increases the total travel time of those
three people in Route A by 3 minutes (1 minute each).
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the rst vote, the experimenter suggests subjects consult Table 2.1 that is in the Instructions
and is displayed on the lab's projector that reports the possible travel times outcomes.
If subjects were given perfect information on the objective eects of the toll on their
earnings, prot-maximizing individuals in the 100% redistribution should unanimously be in
favor of the toll while the individuals in the 40% redistribution rate with value of times of
3 and 4 tokens per minute should be opposed to the toll. Because of this treatment eect,
subjects are placed in one of three groups depending on their values of time: strictly better
o (values of times of 10, 11, 12), weakly better o (value of time of 2), and mixed (value
of times of 3 and 4). Table 2.7 reports the approval percentage by individual's value of time
and the redistribution rate treatment. Table 2.7 also displays the theoretically objective
eects of the toll on costs and earnings as well as the actual average percentage change in
costs by an individual's value of time. Focusing on the rst vote, their appears to be no
noticeable pattern on voting sensitivity by redistribution rate and an individual's value of
time. Surprisingly, individuals in the 40% treatment appear to be were more likely to vote
in favor of the toll compared to those individuals in the 100% treatment. For example, the
individuals with the highest value of time, 12 tokens per minute, who have the most at
stake regarding the imposition of the toll were not in favor of the toll initially in the 100%
redistribution treatment with 37.5% voted in favor. The lack of self-interest observed in
the rst vote by all individuals and whether individual attributes predict voting behavior is
explored in Research Question 3.
The second and third votes help measure the evolution of an individual's acceptability
after experiencing the congestion problem and after experiencing a toll that mitigates the
congestion problem. Since the group's voting outcomes are not revealed until after the nal
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Table 2.7. Approval Percentage of Each Vote By Predicted Outcomes Over
Individual's Value of Time
Value of time 2 3 4
Redistribution Rate 40% 100% 40% 100% 40% 100%
Predicted Change
in Earnings
0.80% 26% -7.20% 18% -15.20% 10%
Predicted Change
in Costs
-1% -32.50% 6% -15% 9.50% -6.30%
Actual Change
in Costs
13.60% -29.60% 10.90% -8.10% 15.10% -5.50%
Vote 1 56.30% 37.50% 50% 50% 56.30% 50%
Vote 2 68.80% 43.80% 56.30% 43.80% 68.80% 62.50%
Vote 3 37.50% 87.50% 12.50% 75% 12.50% 75%
Value of time 10 11 12
Redistribution Rate 40% 100% 40% 100% 40% 100%
Predicted Change
in Earnings
52.80% 78% 64.80% 90% 76.80% 102%
Predicted Change
in Costs
-13.20% -19.50% -14.70% -20.50% -16% -21.30%
Actual Change
in Costs
-3.60% -9.20% -4.60% -12.20% -5.50% -11.70%
Vote 1 62.50% 62.50% 68.80% 56.30% 56.30% 37.50%
Vote 2 62.50% 75% 62.50% 50% 68.80% 75%
Vote 3 93.80% 81.30% 62.50% 81.30% 81.50% 81.30%
Value of time ALL










Vote 1 58.30% 49.00% 53.60%
Vote 2 64.60% 58.30% 61.50%
Vote 3 50% 80.20% 65.10%
vote, each vote discloses an individual's sole acceptability of the toll independent of the
favorability of the other group members. The opinions of other individuals have no inuence
on the individual's voting behavior.19 The reported results in Table 2.7 show an increase
19In Stockholm, it is suggested that the referendum vote that passed the imposition of congestion tolls fell on
party lines. The design of this experiment wanted to keep a controlled environment that kept political party
aliation absent in the experiment. A possible treatment exploration is to examine whether the inclusion
of political party aliation to favorability of the toll in the text of the referendum vote inuences voting
behavior.
37
in favorability of the toll, even for the two individuals in the 40% redistribution treatment
where these individuals are made worse o once the toll is introduced. Across all treatments,
the percentage voting in favor of the toll increased from 56.3% in the rst vote to 61.5%
in the second vote. Perhaps the individuals now voting in favor of the toll experienced the
noticeable dierence in travel costs and gains to the system when comparing outcomes of a
period when at least one subject took Route B with a period when everyone went Route A.
Such an observation would make both the problem and the described eect of the toll more
salient.
The third vote captures the acceptability of the toll after users are accustomed to the
problem with and without the toll and with disclosure on objective measures on how the toll
aected costs.20 This vote helps reveal an individual's subjective value on the toll's objective
eects. Some of the subjects see additional information that shows the ranked information
of other individuals in their group. Table 2.7 compares the predicted change in costs to the
average actual change in costs by individual. Subjects noticeably did not minimize total
costs, but as seen in the discussion of the result of the rst research question, the toll did
achieve the intended reduction of Route A users that created varying welfare eects. Shown
in Table 2.7 and Figure 2.3, these observed and experienced eects noticeably aected the
third vote.
Due to the shorter travel times, the toll allowed the higher-time-value subjects to enjoy
lower travel costs despite payment of a toll, while the lower-time-value subjects were either
made better or worse o by taking the longer Route B depending on the redistribution rate.
As seen in Table 2.7, all individuals that expected an increase in earnings, with the exception
20Recall that before the third vote subjects are shown information that compares their average total costs
of the rst two stages and the percent change in costs.
38
(a) Strictly-Better-O Group (Value Of Time: 10, 11, 12)
(b) Mixed Group (Value Of Time: 3 and 4)
(c) Weakly-Better-O Group (Value Of Time Of 2)
Figure 2.3. Approval Rates Across Three Votes By Sub-Sample And Redis-
tribution Rate
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of people with a value of time of 11 tokens per minute in the 40% redistribution treatment,
were more likely to vote for the toll in the third vote.21 Notice that those that were predicted
to be harmed by the vote (the individuals in the 40% redistribution treatment with a value
of time of 3 and 4) dropped their favorability of the toll to 12.5% approval. The toll for the
lowest-time-value user in the 40% redistribution treatment, on average, actually increased
their costs instead of an expected decline of 0.8 percent. Their favorability of the toll at
the end is 37.5%. A noticeable dierence in favorability of the toll is observed between
redistribution rates: 80.2% favored the toll with 100% redistribution and 50% voted for the
toll in the 40% treatment (see Table 2.7).22
The evolution of voting behavior by sub-sample (individuals in the strictly-better- o,
weakly-better-o, and mixed groups) is displayed in Figure 2.3. Figures 2.3b and 2.3c show
large dierences in approval ratings between the same individual across the redistribution
treatment. The majority of the individuals with a value of time of 2 (weakly better o) did
not vote in favor of the toll in the 40% redistribution treatment since most were actually
made worse o the toll (see Table 2.7; the average cost increase in this group was 13.6%).
Although the theoretical prediction is for these individuals not to be worse o, this result
suggests that the nature of the experience of the toll matters in determining acceptability.
The nature of the experience depends on the individual and the decisions made by other
members in the group.
The full experience of being accustomed and obtaining an objective measure of the con-
gestion problem with and without the toll appears to matter; however, not all individuals
21Some subjects communicated their new found appreciation of the eect of the toll. In the 100% treatment,
a subject with a value of time of 10 tokens per minute commented in realization that they could have been
the decisive vote since only two in their group voted in favor of the toll and the tiebreaker would have chosen
a toll for the third stage: Due to the tiebreaker, I wish that I had voted for the toll earlier to maximize my
token amount.
22Appendix A.3 reports hierarchical voting decision trees by treatment sample.
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voted in their self-interest. Research question three asks, when controlling for how accus-
tomation and nature of the experience, whether individual attributes including reaction to
the ranked information treatment predicts voting behavior.
Answer to Research Question 2: Experience and accustomation of the congestion problem
with and without the toll matters; self-interest appears to be a major determinant on the
opinion of the toll.
2.5.3. Question 3: Do individual attributes determine the acceptability
of tolls and does this acceptability evolve when an individual becomes ac-
customed to the problem and policy? The observation in the previous section of not
everyone voting in their own self-interest, even after being disclosed an objective measure of
the eects of a toll for the third vote, suggests individual beliefs and attitudes may be a factor
in determining acceptability. Understanding how and when these personal attributes aect
the evolution of acceptability of a policy may make the obstacles more clear for policymakers
when implementing acceptable and ecient congestion mitigation instruments. For many
constituents, attitudes might be sensitive to feelings of government intervention, equity con-
cerns, altruism, feelings toward the environment, and political ideology. This section will test
hypotheses relating to prediction of voting behavior controlling for beliefs, accustomation of
the problem and policy, and the nature of the experience.
After the experiment, subjects participate in a survey that elicits measures of their beliefs
as well as their demographic information. The question is whether these measures as well
as the treatment that shows the group's ranked information on the eect of the toll predicts
voting behavior. The survey questions were based on research from Kahan et al. (2011)
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on how individualism and hierarchy aect opinions on scientic evidence, questions of envi-
ronmental concerns measured on the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) Scale, and questions
measuring altruism using aspects of the Schwartz's model (Kotchen and Moore, 2007), and
political ideology questions regarding economic and social issues.
Kahan et al. (2011) measures individual worldview across two dimensions: hierarchy-
egalitarianism and individualism-communitarianism. Six individual statements (individualism-
communitarianism) focus on attitudes toward social orderings that expect individuals to
secure their own well-being without assistance or interference from society versus those that
assign society the obligations to secure collective welfare and power to override compet-
ing individuals interests (Kahan et al., 2011). And six hierarchical statements (hierarchy-
egalitarianism) capture the attitudes toward social ordering that connect authority to strati-
ed social roles based on highly conspicuous and largely xed characters such as gender, race,
and class (Kahan et al., 2011). Subjects indicate the extent that they agree with each of
the statements using a six-level Likert scale which are translated to a score of 1 to 6 on their
level of agreement towards a worldview. The sum of scores for each of the statements places
their views on the respective hierarchy-egalitarianism and individualism-communitarianism
spectrums (6 to 36). These worldview measures may help explain voting behavior.
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(higher value implies more individualistic)
23.22 4.81 23 13-36
Hierarchy (6-36)
(higher value implies more hierarchical)
17.13 6.47 17 6-36
Altruism (5-25)
(higher value implies more altruistic)
17.27 3.36 13 5-25
NEP (5-25)
(higher value implies more
concern for the environment)
19.73 3.37 16 8-25
Stated Ideology (Economic Issues)
(1=Very Liberal; 5=Very Conservative)
3.08 0.92 3 1-5
Stated Political Ideology (Social Issues)
(1=Very Liberal; 5=Very Conservative)
2.73 1.07 3 1-5
Subjects' environmental concerns, altruistic values, and political ideologies were also in-
cluded. Using a ve-point scale, subjects were asked whether they agree or disagree with a
series of ve statements based on the Schwartz model of altruistic behavior (Kotchen and
Moore, 2007). Similarly, subjects indicated their concern for the environment using the same
ve-point Likert scale with a series of ve statements based from the New Ecological Par-
adigm (NEP) Scale (Kotchen and Moore, 2007). The responses for each set of respective
statements can be summed to obtain measures of general concern for the environment and
altruism (5-25). Finally, subjects were asked to state their political preferences on a lib-
eral and conservative spectrum (1=Very Liberal, 2=Liberal, 3=Moderate, 4=Conservative,
5=Very Conservative) on social and conservative issues.
Table 2.8 reports the averages of the general attitudes and worldviews. The combined
individual Kahan measures of individualisms and hierarchy are illustrated in Figure 2.4
and shows that the subjects had more individualistic feelings and were diverse on their
opinions on hierarchy. Similar to Kahan et al. (2011) and Cherry et al. (2013), the hierarchy
and individualism dimensions are combined where people that score above the median in
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Note: densities of individuals (small mark=1 subject, largest mark=5 subjects)
Figure 2.4. Correlation Of Kahan et al. (2011) Worldview Scores
both dimensions are dened as Hierarchical-Individualist and those that scored below the
median in both dimensions as Egalitarian-Communitarian.23 The statements are reported
in Appendix A.2.
A probit model with clustered errors by subject and instrumental variables is used on the
panel data to estimate the eects of these personal attributes on voting behavior (Maddala,
1983; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).24 The panel data entails 192 individuals, i, voting 3
times, t, totaling 576 observations. The errors are clustered by subject since each individual
23Cherry et al. (2013) extend these denitions further where subjects that scored in the top quartile of the
Hierarchy and Individualism measures are additionally dened as Hierarchical and Individualist, respectively,
while those that scored in the bottom quartile of each measure are dened as Egalitarian and Communitarian.
24In the literature examining voting and group behavior in the laboratory, Kallbekken et al. (2011) utilize
a conditional logit model where two of the ve have a random-eects specication and Cherry et al. (2012)
employ a linear probability model with a random-eects specication.
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makes three votes over time. The probability model is as follows:
V oteit = β0 + β1HierarchicalIndividualisti
+ β2EgalitarianCommunitariani + β3Altruismi + β4NEPi
+ β5V ote2t + β6(V ote2t ×HierarchicalIndividualisti)
+ β7(V ote2t × EgalitarianCommunitariani)
+ β8(V ote2t ×Altruismi) + β9(V ote2t ×NEPi)
+ β10V ote3t + β11(V ote3t ×HierarchicalIndividualisti)
+ β12(V ote3t × EgalitarianCommunitariani)
+ β13(V ote3t ×Altruismi) + β14(V ote3t ×NEPi)
+ β15(V ote3t × ̂Experience) + β16(V ote3t ×RankTrmti) + εit
(3)
A binary dependent variable, V oteit, is used where a yes vote equals 1 and 0 otherwise for
each i individual for one of the three votes, t. The independent variables consist of controls
for the timing of the vote or accustomation of the problem or policy, and treatment eects
that occur in the third vote. The following is a list of variables and their denitions:
• V ote2 Vote is second of three votessubject is accustomed to the problem (0 or
1)
• V ote3  Vote is the third of three votessubject is accustomed to the problem and
toll policy (0 or 1)
• Experience  An objective measure of the percentage change in individual average
costs between stage one and stage two. (-47.7 to 29.2)
• RankTrmt  Whether third vote occurs in the group ranked information treatment
 Subjects saw the eect of toll on all group members' costs. (0 or 1)
45
• HierarchicalIndividualist  Above median of both Individualism and Hierarchy
measures (0 or 1). On a scale of 6 to 36 Individualism measures attitudes toward
social orderings that expect individuals to secure their own well-being without assis-
tance or interference from society versus those that assign society the obligations to
secure collective welfare and power to override competing individuals interests. On
a scale of 6 to 36 Hierarchy measures attitudes toward social ordering that connect
authority to stratied social roles based on highly conspicuous and largely xed
characters such as gender, race, and class
• EgalitarianCommunitarian  Below median of both Individualism and Hierarchy
measures (0 or 1).
• Altruism  A measure of a subject's altruism (5-25)
• NEP  New Ecological Paradigm; general concern for the environment (5-25)
• The percent predicted change in cost by subject by redistribution treatment reported
in Table 2.7 is used to instrument for experience.
The model accounts for various experiences across subjects. In the experiment, subjects
are randomly assigned to a computer and given their value of time. They bring with them
just their idiosyncratic beliefs and behaviors. Any individual can aect their experience
as well as the experience of other players of their group by making route-choice decisions
that conict with the model's prediction. To account for this endogenous experience, the
predicted percentage change in cost of the toll reported in Table 2.7 is used for Experience
in Equation 3. Furthermore, Equation 3 is estimated for dierent sub-samples: subjects that
are predicted to be strictly better o (value of times: 10, 11, 12), weakly better o (value of
time of 2), and mixed (value of times: 3 and 4). To account for the various equity eects of
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congestion pricing stated in the literature, this approach allows for close examination of the
relationship between beliefs, accustomation, and nature of experience on acceptability.
Measures of political ideologies on economic and social economical issues are not included
in the model specication because of their high correlation to the other measures.25 Fur-
thermore, the other worldview measures allow us to assign a more accurate description of an
individual based on their responses rather than if subjects self-select their worldview or ide-
ology. Such political ideology questions or questions on party aliation make it dicult for
a researcher to objectively classify a respondent's particular worldview. Placing individuals
in groups based on answers to personal belief and worldview questions rather than utilizing
stated political aliations should provide a stronger and more externally valid empirical
analysis of the motivations of constituents' political preferences.
The coecient estimates reported in Table 2.9 are estimated by sub-sample and are used
to test hypotheses to answer the third research question on whether individual attributes
and timing of accustomation determine the acceptability of tolls. Four hypotheses are tested.
First, votes are believed to be a function of beliefs and accustomation of the problem and
policy. Second, given that subjects have not encountered this problem or understand the
severity of congestion, beliefs are a major factor in predicting the rst vote. Third, when
determining approval of the policy, subjects rely less on their beliefs after being accustomed
to the problem and policy. Fourth, subjects will vote in their self-interest after experiencing
the toll and given an objective measure of the nature of their experience.
25A principal component analysis that includes all six measures was conducted and identied two signicant
components: Right-winger (left-winger) and Environmental Libertarian/Individualist. These components
did not produce signicant coecients and their interpretation conicts with the objective of the chapter of
understanding individual's eciency and fairness perceptions.
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The sets of Wald hypothesis tests on voting behavior by sub-sample are reported in
Table 2.10. To test the rst hypothesis that personal attributes and accustomation do not
matter, the coecients for those variables are compared zero. To test the second hypothesis
that beliefs do not predict the rst vote, the coecients that measure how the four belief
measures aect the rst vote are compared to zero individually and jointly. The third
hypothesis is that accustomation and the inuence of beliefs do not change voting behavior,
and is tested in sets by comparing the coecients representing accustomation and type of
belief. Lastly, to test the fourth hypothesis that the total eect of accustomation and the
nature of experience matters in the nal vote, the coecients representing the eect of the
nature of experience on voting and the eect of the group ranked information treatment are
compared to zero. The coecient estimates of Equation 3 are reported in Table 2.9 and the
hypothesis test results are reported in Table 2.10 by sub-sample.
Across all individuals, as well as all sub-samples, individual beliefs had no signicant
eect on voting behavior for the rst vote, but these beliefs were signicant after being
accustomed to the problem. This result conicts with the expectation of subjects relying on
their knee-jerk reaction and relying on their beliefs for the vote and suggests that subjects
could be using their best guess.26 For the rst and second vote, surprisingly no signicant
pattern of initial (un)acceptability explained by beliefs for a Pigouvian policy is observed.
For all individuals, it appears that after experiencing the problem beliefs contribute to how
an individual feels about a toll policy. Those identied as Hierarchical-Individualists (10%
signicance), Egalitarian-Communitarians (1% signicance), and higher measures of altruism
(10% signicance) were signicantly more likely to vote in favor of the policy compared
26To better determine initial voting behavior, future research on voting behavior in a laboratory environment
should have a third voting option of not casting a vote. Moreover, it could also be helpful to have a monetary
cost to cast a vote.
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to the rst vote. Perhaps the group of Hierarchical-Individualists voted based on their
perception of how the policy will aect their and the group's outcomes. And the Egalitarian-
Communitarians felt more inclined to demand intervention after experiencing what they see
is a market failure. It could be that beliefs matter in determining initial feelings for a
policy, but beliefs will matter more if individuals are given the chance to be accustomed
and understand the context of the problem. After all, the Instructions explicitly describes
the externality problem, but individuals may rst want to understand the severity of the
congestion problem before condently voting in favor of a policy. This is consistent with
the Ison and Rye (2005) nding that the congestion problem needs to be severe enough for
a policy to gain acceptance. However, these eects from beliefs dissolve in the nal vote.
Being accustomed to the problem and policy did not signicantly aect voting behavior nor
did the disclosure of information of ranked group performance information. Not surprisingly,
experience appears to play a signicant role in determining the nal vote suggesting that
self-interest is a signicant component in determining acceptability.
Looking at the four hypotheses across all individuals reported in Table 2.10, it appears
only some beliefs matter. The null hypothesis that votes are not a function of accustomation
and beliefs is rejected. However, the second hypothesis that beliefs do not predict the
rst vote is not rejected. However, the hypothesis that Egalitarian-Communitarian are not
sensitive to experiencing the problem and policy is rejected. These individuals are more
likely to vote in favor of the policy after experiencing the problem than at any other time.
Lastly, several of the last group of hypotheses were not rejected. The aggregate eect of being
accustomed to the toll and the nature of the experience not aecting voting behavior being
dierent than the probability of the rst vote is not rejected. The nature of the experience
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aected the third vote while the group-ranked-information treatment had no signicant
eect. These results suggest that across all individuals certain beliefs are signicant in
predicting voting behavior only after the rst vote. Beliefs appear play a signicant role in
predicting the nal vote, while the relationship between voting and nature of an individual's
experience closely overlaps with an individual's self-interest.
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Table 2.9. Probit Coecient Estimates For Predicting Voting Behavior






(Value of time 10, 11, 12)
Mixed
(Value of time 3 and 4)
Weakly Better O
(Value of time 2)
HierarchicalIndividualist -0.20 (0.25) -0.38 (0.34) -0.38 (0.46) 0.56 (0.544)
EgalitarianCommunitarian -0.29 (0.23) -0.21 (0.35) -0.47 (0.39) 0.21 (0.62)
Altruism -0.03 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04) -0.12 (0.08) 0.00 (0.7)
NEP 0.03 (0.03) 0.04 (0.04) -0.03 (0.07) 0.10 (0.08)
Vote2 -1.10 (0.79) -1.50 (1.25) -1.87 (1.68) 0.44 (1.20)
Vote2×HierarchicalIndividualist 0.49 (0.26)* 0.74 (0.39)* 0.23 (0.42) 0.42 (0.74)
Vote2×EgalitarianCommunitarian 0.75 (0.27)*** 1.13 (0.47)** 0.95 (0.46)** -0.24 (0.36)
Vote2×Altruism 0.06 (0.03)* 0.07 (0.06) 0.12 (0.07)* 0.03 (0.06)
Vote2×NEP -0.00 (0.34) 0.01 (0.05) -0.03 (0.07) -0.02 (0.07)
Vote3 -0.55 (0.99) 0.93 (1.36) -4.90 (1.89)*** 3.50 (2.85)
Vote3×HierarchicalIndividualist 0.44 (0.35) 0.41 (0.47) 1.37 (0.71)* -1.37 (0.76)*
Vote3×EgalitarianCommunitarian 0.19 (0.32) 0.67 (0.64) 0.65 (0.49) -0.93 (1.06)
Vote3×Altruism 0.01 (0.05) -0.03 (0.06) 0.06 (0.10) 0.12 (0.13)
Vote3×NEP 0.03 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) 0.15 (0.09)* -0.20 (0.15)
Vote3×RankTrmt -0.16 (0.18) -0.31 (0.28) 0.36 (0.33) -1.40 (0.76)***
Vote3×Experience -0.01 (0.01)*** 0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.11) -0.00 (0.01)
Constant 0.06 (0.70) -0.19 (0.94) 3.03 (1.47) -2.25 (1.83)
Number of observations 576 288 192 96
Number of individuals 192 96 64 32
Chi-square 35.2 35.2 37.58 26.08
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*Signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, ***signicant at 1%
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Table 2.10. Results Of Hypothesis Tests





(Value of time 10, 11, 12)
Mixed
(Value of time 3 and 4)
Weakly Better O
(Value of time 2)
Hypothesis 1: Votes are not a function of beliefs and accustomation of the problem and policy
H0 : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 = β6 = β7 = β8 =
β9 = β10 = β11 = β12 = β13 = β14 = 0
30.28*** (14) 32.71*** (14) 34.41*** (14) 18.69 (14)
Hypothesis 2: Beliefs do not predict rst vote
H0 : β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0 3.08 (4) 2.68 (4) 5.87 (4) 2.27 (4)
Hypothesis 3: Accustomation and the inuence of beliefs do not change voting behavior
Accustomationtiming of vote
H0 : β5 = 0 1.99 (1) 1.45 (1) 1.25 (1) 0.00 (1)
H0 : β10 = 0 0.31 (1) 0.46 (1) 6.74*** (1) 1.50 (1)
H0 : β5 = β10 0.33 (1) 4.03** (1) 2.48 (1) 1.23 (1)
Hierarchical-Individualist
H0 : β1 = β6 2.46 (1) 3.08* (1) 0.66 (1) 0.02 (1)
H0 : β1 = β11 1.30 (1) 1.12 (1) 2.42 (1) 2.56 (1)
H0 : β1 = β6 = β11 2.47 (2) 3.41 (2) 2.81 (2) 4.15 (2)
Egalitarian-Communitarian
H0 : β2 = β7 5.51** (1) 3.58* (1) 3.57* (1) 0.33 (1)
H0 : β2 = β12 0.89 (1) 0.90 (1) 1.96 (1) 0.50 (1)
H0 : β2 = β7 = β12 7.76** (2) 4.04 (2) 3.58 (2) 0.50 (2)
Altruism
H0 : β3 = β8 2.41 (1) 0.81 (1) 3.32* (1) 0.05 (1)
H0 : β3 = β13 0.27 (1) 0.06 (1) 1.14 (1) 0.35 (1)
H0 : β3 = β8 = β13 3.38 (2) 2.79 (2) 3.96 (2) 0.44 (2)
NEP
H0 : β4 = β9 0.00 (1) 0.13 (1) 0.00 (1) 0.79 (1)
H0 : β4 = β14 0.89 (1) 0.10 (1) 1.50 (1) 1.87 (1)
H0 : β4 = β9 = β14 0.89 (2) 0.13 (2) 5.00* (2) 1.93 (2)
Hypothesis 4: The nature of the experience matters in the nal vote
H0 : β10 + β15 × Experience = 0 0.25 (1) 0.38 (1) 6.97*** (1) 1.52 (1)
H0 : β10 = β11 = β12 = β13 = β14 = 0 8.92 (5) 16.61*** (5) 14.96** (5) 9.06 (5)
H0 : β10 = β11 = β12 = β13 = β14 = β15 = 0 16.53** (6) 16.71** (6) 18.09*** (6) 9.24 (6)
H0 : β10 = β11 = β12 = β13 = β14 = β16 = 0 9.26 (6) 17.61*** (6) 15.09** (6) 12.96** (6)
H0 : β10 = β11 = β12 = β13 = β14 = β15 = β16 = 0 17.00** (7) 17.78** (7) 18.15** (7) 12.96* (7)
Note: Reported are chi-squared statistics with degrees of freedom in parentheses.
*Signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, ***signicant at 1%
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The estimates of Equation 3 by sub-sample yield noteworthy inferences (See Table 2.10).
As discussed in previous sections, this group should always be made better o since their
optimal decision is always route A, and therefore should always be in favor of the toll policy.
Two coecients from the strictly-better-o group are positive and statistically signicant:
the second votes for Hierarchical-Individualist and Egalitarian-Communitarian. After be-
ing accustomed to the problem, Hierarchical-Individualists, at 10% signicance, appear to
understand that a policy will benet themselves since they have the most value of time at
stake and are more likely to vote for the policy. Their hierarchical worldview appears to be
motivating their voting decision. These would be the same individuals that would be in favor
of congestion pricing since they recognize and can aord the benets of congestion pricing.
This result suggests self-interest rather than considering the social good was a contributing
factor in the vote. Egalitarian-Communitarians in this group also were signicantly more
likely to vote in favor of the policy after being accustomed to the problem. These people
may have felt strongly that a problem existed and government was necessary to resolve the
congestion problem. For this group, hypothesis three is noteworthy, especially for the timing
of the vote (See Table 2.10). Although no statistically signicant dierence from the rst
vote is observed, the second and third vote are signicantly dierent from each other. The
average group member more likely voted in favor of the toll after being accustomed to both
the problem and policy. As expected since these group members were predicted to be made
better o, this result implies that these individuals will have greater favorability for a con-
gestion pricing policy after being accustomed to its eects. However, the aggregate eect of
accustomation and nature of the experience on the third vote that is tested in hypothesis
four did not show statistical dierence from the rst vote.
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The individuals in the mixed group should take Route B with the policy and are either
made better o or worse o depending on the redistribution treatment. Similar to the previ-
ous sample estimations, Egalitarian-Communitarians in the mixed group were more likely to
vote in favor of the toll after being accustomed to the congestion problem. The altruism scale
measure also had a signicant positive eect on voting behavior compared to the rst vote.
As expected, being accustomed to the toll policy negatively aected this group's views of the
policy. The third vote by itself is signicantly negative at 1% signicance level. However,
worldviews appear here to factor in the decision for the nal vote. Hierarchical-Individualists
were more likely to vote in favor of the policy. People with stronger (weaker) views on the
environment measured on the NEP scale were more (less) likely to vote in favor of the toll at
10% signicance. Of the four hypotheses, this group revealed that the combination of being
accustomed to the problem and policy and the nature of the experience had a signicant
and negative eect on acceptability. However, the nature of the experience by itself has a
signicant impact. With the exception of Hierarchical-Individualists and individuals high
on the NEP scale, policymakers should note people with such intermediate values of time
will most likely be against congestion pricing after experiencing it and having to make alter-
native route-choice decisions. Without redistribution congestion pricing makes some people
worse o and/or creates inequitable outcomes making it unlikely some groups will ever be in
favor of the toll. Policymakers should account for the size of these groups when considering
implementing a trial or permanent program. A large population of this group could create a
political backlash if toll revenue does not adequately compensate for cost increases for these
individuals.
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The weakly-better-o group contains those individuals with the lowest value of time
who should switch routes with the policy. The estimated model loses signicance because
of the amount of variables and number of observations in this small group. Hierarchical-
Individualists in this group are less likely to vote in favor of the toll after experiencing
the policy (10% signicance). The ranked group information treatment signicantly, at
the 1% level, decreased the likelihood of voting in favor of voting for the policy as well.
Members in this group are pivot voters, and it appears Hierarchical-Individualists are relying
on a combination of their worldview against government intervention and their self-interest.
However, the third set of hypotheses testing that the inuence of these beliefs not changing
voting behavior is not rejected. Weakly-better-o individuals appear to be sensitive to seeing
the ranked group information on the inequitable impact the toll has on other group member's
costs or how they ranked compared to the group. These results suggest policymakers need to
be aware that when obtaining majority approval of congestion pricing that swing voters may
be sensitive to information on the equity eects on tolls. However, as reported in Table 2.7
these group members made sub-optimal route-choice decisions in the 40% treatment making
them worse o. Such a result suggests that the objective eects of a congestion pricing
policy may not be achieved for all individuals and that predicting the ex-ante behavioral
route-choice responses and perceptions of these marginal users is dicult.
Answer to Research Question 3: The combination of accustomation of the problem and policy,
the nature of experience and individual beliefs can predict acceptability of a toll. Individual
beliefs did not predict initial feelings toward the toll, but the evolution of voting behavior did
depend on individual beliefs and exogenous values of time.
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2.6. Conclusion
Urban congestion is a growing problem creating many external costs to users of the
road and the environment. Theoretically, congestion-pricing policy instruments improve
outcomes and eciency, but they are seldom put to practice. Barriers such as political and
public acceptability as well as general obliviousness by people and policymakers alike on how
a transportation system works and is maintained hinder congestion pricing implementation.
When considering congestion pricing to this common good problem, policymakers are aware
(and are usually made aware by the public) that congestion pricing creates fairness and
equity concerns. The experience of a trial period of congestion pricing in Stockholm in 2006
provides a telling story that experience matters. The initially reluctant Stockholmers ended
up passing a referendum to keep the congestion pricing permanent after experience a trial-
period of congestion pricing (Börjesson et al., 2012). The Stockholm experience is reproduced
here in a laboratory setting to observe how beliefs, accustomation, and the nature of the
experience explain the evolution of acceptability in a controlled environment.
The results provide an appealing complement to the understanding of some of the issues
eecting the acceptability of incentive-based mechanisms on environmental problems. The
experiment is used to examine situations where a congestion toll creates overall eciency
improvements but with inequitable outcomes, and in some case makes some individuals
worse o. The results show the toll achieved the objective of reducing congestion and that
individuals' acceptability of the toll is primarily based on the nature of their experience and
being accustomed to the problem and policy. However, self-interest did not solely determine
acceptability, and the results suggest that acceptability goes beyond standard self-interest.
Beliefs and the type of user impacted by the policy are relevant, but no robust nding is
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observed that shows a strong pattern of negative sentiments explained by beliefs toward the
tolling policy (or government intervention).
A key nding is that beliefs do not determine initial feelings for a toll policy and that
initial feelings appear to be random including explicit states on varying the amount of redis-
tribution of toll revenue. The expectation that these beliefs will be heavily relied upon for
the rst vote is unfounded. It is not until individuals become accustomed to the problem
can some individuals comprehend the severity of the problem do some beliefs matter and can
predict acceptability. The results suggests that those with both strong hierarchical as well
as individualistic views and stand to benet for the policy are unsurprisingly more likely to
vote in favor of the policy. However, those with both strong egalitarian and communitarian
views also are more likely to favor the policy even if it might make them worse o. The likely
reason is that these people are more favorable to government intervention when realizing a
problem. The results also nd other beliefs predicting the timing of acceptability.
Similar to the Stockholm experience, the combination of accustomation, nature of the ex-
perience, and self-interest strongly determined acceptability of the toll. Policymakers should
be aware that personal attributes may or may not matter when rst introducing congestion
pricing. A carefully implemented trial period similar to the experience in Stockholm may
be worth considering when implementing congestion pricing or environmental policy. Poli-
cymakers should take these results and ndings into account when implementing a trial or
permanent congestion policy. Understanding the sizes of the populations of dierent groups
impacted by the congestion policy is essential in predicting majority approval. Moreover,
such analysis will help identify which groups to earmark revenues so to compensate for hard-
ship the congestion policy creates. However, the upfront nancial and administrative costs
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must be considered for such a policy to pass a benet-cost test. But for successful imple-
mentation, benets from the policy instruments should be felt and seen by the majority of
users.
Please note that the marginal external congestion cost in this research focused entirely
on value of time and did not consider environmental damages from increased emissions.
Potentially in the two-route framework described, those with lower value of times are assumed
to be those with lower incomes and therefore are more likely to have older vintage cars that
may be more harmful to the environment. A congestion policy as described above may
increase total amount of emissions by having these more polluting cars take longer routes and
reducing the overall benet of decreasing total travel times. Future laboratory experiments
could create a setting where individuals create two negative externalities: the travel time
externality that has heterogeneous eects and an emissions externality that has homogeneous
eects but has heterogeneous sources that depends on the travel times of individuals that
have varied values of time (i.e., dierent car vintages that have dierent emissions rates).27
This type of frame-work can test the eectiveness of rst-best and second-best pricing.
It is still an open question whether beliefs and characteristics determine initial feelings
toward congestion pricing policies or other environmental policies. Future research should
consider settings where there is an option to not vote, but to still have that vote be binding
with a tie-breaker in place. Obtaining a censored data set may enhance the ability to
predict initial feelings. Moreover, also creating a setting where individuals must incur some
27Ideally, in a laboratory setting the costs of the second externality will not be felt immediately after a
period but should be delayed sometime later in the experiment's round. Perhaps provide on the screen some
measure showing total accumulation throughout a round.
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cost (preferably a monetary cost) to vote could also provide insights on the condence of
individual's voting behavior and acceptability of the policy.28
Future experiments that test the validity of the survey instruments that measure these
personal attributes as well as do similar experiments as done in the study are encouraged.
Future experiments could have dierent redistribution rates, ordering eects of the toll,
randomization of individuals' values of time within a session, or delaying and/or randomizing
the amount of redistribution of the toll. The more laboratory and eld studies from trials
will help provide facts on the essence of aversion to congestion pricing. Policymakers will
then have an easier time targeting public relations to groups on the margin to help assure a
trial run and or permanent congestion pricing policy would be successful. Policymakers need
to carefully design an instrument where the gains are noticeable and felt by the majority of
constituents. Knowledge of worldviews may help in communicating and being open about
the eects of the policy. As King et al. (2007) state, congestion pricing will be implemented
not when it is tolerable to the prospective losers, but when it is irresistible to the prospective
winners.
28A suggestion would be for subjects to pay for votes using money given to them as a show-up fee.
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CHAPTER 3
A Three-player Bottleneck Congestion Game With
And Without Efficient Pricing
3.1. Introduction
Congestion can be found everywhere, especially in transportation systems. Conges-
tion creates problems from its external costs. For transportation, congestion aects im-
portant quality aspects like expected travel time, expected arrival time, reliability, con-
venience of travel, safety, and the environment. Policymakers face natural limitations of
increasing infrastructure capacity in urban areas and should have a general understanding of
the micro-foundations of congestion when alternative incentive-based demand-management
mechanisms like congestion pricing are considered. The basic bottleneck model details the
negative externality of the time costs users of a single route network impose on each other.
The congestion literature has shown that time-delay and schedule-delay cost externalities are
ranked highest as the costs of congestion in a list that includes external costs of accidents
and environmental damage (Small and Verhoef, 2007; Anas and Lindsey, 2011). Discussing
congestion and the bottleneck model at a discrete individual level of two and three people
rather than of a theoretical discussion of a continuous environment of N individuals assumed
in the basic bottleneck model may make understanding the technical foundations of conges-
tion and congestion pricing more approachable and understandable to a broader audience,
including policymakers.
Levinson (2005) formally provides a normal-form game structure for a bottleneck con-
gestion game for two players with and without congestion tolls. The congestion problem
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ultimately can be reduced down to just two people. He then discusses the extension of the
game to three players and how the game could be extended to N discrete players.1 His
three-player extension includes the methodology on how payos (penalties) are calculated
and what are the predicted pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) for various time cost pa-
rameters. His discussion of the three-player game, however, does not include the general
normal-form game structure or detailed formulas for calculating ecient congestion tolls
seen in the two-player game discussion. This chapter presents the normal-form structure for
a three-player bottleneck game and the derivation and inclusion of the ecient tolls. The
predicted PSNE with and without the tolls are discussed.2 This chapter comprehensively
shows the essence of congestion pricing and why the toll should equal the negative externality
a user imposes on society.
I expand from previous literature to formally show a prisoner's dilemma and the emer-
gence of congestion in a three-player congestion game. I then show how congestion pricing
is calculated, illustrate the problem, and how tolls can be used to mitigate congestion whilst
addressing equity and behavioral impacts from redistribution of toll revenues. Unlike the
discussion of a two-player game, the inclusion of a third player reveals the policy and welfare
implications when two users generate a queue that negatively aects a third player. This
simplied framework will help the reader comprehend the micro-foundations of a conges-
tion problem as well as understand how variations of time and schedule delay aects the
congestion problem and policy recommendations.
1Note each additional player makes examination of the game exponentially more complex. The described
model below will be worded so that one could expand the game to more than three players.
2A forthcoming corrigendum co-authored with David M. Levinson in the journal Transportation Research
Part A: Policy and Practice corrects several of the predicted PSNE reported in Levinson (2005). See
Appendix B.3.
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This note has six sections. Section 3.2 provides a summary of the Levinson (2005) game-
theoretical bottleneck congestion game and the formal development of the three-player game.
Section 3.3 discusses the derivation of the tolls and how the tolls aect behavior. In Section
3.4 the congestion problem is illustrated using gures. Section 3.5 discusses how to solve
for Nash equilibria (including mixed strategies), how the redistribution of revenue-neutral
tolls aects player behavior, and how the model can be applied to laboratory experiments.
Section 3.6 concludes. Suggested modications for the model in Levinson (2005) including
corrections to the PNSE for a three-player game are reported in the Appendix.
3.2. Three-player Bottleneck Congestion Game
In the Levinson (2005) congestion game based on the basic bottleneck model by Vickrey
(1969) and Arnott et al. (1990b) among others, players (or vehicles) travel on a single link
from a common origin to a common destination. Players simultaneously decide when to
depart knowing that a bottleneck exists; their objective is to minimize their costs. Zou and
Levinson (2006) extend the Levinson (2005) model by developing a generalized N -player
game and comparing the model's simulated results to the basic bottleneck model. They
nd support that the game theory approach yields similar results. Xin and Levinson (2007)
employ a similar stochastic congestion model and simulate dierent pricing schemes and
various compositions of users' aversions of being late. The following fullls a gap between a
model with two players and N players by formalizing a three-player game that can provide
insights to unique congestion situations that can only exist if there are more than two players.
In Levinson (2005), players make their departure decisions based on what they think
the other players' departure decisions are. The model requires three variables: penalties for
early arrival (E) and for late arrival (L), and the penalty for incurring a journey delay (D).
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When there are three players, each player has the option of departing: Very Early (v), Early
(e), On-time (o), or Late (l). The bottleneck allows for players to arrive only one at a time.
Each of the three players then can arrive in one of ve arrival time slots: Very Early,
Early, On-time, Late, Really Late (r), and Super Late (s).3 Congestion occurs if two or
more players depart at the same time. When congestion occurs then the way the congested
players go through the bottleneck is randomly determined. For example, in a three-player
game, if two players depart at the same time then one of the two will randomly be sorted
to arrive at the intended departure time while the other player will arrive at the next time
slot and incur a journey delay. Similarly, if all three players depart at the same time, then
one of the three will randomly be determined to arrive at the intended time, another player
will be bumped to the next time slot and incur a journey delay, while the third player
will be bumped two time slots and incur two journey delays. Each player has the same
probability of incurring zero, one, or two journey delays. If a player departs at a time slot
immediately after two players depart at the same time, then that player is in a queue. Of
the two congested players, one will arrive at their intended time while the other one will be
journey delayed and arrive at the next time slot which is the departure time of the player
that entered a queue. Since it is rst-come-rst-serve, the player that arrives in the back of
the queue is journey delayed and arrives at the next time slot. In such a scenario where a
player enters an existing queue by departing at the time slot immediately after two players
create congestion, two of the three players each incur one journey delay. Without losing
generality, assume that if there is no queue then travel time costsconsidered here as journey
delay costsare zero. Journey delays are similar to congestion. The random determination
3For a two-player game described in Levinson (2005), each decides to either depart: Early, On-time, or Late
with the possible arrivals of Early, On-time, Late, and Very Late.
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of how players go through the bottleneck functions the same in a game where there are more
than three players, except there will be more possible departure and arrival time periods and
more situations and varieties of queues existing.
This discretized model diers from those elsewhere in the existing literature. Ziegelmeyer
et al. (2008) develop a similar discretized game-theoretical single-route bottleneck model
containing travel and scheduling costs that is used for laboratory experiments of groups of
four and sixteen. However, unlike the model presented in this chapter, their model contains
no sorting mechanism when users encounter a bottleneck and create a queue (congestion)
users arriving at the queue at the same time are assumed to arrive at the destination at same
time and incur the same costs. Breinbjerg et al. (2014) also develop a discretized bottleneck
queueing model, but their model contains just travel delays (queueing time) costs and not
any scheduling delay costs. Breinbjerg et al. (2014) vary in their model and examine in
a laboratory experiment the outcomes and fairness perceptions of dierent sorting service
mechanism of the queue created by the bottleneck. Users are either sorted by rst-in-rst-out,
last-in-rst-out, or service-in-random-order. The omission of scheduling costs, an essential
component in the basic bottleneck model, hinders the discussion of welfare implications from
the imposition of congestion pricing. The Ziegelmeyer et al. (2008) and Breinbjerg et al.
(2014) models do not include discussion or derivation of ecient congestion tolls. The model
presented here derives ecient tolls and discusses welfare implications of ex-ante and ex-post
outcomes. The simplied model revealing both ex ante and ex-post outcomes ought to be
more approachable to understand the essence of the basic bottleneck model and congestion
pricing.4
4The basic bottleneck model assumes users depart across continuous time and that a rst-in-rst-out queue
is formed once the bottleneck reaches past its free-ow capacity. Therefore, unlike this discretized model
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Similar to the continuous variables used in the basic bottleneck congestion model pre-
sented in the theoretical literature, behavior in the discrete game-theoretical model version
depends on users' time and schedule delay preferences. A rational player knowing other
players' departure decisions (t−i) will then know their expected costs from the probability of
arriving at a certain time and any expected journey delay. The sum of the expected cost of
schedule delay and expected cost of the journey delay is the total expected cost for that de-
parture time. Players try to minimize their total expected costs given the departure patterns
of the other two players. The following equations are identical to those in Levinson (2005)
except in equation (8) where θ is used to represent expected schedule delay costs instead of
E to avoid confusion of nomenclature.5
Formally, the journey delay or what is referred to as the expected journey delay, ε(dt), at
departure time ti for individual i, depends on how many vehicles the bottleneck can service
per unit of time and departure times of other players, t−i. Assume the bottleneck services
one vehicle per unit of time, thus the expected journey delay is measured as:
(4) ε(dt) = Qt + 0.5(At − 1)
where Qt(ti, t−i) is the standing queue at time t and is equal to the total number of other
players remaining in the queue in the time period immediately before the player's departure
time, ti, after bottleneck has been serviced. The total number of departures at time t is
that has a bottleneck with a random-sorting mechanism, the equilibrium ex-ante and ex-post outcomes in
the basic bottleneck model are the same.
5A table of nomenclature can be found in Appendix B (see Table B.2.1).
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Table 3.1. Expected Journey Delay Costs Given The Departure Strategies
Of Other Two Players
Player B v v v v e e e o o l





A v D 0.5D 0.5D 0.5D 0 0 0 0 0 0
e D 0.5D 0 0 D 0.5D 0.5D 0 0 0
o 0 0 0.5D 0 D 0.5D 0 D 0.5D 0
l 0 0 0 0.5D 0 0 0.5D D 0.5D D
represented by At(ti, t−i).6
(5) C(dt) = (Qt + 0.5(At − 1))D
The expected costs of a journey delay, C(dt), is the expected journey delay multiplied by the
delay penalty, D. Table 3.1 displays for a three-player game the expected journey delay costs
which are the probabilities of a journey delay multiplied by the journey delay penalty (D)
for each departure scenario. The three possible departure scenarios for Player A to depart
and immediately enter behind a queue (Qt=1) are highlighted in bold in Table 3.1: (Player
A: Early, Player B: Very Early, Player C: Very Early), (Player A: On-time, Player B: Early,
Player C: Early), and (Player A: Late, Player B: On-time, Player C: On-time).
The deviation from the time at which a player arrives at their nal destination (as
opposed to departs) and the desired, or On-time, period is the schedule delay (Si). The
schedule delay is
(6) Si = ta + dt − to
6Independent of a queue and assuming one-at-a-time arrival, the expected journey delay from N users entering




N that can be simplied to
N−1
2 . This is displayed as
0.5(At − 1) where At is total number of players entering at time t.
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where dt is the journey delay, ta is the player's departure time (also be interpreted as the
arrival at back of queue), and to is desired arrival time, which is to be On-time at their
nal destination (also interpreted as the desired time of departure from front of queue). The
value of being On-time is assumed to be zero, thus Si can be negative or positive depending
on whether a driver departs Early or Late relative to the On-time departure time. Negative
values represent early arrival (arrival in front of queue), while positive values represent later





E × |Si| if Si < 0
L× |Si| if Si > 0
The journey delay is determined probabilistically and is greater than or equal to zero since
drivers can arrive at a time slot only one at a time and are sorted randomly when drivers
depart at the same time. The schedule delay is calculated by solving and adding the schedule
delay for each probability of journey delay. Note that the schedule delay is independent of
journey delay. Schedule delay cannot be calculated from the expected value of journey delay
since journey delay may be zero on average while sometimes schedule delay is positive and
sometimes negative, which do not cancel each other out but are additive.7 The expected
schedule delay cost for traveler i, θ(Si), is determined by the individual's departure time ti







= P (v)× 2E + P (e)× E + P (l)× L+ P (r)× 2L+ P (s)× 3L
7For example in a three-player game, a player that departs early along with the other two players has the
same probability of arriving Early, On-time, or Late yet their expected schedule delay is not zero (i.e.,
expected arrival of On-time.
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where 1 = ΣtPt = P (v)+P (e)+P (o)+P (l)+P (r)+P (s); P () is the probability function for
player i, displayed in Table 3.2;
∏
t = penalty function = (2E,E, 0, L, 2L, 3L); v, e, o, l, r, s
are the periods of arrival from the queue that starts at On-time, zero (Very Early (to - 2),
Early (to - 1), On-time (to), Late (to + 1), Really Late (to + 2), Super Late (to + 3).8
Table 3.3 shows the expected schedule delay costs for a three-player game. The expected
costs are the probability-average of all possible arrival times. It is found by summing the
products of the probabilities of arrival outcomes from Table 3.2 and the penalty function
for a player's departure time given the other players' departure times. Notice again that
for scenario eee that the expected schedule delay is not zero, but is positive because the
expected penalties are additive.
Consistent with the theoretical literature of users choosing an optimal schedule for their
trip by trading o travel-time cost against schedule-delay cost, the play of the three-player
game depends on one's expected time (journey delay) and schedule delay costs. For exam-
ple, in equilibrium in the basic bottleneck model, the identical individuals have no incentive
to change their departure time when minimizing their travel-time and schedule-delay costs
implying that trip costs must be the same for all departure times (Arnott et al., 1990b; Small
and Verhoef, 2007).9 However, in our three-player game context, a player's travel time is
assumed to be zero regardless of departure time unless the player incurs (expects) a journey
delay. The total expected costs of a departure decision are the sum of the expected jour-
ney and schedule delay costs (the cell-by-cell sum of Table 3.1 and Table 3.3, respectively.)
8 Levinson (2005) also assumes a linear penalty function.
9In the three-player game, in equilibrium users could have ex-ante the same expected costs, but will ex-post
end with dierent costs. The basic bottleneck model assumes the ex-ante and ex-post outcomes are the
same.
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Table 3.2. Arrival Probability Given Departure Strategies, Three-player Game
Player B v v v v e e e o o l
Player C v e o l e o l o l l
departure decision
Player A Arrival Probability
very early (v)
P (v) 1/3 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1
P (e) 1/3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
P (o) 1/3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P (l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P (r) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P (s) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
early (e)
P (v) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P (e) 0 0.5 1 1 1/3 0.5 0.5 1 1 1
P (o) 1 0.5 0 0 1/3 0.5 0.5 0 0 0
P (l) 0 0 0 0 1/3 0 0 0 0 0
P (r) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P (s) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
on-time (o)
P (v) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P (e) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P (o) 1 1 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 1/3 0.5 1
P (l) 0 0 0.5 0 1 0.5 0 1/3 0.5 0
P (r) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/3 0 0
P (s) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
late (l)
P (v) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P (e) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P (o) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P (l) 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 0 0.5 1/3
P (r) 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 1 0.5 1/3
P (s) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/3
Source: Table 10 from Levinson (2005).
Table 3.4 reports the total expected costs and is the simplied normal-form bottleneck con-
gestion game for one of the three players. If we assume homogeneous time preferences then
Table 3.4 is sucient to understand the three-player game. Numerous versions of the game
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Table 3.3. Expected Schedule Delay Costs
Player B v v v v e e e o o l





A v E 1.5E 1.5E 1.5E 2E 2E 2E 2E 2E 2E
e 0 0.5E E E E3 +
L
3 0.5E 0.5E E E E
o 0 0 0.5L 0 L 0.5L 0 L 0.5L 0
l L L L 1.5L L L 1.5L 2L 1.5L 2L
can be created using any combination of values of E, L, and D.10
Players use best-response strategies to minimize expected total costs given the other two
players' departure decisions. Nash equilibria depend on values of E, L, and D and can be
found by iterating among the outcomes from the best responses of the other homogeneous
players.11 Assuming that the cost penalties are non-zero, note that for ve of the columns
we can predict that there is at least one cost-minimizing strategy where expected costs equal
zero by departing On-time. The best response for these same ve are scenarios where Player
A does not create congestion or departs behind a queue.
Note that players with homogeneous time preferences minimize total group time costs
if each departed at separate time slots, yet no rational player has the incentive to do so.
All players would prefer to depart and arrive On-time. Yet an On-time arrival is not guar-
anteed and players strategically schedule their departure patterns to minimize their total
expected private costs. These strategies of the players without tolls emulates a three-person
prisoner's dilemma where if they were to coordinate their actions they would reduce total
10Much of the literature assumes E < D < L reported in Small (1982), but here the framework remains gen-
eral. A three-player game with heterogeneous time-preferences can be developed using the same theoretical
framework.
11To solve for PSNE (if one exists), start at any given departures for the other two players to nd best
response. From that predicted outcome then iterate to nd how the other player would respond. Iterate
until you reach a Nash equilibrium where no player has the incentive to depart at a dierent time. In several
cases, no PSNE solutions exist which implies that Nash equilibria exist in mixed strategies. See proceeding
sections for a discussion of nding all Nash equilibria.
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social costs.12 Even with a prisoner's dilemma, players internalize congestion but only the
increased congestion costs that are imposed on themselves and not others.
Equity and fairness concerns underlies the congestion game. Since the total cost mini-
mizing departure pattern requires players to depart at separate times, this social optimum
creates winners and losers. A user equilibrium strategy that creates congestion may be
perceived as fair because the chance by the inherent random sorting in the game may give
everyone an equal opportunity ex-ante of obtaining a minimum-cost outcome. At the social
optimal departure pattern, the game leaves open on how players coordinate to determine
who gets which time slot.13 The model can also provide theoretically predicted prices of an-
archy which measures how the system's (game's) eciency degrades compared to the social
optimum. It is calculated by the ratio of the costs of user equilibrium and social optimum.
For example, if the total costs at the social optimum is 8 and the user equilibrium costs are
12, then the price of anarchy would be 1.5, which implies that the user equilibrium degrades
eciency by 50%.
3.3. Three-player Bottleneck Game With Congestion Tolls
The described bottleneck congestion game exemplies the problem of a (time cost) con-
gestion externality. A player does not account for the increased total (schedule and journey
delay) costs they impose on other players when they depart at the same time as other players
creating congestion. The model can be extended to include congestion pricing by imposing
12Another interpretation is to assume an operator that is a social planner or monopolist decides the departure
times of the three agents. Such an entity would thus coordinate the departure of the three agents as to
minimize total costs. An example of such a entity could be an monopolist airline scheduling arrivals and
departures.
13Keep in mind that if the game is repetitive and mechanisms are imposed so to achieve social optimal
sorting, a player still might want to deviate from cost-minimizing behavior and try to punish another player
to bump them out of their preferred time slot to enforce societal fairness norms. Even without a repeated
context and when a PSNE does not exist, equilbria in mixed strategies exist.
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Table 3.4. Expected Total Costs Without Congestion Tolls
Player B v v v v e





A v E +D 1.5E + 0.5D 1.5E + 0.5D 1.5E + 0.5D 2E
e D 0.5E + 0.5D E E E3 +D +
L
3
o 0 0 0.5D + 0.5L 0 D + L
l L L L 0.5D + 1.5L L
Player B e e o o l





A v 2E 2E 2E 2E 2E
e 0.5E + 0.5D 0.5E + 0.5D E E E
o 0.5D + 0.5L 0 D + L 0.5D + 0.5L 0
l L 0.5D + 1.5L D + 2L 0.5D + 1.5L D + 2L
ecient tolls on congestible scenarios. A toll can be imposed in the cells in Table 3.4 where
congestion occurs so that players can internalize the congestion costs (mecc) they impose
on others. Sixteen congestible scenarios exist in a three-player game. The value of a toll
depends on the particular congestion scenariothe departure pattern of playersand a toll
is paid only if a player creates congestion. As Levinson (2005) mentions, since decisions
are made simultaneously the tolls constitute a threat in that they might (or might not) be
paid and are dependent on the actions of the other players. These tolls incentivize players
to behave in a manner that steers them toward a socially optimal outcome that minimizes
group costs.14
14The most germane example of why players would allow an institution with self-imposed taxes or tolls comes
from the story of missionaries visiting nineteenth-century China. Although the authenticity of the story is
doubted, the point should not be. The potentially apocryphal tale exists in various versions in economics
textbooks, writings, and podcasts (See Cheung (1983) where the example I believe rst originated). The
example goes that a group of missionaries arrive in China and observe a group of working men (called
trackers) using ropes to pull a heavy barge up a river with a strong current. The missionaries were shocked
to see a man on the barge with a long whip lashing out at any of the men that had slack on their rope. The
shocked missionaries ran to the group men pulling the barge to tell them that they will help end such abuse.
Yet instead of being welcomed by their concern, the men pulling the barge told the missionaries to calm
down and mind their own business since it was them that own the barge. They informed the missionaries
that the faster they get the cargo up the river the more they get paid. And they hired this man to be their
monitor and whip them to reduce the incentive to shirk and free-ride on the eort of others. Thus like the
Pigouvian tolls in congestion, a group might want to set up an institution that may seem punishing but can
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A Pigouvian toll or tax is a fee that equals the aggregate marginal social cost or damage
incurred by a user, excluding the marginal private cost borne by that user, when evaluated at
the ecient level of pollution, or in this case, congestion. However, in this probabilistic and
ex-ante context the toll cannot be evaluated in the typical ex-post context. If the Pigouvian
tolls were evaluated using ex-post outcomes then the tolls would be zero since at the ecient
level is when the group departs at dierent times, no congestion occurs, and group costs are
minimized. Instead the ecient congestion toll is not Pigouvian by denition but instead
equals the calculated ex-ante expected mecc.
The mecc is the dierence between the incremental social cost a player creates by en-
tering a congestible scenario and the player's own incremental private cost for entering that
specic scenario.15 Although decisions are made simultaneously, it is helpful to assume when
considering the tolls that decisions are made in a sequential manner. In the model, total
social cost (TSC) is not a continuous function but is a discrete function. So the incremental
social cost (ISC) is the appropriate basis for calculating the price, where ISC = ∆TSC/∆q,
with q as the number of players. The incremental private cost (IPC) is the additional amount
each player pays in the absence of tolls to take the trip, their own travel time. This cost
is already internalized by the player and is excluded from the incremental (marginal) social
cost value.16 The appropriate ecient toll depends on the congestion scenario and is ex-
pressed by τ(ti; t−i) = ISC − IPC. The toll for the given congestion scenario represents
the incremental external congestion costs externality (mecc), which represents the increased
and will make all members better o compared to the alternatives. The version by Cheung has this behavior
occurring right before the communist regime and does not mention shocked Westerners.
15If using the Pigouvian toll denition, the toll will be evaluated at a ecient such as veo and since no player
is creating mecc, the outcome is ecient and any toll would be valued zero. This is why the toll should not
be evaluated at the ecient level.
16Not accounting for an individuals private cost, or own contribution to congestion, will inate the toll to
an inecient level.
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expected journey and schedule delay costs imposed on other players. The ISC is calculated
by taking the dierence between TSC under conditions with and without a marginal user
creating congestion for each congestible scenario (see Table 3.5). The TSC with the mar-
ginal player is the sum of the expected costs from Table 3.4 for all three players for a given
congestion scenario. The TSC without the marginal player is the sum of expected costs in
Table 3.4 of the two players if the marginal player selected a non-congestible departure time
or was absent from the game. That is, it is the TSC of the original two players before the
marginal player makes a departure decision. The ISC is the dierence between TSC with and
without the marginal player. Similarly, the IPC can be thought as the individual eect of
being the marginal player. It is the individual expected costs reported in Table 3.4 that can
be thought of as the expected costs of entering the game and making a departure decision
after the two other players have made their departure decisions.
For each congestion scenario, the ecient toll is the dierence between ISC and IPC,
which represents the mecc a player imposes on the group. As seen in Table 3.5, sixteen
possible congestible scenarios, ignoring player identication, can occur.17 The eight dierent
mecc values of the sixteen scenarios in the game represent the eight ecient tolls for this
game (τα, τβ τδ, τΘ, τµ, τε, τσ, and τλ; see Table 3.5). Tolls are imposed in appropriate
cells in Table 3.4 to obtain Table 3.6. Note that depending on the parameters there may be
fewer tolls actually imposed in the game since if the calculated toll (mecc) is negative it is
maximized to zero.
Note in Table 3.5 that eight unique tolls exist in a three-player game. No tolls are incurred
when a socially optimal Nash equilibrium departure pattern happens since no congestion oc-
curs (mecc ≤ 0). Several congestion scenarios in Table 3.5 share the same toll value, and
17Formulas for the tolls for a three-player game are not reported in Levinson (2005).
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many require a maximization operator since the calculated tolls (mecc's) for departures be-
fore the On-time departure time could be negative. Depending on the time cost parameters,
individuals that create congestion before the On-time time slot could potentially generate an
incremental social benet by journey delaying other players from an earlier time of arrival
to a less costly On-time arrival time. This is why tolls in the earlier time periods must be
greater than or equal to zero.18 Moreover, the presence of negative mecc suggest that the
socially optimal and acceptable level of congestion depends on the cost parameters and may
not always be group departure patterns with absolutely no congestion. Some congestion
could be socially acceptable.
With tolls, Table 3.4 is modied by adding in the toll (mecc) to the appropriate cells for
each congestion scenario from Table 3.5. Table 3.6 now represents the formal normal-form
bottleneck congestion game with ecient tolls. Situations where a player enters in a queuing
scenario like vve, eeo, and ool do not have a toll. Under such a situation, a person that
departs the period after a two-way congestion scenario will create costs only for themselves
and does not create a time-delay externality on the other players. As such, the mecc of
entering a queuing scenario is zero and a toll should not be imposed. Players should already
internalize privately the costs associated with entering the back of a queue.
The introduction of ecient congestion tolls mitigates the prisoner's dilemma and allows
players to cooperate and coordinate their decisions to reduce TSC.19 But, as can be shown, a
three-player game with homogeneous time preferences (cost parameters) does indeed create
clear equity concerns with winners and losers ex-ante. At the social optimum, when
18For example, if E > D then arriving Early versus incurring a journey delay at Early and arriving On-time
would be more costly. Note that if you consider a situation where E = 5, D = 4, L = 5, the non-toll PSNE
departure pattern eee is unique.
19Note that a game with heterogeneous time preferences will yield individual-specic Pigouvian tolls.
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players depart at dierent times, players will have unequal outcomes.20 A discussion on how
to solve for Nash equilibria with and without tolls follows below.
Analysts should note that this derivation of tolls is one of many pricing approaches that
could be employed. Arnott et al. (1993) address in their bottleneck model dierent pricing
scenarios such as no toll, uniform toll (constant throughout the day), ne toll (completely
exible; time-dependent), and coarse toll (intermediate between uniform toll and ne toll),
but do not explicitly address the unique queue that occurs in a discrete three-player bot-
tleneck game. Zou and Levinson (2006) examine the dierent pricing scenarios with their
discretized model, but also do not explicitly address the unique queue. The Xin and Levin-
son (2007) N -player game employs two types of pricing schemes: omniscient pricing (all
costs are known to a transportation administer) and observable pricing (only queuing delay
costs are considered and not schedule delay costs). Omniscient pricing would have players
paying for the additional externality of the schedule delay costs players avoiding congestion.
Omniscient tolls are calculated as the (expected) dierence in total social costs from an
additional player (e.g., if two players depart On-time and Early, then the individual that
departs On-time would pay the toll of the schedule delay costs, E, of the second player who
is avoiding On-time congestion.). It is argued that since schedule delay costs of a traveler
costs are unobservable, a more realistic approach would impose congestion pricing on queue-
ing delay (this is consistent with the theoretical static analysis conducted by Walters (1961)
where schedule delay is not considered). The pricing approach presented here lies somewhere
in between the omniscient and queueing pricing approaches. Unlike other approaches, this
20In a repeated game, the tolls help sustain a socially optimal departure pattern by providing a disincentive
for players to punish and bump other players out of a superior time slot.
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method explicitly shows the marginal social costs that occur when a player departs in a dis-
crete time that is immediately after a departure time when congestion occurs. This situation
cannot be observed in the context of a two-player game.
Ecient tolls (or Pigouvian tolls) or taxes ought to be zero in situations without the
presence of any technological externalities; no potential Pareto improvements can be made.
If players departed at dierent times then no tolls will be paid except for the more complete
omniscient tolling approach where players will pay dierent toll rates depending on their
departure time. Thus instead of tolls being used as threat, players paying omniscient tolls
and are in an ecient departure pattern will now have additional private costs except by
the player with the greatest schedule delay cost. Players (society) will understandably prefer
having no tolls or the other pricing schemes compared to the omniscient toll approach.
Departure patterns that do not create congestion ex-ante and ex-post and/or yield an mecc
equal to or less than zero should not have any tolls imposed.
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vvv 3E + 3D 3E +D 2D E +D MAX(D − E, 0) τα
vve 3E + 2D 3E 2D 1.5E + 0.5D MAX(1.5D − 1.5E, 0) τβ
vvo 3E +D 2E E +D 1.5E + 0.5D MAX(0.5D − 0.5E, 0) τδ
vvl 3E +D + L 2E + L E +D 1.5E + 0.5D MAX(0.5D − 0.5E, 0) τδ
eev 3E +D 3E D 0.5× (E +D) MAX(0.5D − 0.5E, 0) τδ









eeo E + 2D + L E 2D + L 0.5× (E +D) MAX(1.5D + L− 0.5E, 0) τε
eel E +D + L E + L D 0.5× (E +D) MAX(0.5D − 0.5E, 0) τδ
oov 2E +D + L 2E D + L 0.5× (D + L) 0.5× (D + L) τµ
ooe E +D + L E D + L 0.5× (D + L) 0.5× (D + L) τµ
ooo 3D + 3L D + L 2× (D + L) D + L D + L τλ
ool 2D + 3L L 2× (D + L) 0.5× (D + L) 1.5× (D + L) τσ
llv 2E +D + 3L 2E + L D + 2L 0.5D + 1.5L 0.5× (D + L) τµ
lle 2E +D + 3L 2E + L D + 2L 0.5D + 1.5L 0.5× (D + L) τµ
llo D + 3L L D + 2L 0.5D + 1.5L 0.5× (D + L) τµ
lll 3D + 6L D + 3L 2D + 3L D + 2L D + L τλ
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Table 3.6. Expected Total Costs With Congestion Tolls
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3.4. The Three-player Congestion Problem Illustrated
The twelve gures in Figure 3.1 best illustrate the three-player congestion problem and
the mecc and resulting ecient congestion tolls for 13 of the 16 possible congestion scenar-
ios.21 Thinking of the game in a sequential manner, the gures reveal the costs and harm at
the individual level when a player creates or increases congestion.22 The gures use abstract
terms E, D, & L and assume homogeneous players but has a relative scale by departure
time of time value preferences of E = 5, D = 4, L = 8. The rst row (Figures 3.1a- 3.1c)
show the costs of individuals departing Very Early, Figures 3.1d- 3.1f show costs of indi-
viduals departing Early, Figures 3.1g- 3.1i show costs of individuals departing On-time, and
Figures 3.1j- 3.1l show individual costs of departing Late.
To see an intuitive illustration of congestion, consider the congestion that can occur at
the Early departure time in Figure 3.1. As expected in Figure 3.1d when only one person
departs Early that person incurs a (expected) cost of E since no queue is generated (Q = 0).23
The incremental private cost (appears as MPC) from zero to one departures at Early is
E. Now consider the congestion with two people departing Early (Q = 1) as shown in
Figure 3.1e. As mentioned above, with this two-way congestion, ex post one person will
arrive Early incurring a cost of E, while the other incurs a journey delay and arrives On-
time and incurs a cost of D. The TSC are E + D and are represented by the area of the
rectangle over the two users. The MPC for both players is 0.5(E + D) since each player
has an equal chance obtaining their desired arrival time. Notice the grey region, the second
21The remaining three congestion scenarios are when a player creates a queue (scenarios vve, eeo, and ool)
are illustrated in the appendix in Figures B.1d- B.1f in Figure B.1.
22The reader may want to refer to the gures in Figure B.2 in the Appendix to see the cost curves drawn
in the more traditional manner. The gures depict the same information, but the illustrations in Figure 3.1
best convey the congestion problem on all players' private costs.
23This diers from the prior nomenclature where Q now represents the amount of other players departing
at the same time rather than the amount of users delayed from prior departure times.
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Early departure increased the original player's ex-ante expected costs from E to 0.5(E+D).
This increase is the mecc imposed by the second player and equals the change in social costs
minus the marginal entrant's MPC evaluated at two Early departures. The marginal entrant
is assumed to know that there is already one person departing at that time. Again, the mecc
cannot include a player's own congestion externality costs.
Continuing with the example of players departing Early, when there are three entrants
(Q = 2) we can see in Figure 3.1f the mecc substantially increases. The interpretation and
calculation of the mecc when Q ≥ 2 can be tricky. Recall that the mecc equals the costs
imposed on society that the marginal entrant creates. This is why the shaded mecc region in
Figure 3.1e of two-way congestion is not included in mecc. The costs of the existing two-way
congestion were going to occur anyway and the value of the mecc and resulting toll should
capture just the external costs the marginal player creates.24 This point is emphasize because
it is not easily observed when using the more traditional approach of modeling costs depicted
in Figure B.2 shown in the Appendix. In the context of a small group, these illustrations
of the eects of individual costs can easily demonstrate the problems from congestion and
the need and the essence of congestion pricing to a lay person. Unlike the continuous space
illustrated in the basic bottleneck model, the discretized version allows us for comparisons of
ex-ante and ex-post outcomes and the welfare created with and without congestion pricing.
The mecc's illustrated in Figure 3.1 do not have a linear pattern. The existence and
sizes of a congestion scenario's mecc depend on the time cost preferences: E, D, and L. For
example, compare two-way congestion for the Early and On-time departure times. The mecc
is noticeably smaller in Figure 3.1e than in Figure 3.1h. As mentioned in the previous section,
24It would be incorrect for the value to represent the dierence between one and three entrants. The mecc
should represent the change in costs of a single additional user. For games with N>3 the same properties
hold when calculating the mecc's and resulting tolls of three-way congestion, four-way congestion, etc.
81
incurring a journey delay at the Early departure time results in the player not incurring any
schedule delay by being bumped and arriving On-time. S/he will incur just the journey
delay penalty, D. If E > D, then the mecc is negative since that player would prefer to be
randomly be the player be bumped and incur a journey delay. The same properties do not
hold for departure at or after the On-time departure time. Assuming positive parameters
of E, D, and L, Very Early and Early departures could have negative mecc and a toll is
not required, while times at or after the On-time departure will have positive mecc and will
indeed require a toll (See Table 3.5).
Conceptually, to solve the three-player game one must think of the game in a sequential
manner. The four departure times illustrated in Figure 3.1 can be thought of as individual
markets. Given the decision of a rst player, the second player will make their decision on
expected MPC with or without a toll of the four departure times (markets). The decision
should dier between games with and without tolls. Observing the costs in Figure 3.1
motivates the need for ecient tolls. The inclusion of the toll will internalize the mecc and
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Figure 3.1. The Incremental Costs Of Congestion Illustrated
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3.5. A Discussion On Nash Equilibria And Model's Relevance
A simple closed-form method that solves Nash equilibria with and without tolls using
parameters E, D, and L does not exist. The existence of PSNE depends on relative sizes
of time cost parameters; if no PSNE exist then equilibria exist only in mixed strategies
(MSNE). The PSNE of players departing at separate times typically exist when tolls are
present. However, the PSNE are not unique since there are multiple PSNE of the same
departure pattern when accounting for player identication. For example, if the predicted
pure strategy equilibrium is Very Early, Early, and On-time then there exists six possible
combinations of PSNE when accounting for player identication. The game then turns into a
coordination game and players will employ mixed strategies since the socially-optimal PSNE
is not unique. Players would randomize their departure decisions because of the uncertain
nature of other players' decisions resulting in MSNE. A comparison of the MSNEs with
and without toll can demonstrate that tolls provide an eciency gain after toll revenues are
redistributed.
To calculate all Nash equilibria including mixed strategies the open-sourced software
Gambit is recommended (McKelvey et al., 2013). If PSNE exist, they can be found through
an iterative process of players' best response using values from Table 3.4 and 3.6. An
open question remains on how individuals base their decisions and whether learning and
experience (hysteresis) aect their decisions (Roth and Erev, 1995; Ziegelmeyer et al., 2008).
Players switching from a game with tolls to one without would revert back to a prisoner's
dilemma.25 Empirically observing the theoretical PSNE and MSNE predictions may take
25 Börjesson et al. (2012) did not observe people going back to their old habits immediately after the
expiration of the six month congestion charge trial-period in Stockholm in 2006 and 2007.
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several or multiple iterations of the game considering that this is a simultaneous game with
64 possible outcomes.26
The tolls do improve social welfare, but some players are denitely worse o. Some of
the players are priced to a inferior departure time. A similar result is seen in the bottleneck
model. Hau (1992) says that under normal trac conditions and if the toll revenue is put
aside, then an optimal toll achieves a socially ecient outcome, but would make society
worse o because users' costs will increase. Only after the government spends the revenue
will society be made better o. As mentioned in Levinson (2005), tolls are seen as a transfer
and are assumed to be returned to the players (road users) in some form. A transfer needs
to be assumed for any kind of ecient toll or Pigouvian policy to be welfare improving.
However, methods of reducing users' costs through the handling of equity concerns and
granting exemptions of certain groups from paying a toll can undermine eciency (Anas
and Lindsey, 2011). In a review of the literature on how to address equity concerns of road
pricing, Levinson (2010) nds recycling collected toll revenues can address such concerns.
Yet a tradeo exists between alleviating fairness and equity concerns and improving system
eciency when considering or designing a pricing policy. Policymakers have to weigh the
political feasibly of a congestion policy and whether it will be politically acceptable. Levinson
(2010) remarks that the perception of equity is highly subjective and satisfying certain groups
is necessary to obtain acceptability of congestion program.
In a small group environment, players would likely adjust their expected costs to account
for the large revenue shares of any redistribution. Players would be aware that economically
26Similarly, observing the MSNE in the classic rock-paper-scissors game (also called roshambo) observing
the mixed strategy of every player randomizing their strategy by a third would take multiple observations.
A player randomizes their strategies to keep the other players guessing so to not allow others to obtain
advantage in the game.
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signicant shares of revenue recycling are likely because of the small N environment, the one-
shot nature of the game, and the likely prompt timing of payouts of revenue shares. Players
expecting revenue redistribution will discount the magnitude of the tolls which will degrade
the objective eects and the eciency of the tolls.27 For example, a three-way congestion
would no longer trigger a positive toll charge since if everyone pays the same toll and all
revenue is redistributed back in lump-sum payments, then there is no additional cost for
entering that scenario.28 It is therefore important to consider when factoring in any type
of redistribution the best response for a given departure pattern might change compared to
a binding toll since players are considering the increased amount of toll revenue they will
receive.
An example of a player accounting for revenue redistribution, where the toll incentivizes
the player to make a Pareto inferior best-response decision, is the situation when the other
two players are assumed to depart Early. Under standard assumptions for time cost values
and with binding tolls, the best response for Player A to Players B and C both departing
Early is to depart Very Early as can be shown in Table 3.6 (assuming 2E < L + D). Yet
full lump-sum redistribution of tolls complicates this best response. Player A will know that
Players B and C will pay higher tolls, which increases toll revenues, if s/he chooses to depart
On-time versus Very Early and thus will receive a larger compensation that will oset their
expected costs. In Table 3.4, tolls for eev are less than eeo, which implies that the share of
toll revenue will be greater if the player departs On-time. Therefore, the best response for
Player A when the other two players depart Early is to depart On-time. An Early departure
27An open question is how any redistribution will aect the performance of an omniscient pricing scheme.
28Such a departure decision may not be a best response ex-post.
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minimizes their expected costs after adjusting for redistribution.29 This shift of expected
costs makes the outcome Pareto inferior since it increases TSC by increasing the amount
of journey delays from one to two. Any proposed solution for this issue needs toll revenue
to be allocated in such a way that it both improves social welfare and still achieves the
social optimal in PSNE. This solution could be distributing a percentage of total revenues,
the addition of third-party players that will spread and decrease the percentage of revenue
allocation, or other methods that do not make the congestion policy Pareto inferior.
Note that this formal extension of the three-player game is not limited to making theo-
retical predictions, it can also be applied to laboratory experiments or classroom exercises.30
The author has ran experiments of this game to investigate the performance and public
acceptability of congestion tolls. The game was programmed and conducted with the soft-
ware z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).31 Classroom exercises using the same z-Tree code were
conducted in Professor Levinson's Introduction to Trac Engineering course at University
of Minnesota in October 2013. Classroom experiments or similar hands-on approaches can
provide an engaged learning tool for people (hopefully current and future policymakers) to
understand congestion and congestion pricing.
29From Table 3.5, total toll revenue (the toll multiplied by two) for the situation of vee is MAX(D −
E, 0) while the total toll revenue for eeo is noticeably higher at MAX(3D + 2L − E, 0). A full lump-
sum redistribution of toll revenue (each player receives MAX(D + 2L3 − E3 , 0)) implicitly subsidizes and
incentivizes Player A to choose the socially inferior best response of departing On-time when the two other
players are assumed to depart Early. An On-time departure will then, assuming a positive toll, have an
adjusted expected cost of E3 +
L
3 instead of the expected cost of L+D of departing On-time without revenue
redistribution. The adjusted expected costs are then 7E3 −D − 2L3 , 13E +D + 13L, E3 + L3 , and E3 + L3 −D
for departures of Very Early, Early, On-Time, and Late, respectively, given the other two players depart
Early. The adjusted expected costs will most likely be less for On-time departure than the Very Early and
Early departure if 6E > D + L. It is up to the reader to modify the formal game and add a redistribution
parameter that takes values 0-1 for collected toll revenue.
30See Ziegelmeyer et al. (2008). Using their own model based on the bottleneck model, they investigate the
impact of public information and size of group on players' selection of scheduled discrete departure times.
Their framework does not discuss the introduction of ecient tolls.
31A copy of the z-Tree code is available upon request
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As with the case of including referendum votes, the game can be extended to test numer-
ous theories in a laboratory environment. The provided formal framework of the congestion
model can allow for relaxation of assumptions and further extensions to investigate conges-
tion using game theory. Researchers applying the model must be aware that examining and
testing MSNE in the laboratory is dicult and requires many observations.
3.6. Conclusion
This chapter corrects and further develops the discretized game-theoretic bottleneck
model rst introduced by Levinson (2005). This simplied and discretized version of the
heavily discussed basic bottleneck model of users trading o travel time (journey delay)
costs and schedule delay costs can illustrate the theoretical ex-ante and ex-post predictions
and welfare implications of congestion with and without congestion pricing. The model as-
sumes three players, but it can be expanded to more than three players. The inclusion of a
third player introduces the problem of when a player enters behind an existing queue. With-
out congestion pricing and over a range of cost parameters, the game emulates a prisoner's
dilemma. The predictions of the model indicate that congestion is an outcome of rational
behavior. The inclusion of an ecient toll can lead to pure-strategy Nash Equilibria (PSNE)
resulting in a socially optimal outcome or more ecient mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria
(MSNE). However, some forms of revenue allocation can distort behavior yielding an inferior
congestion policy that does not guarantee gains in eciency. Through the understanding of
simple interactions in a congestion context, policymakers exposed to such thinking can be
made more informed of the congestion problem and the eects and necessity of congestion
pricing.
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The inclusion of an ecient toll equaling the marginal external congestion cost (mecc)
of a player entering a departure time can lead to a socially optimal solution that may not
be unique. The existence of multiple PSNE implies that equilibria exist in MSNE. The
model conrms two troubling results mentioned in Silva et al. (2014) as they relate to the
equilibrium solution in bottleneck model: the potential nonexistence and uniqueness of PSNE
with or without tolls and that if PSNE do not exist, identical or homogeneous users can incur
dierent equilibrium costs.
The existence of non-unique equilbria in pure strategies makes it dicult to observe any
mixed strategies in a laboratory environment. The model can be extended to discuss methods
of revenue allocation to generate a PSNE that obtains the socially optimal outcome unique.
But any unique equilibrium solution will most likely have to have heterogeneous preferences
among the three players or for the revenue allocation to create winners and losers ad hoc
among homogeneous agents. The result in Levinson (2005) that tolls equaling a player's
mecc act as an information signal and are not paid in the PSNE is important; however, since
the optimal PSNE are not unique, there is still a need to design an eective toll revenue
redistribution scheme while keeping the tolls ecient. The type of redistribution scheme is
important when considering the public and political acceptability barriers of policymakers
introducing congestion tolls. The hope is that this model can demonstrate to policymakers
that congestion is a problem and such barriers are worth confronting. However, the model
suggests that the public may not be persuaded to accept a congestion pricing institution
where equity concerns are endogenous, the costs of traveling increase from tolls, and the
existence of equilibria in mixed-strategies still creates potential congestion problems.
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CHAPTER 4
Performance And Acceptability Of Congestion
Pricing Of A Three-player Bottleneck Game:
Experimental Evidence
4.1. Introduction
Trac congestion generates costs to society in dierent waysextra fuel is consumed,
more vehicle miles are traveled, land-use decisions are distorted by the presence of con-
gestion externalities, and commuters face time-delays. The Texas A&M Transportation
Institute states in its 2012 Urban Mobility Report (Schrank et al., 2012) that United States
trac congestion costs are increasing and that in 2011 congestion generated additional car-
bon dioxide emissions of 56 billion pounds, about 2.9 billion gallons of fuel wasted, and
$121 billion in total nancial costs. These total nancial costs translate to $818 per U.S.
commuter in 2011. But the majority of the negative externality costs from urban trans-
portation congestion stem from time-delay costs (Anas and Lindsey, 2011). These costs are
cuased by road users even though many of these users make decisions of taking dierent
modes of transportation, routes, or departing at dierent times, to avoid many of the costs
of congestion.
When addressing trac congestion, policy-makers face natural limitations of expanding
road and parking capacity in urban areas and turn to demand management policies that use
incentive-based mechanisms such as road pricing, cordon zone pricing, or demand-response
pricing for parking. While economists recommend such theoretically ecient policies, policy-
makers interested in mitigating the costs of negative externalities from trac congestion are
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concerned with the actual eciency and with political feasibility and public acceptabil-
ity of incentive-based mechanisms. Plans to implement road congestion pricing in Hong
Kong, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Scotland, and cities in the United States failed because
of public opposition (Hau, 1990; Kallbecken, 2013). However, congestion pricing policies
were successfully implemented and politically accepted, albeit disputed, in cities such as
Stockholm, Singapore, London, and Milan (Anas and Lindsey, 2011; Winslott-Hiselius et al.,
2009). Some of these schemes were successful in achieving their intended goals, others failed;
partly because commuters did not respond to the incentives the way policy-makers expected,
partly because the schemes, in an eort to increase acceptability, were not set up in a way
economists would recommend. The public acceptability literature raises several questions on
why some city congestion polices succeed while others do not. Yet as prefaced in much of
the literature, each city's congestion policy experience has its unique circumstances on why
a city's policy became a success or failure.
Two research questions then ensue, which motivated this chapter: how do individuals
respond to dierent incentives in a congestion context when welfare eects are endogenous,
and what factors inuence the public acceptability of an incentive-based mechanism. By
connecting the performance of individuals to their political worldviews on the acceptability
of such a policy, we can elicit reasons why some incentive-based programs are successfully
implemented while others fail. But since real-world data on individual congestion behavior
are sparse and fraught with noise, we turn to laboratory experiments to investigate the
performance and acceptability of revenue-neutral congestion tolls that are enacted by a series
of referendum votes. Although observing a real-world experiment would be ideal, laboratory
experiments allow for a low-cost setting to examine actual incentive-compatible behavior and
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can provide a guide of translating how policies would perform in the real world. I apply a
three-player bottleneck congestion game that contains time-delay externalities and emulates
a three-player prisoner's dilemma where the welfare eects are endogenous.
Despite theoretical predictions of eciency improvements from revenue-neutral tolls, the
results show varied performance and eciency improvements. Congestion tolls appear to be
most eective when there are higher schedule delay penalties (i.e., less schedule exibility)
yet the eciency improvements from tolls did not automatically lead a group of individuals
to the theoretically predicted socially optimal outcomes. Even with the evidence varied
eciency improvements from revenue-neutral tolls, public acceptabilitymeasured by a series
of referendum votesdid not increase over time. In this setting, political worldviews appear
to have no strong eects on public acceptability.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next two sections present background
information that reviews the literature and describes the three-player bottleneck congestion
model used for this experiment. Section 4.4 presents the experiment design of the experiment.
Section 4.5 presents the empirical results and discusses some implications of the results, and
Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2. Review Of Literature
A plethora of literature exists that investigates congestion issues for dierent elds. Urban
trac congestion is one eld that has interdisciplinary interest among urban planners, trac
engineers, economists, and others interested in the societal and environmental impacts from
congestion. This chapter's focus on time-costs is a concept at the core of many issues related
to congestion and queuing theory with many focusing on the allocation and value of time
developed by Becker (1965). This chapter builds on the (endogenous) allocation and value
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of time concept by combining it with the observation by Anas and Lindsey (2011) that
time-delay costs contribute to the majority of the negative externality costs from urban
transportation congestion.
The theoretical discussions of trac engineering by Wardrop (1952) in the 1950s paved
the way for an enormous amount of literature in urban trac congestion. Vickrey (1969)
proposed a bottleneck theoretical model that uses a value of time metric to examine con-
gestion problems. His model is used as the basis to many extensions that theoretically
examines issues concerning trac congestion such as number of routes, number of bottle-
necks, preferences of motorists, parking availability, dynamic problems with congestion, and
other related to transportation congestion issues (De Palma et al., 1983, 1997; Ben-Akiva
et al., 1984, 1986; Arnott et al., 1990a,b, 1993; Arnott, 1994; Arnott et al., 1994; Arnott and
Small, 1994; Arnott, 2006; De Palma and Fosgerau, 2010; Qian et al., 2011, 2012). These
developed congestion models assume many individuals and motorists do not specically ex-
amine congestion at the individual level. Levinson (2005) lls this gap by adapting Vickrey's
model for a game-theoretical bottleneck congestion model with individual players. Levin-
son's model can examine congestion with just the simplest form of two players but can be
expanded to multiple players. The model with three players is developed in Chapter 3 and
is also described in the next section; it is useful for examining and predicting outcomes as
well as calculating the optimal congestion tolls that make players internalize the social costs
of increasing time-cost delays they impose on others when creating congestion.
Congestion and responsive pricing has been discussed since Vickrey (1971) as demand-
management tool for congestion goods or goods having uncertain short-term demand. This
type of pricing has been implemented for goods such as electricity, canal and airport slots,
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internet bandwidth at cafes, vending machines, and alcoholic beverages at bars.1 The urban
transportation literature has recently focused on pricing of roads and parking spaces (Lind-
sey and Verhoef, 2000; Anderson and De Palma, 2004; Shoup, 2005; Zou and Levinson, 2006;
Borger, 2011).2 Most of the literature examines the eciency improvements and investigates
the trade-os stemming from equity concerns when responsive pricing is being used as a
demand-management tool. Chapter 3 formally adapts the Levinson (2005) bottleneck con-
gestion game, making it the most appropriate model for investigating the performance and
acceptability of tolls that theoretically act as a responsive pricing mechanism that manages
congestion.
Testing and investigating congestion theories in the real world is dicult. Because of
the enormous costs and infeasibility of implementing policies and collecting data, labora-
tory experiments have recently provided a low-cost alternative of investigating bottleneck
congestion models (Anderson et al., 2008; Hartman, 2007, 2012; Denant-Boemont et al.,
2009; Ziegelmeyer et al., 2008). None of these experiments have incorporated voting be-
havior and investigated the trade-o between eciency and equity concerns of congestion
(Pigouvian) tolls. The Levinson (2005) bottleneck congestion game applied in this chapter
does not have the exact properties as those in the previous literature. Such dierences may
prohibit the translation and comparison of results to previous congestion experiments, forms
of the bottleneck congestion model, and three trac paradoxes: Braess, Downs-Thomson,
and Pigou-Knight-Downs. However, the objective of this chapter is to examine the per-
formance and public acceptability of congestion tolls when welfare and equity concerns are
1A bar with changing prices Freakonomics, April 13, 2012. http://www.freakonomics.com/2012/04/13/a-
bar-with-changing-prices
2San Francisco is the rst major city to experiment with responsive pricing for parking with their SFpark
program (Chatman and Manville, 2014).
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endogenous. The model in Chapter 3 provides a game-theoretical base to compare empirical
outcomes to theoretical predictions. This chapter contributes to the literature by displaying
the performance and acceptability of a Vickrey based bottleneck congestion model.
A range of literature examining the public acceptability of incentive-based mechanisms
that deal with negative externalities exists with many studies focusing on the performance
and acceptability of road policies (Schade and Schlag, 2003; Marcucci and Marini, 2001;
Gaunt et al., 2007; Winslott-Hiselius et al., 2009; Larson and Sasanuma, 2010; Kallbecken,
2013). Schade and Schlag (2003) and Kallbecken (2013) identify and discuss factors that
determine the public acceptability and political feasibility of incentive-based mechanisms.
Even though pricing congestion can be seen as a mechanism to achieve cooperation and
socially optimal outcomes, the public acceptability of any incentive-based mechanism is
recognized as a main obstacle to the successful implementation of such a policy. Plans
to implement road congestion pricing in Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Scotland,
and the United States failed because of public opposition (Hau, 1990; Kallbecken, 2013).
However, congestion pricing plans were successfully implemented and politically accepted
in cities such as Stockholm, Singapore, London, and Milan. Yet each city has its own
circumstances to explain the success or failure of congestion pricing policies. Eliasson (2009)
comments that one of the issues related to urban road pricing is the imperfect nature of real-
world pricing schemes. He argues that unlike predicted theoretical outcomes, these actual
schemes do not guarantee that their benets exceed their set-up and operation costs. This
experiment examines if the endogenous welfare eects aect the success of a congestion toll
policy.
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The perceived eectiveness and eciency of the congestion program assisted with the
experience and eventual success in Stockholm. Furthermore, the implementation and positive
experience of a trial run assisted and helped overcome the program's initial negative view
resulting in a 51.3% referendum vote approval of keeping the policy permanent (Börjesson
et al., 2012; Winslott-Hiselius et al., 2009). Such approval also overcame the perceived
distributional and equity concerns of the regressive nature and punishing eects of road
prices on society's poorer population (Karlström and Franklin, 2009). Yet Anas and Lindsey
(2011) speculate that the voting behavior was inuenced by political ideology (Hårsman and
Quigley, 2010).
Yet pricing policies in cities like Hong Kong and Edinburgh, Scotland, failed. Distribu-
tional and equity concerns and the lack of understanding of the eectiveness of the program
resulted in rational and self-interested people to vote down or discontinue these programs.
Gaunt et al. (2007) reviewed self-completed questionnaires from voters in Edinburgh and
found that the pricing scheme was too overly complex for people to understand and that car
ownership was a principal determinant of voting behavior. This complexity did not allow car
owners to fully appreciate the potential benets and eectiveness of the scheme even though
most knew that congestion was a signicant and growing program. As such, this misun-
derstanding and Edinburgh's failure to expand transit opportunities as part of the program
resulted in citizens in 2005 opposing and voting down the road pricing scheme (Anas and
Lindsey, 2011).
Similarly, despite having a 21-month long trial run, Hong Kong had several contributing
reasons for why their electronic road pricing system failed despite reports that the policy
had an estimated benet-cost ratio of 14 to 1 (Hau, 1990). Hau (1990) lists a few of the
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contributing reasons for why the policy was voted down: the income eects of a weakening
economy at the time, the distributional concerns of motorists due to the exemptions of
certain vehicles, the lack of public relations between the government and citizens, and the
distrust people had on whether the government would follow through with their earmarking
promises. So it appears that the circumstances for the acceptability of a congestion pricing
scheme are sensitive to the perceived eectiveness and eciency, the distributional concerns,
and the rational self-interest and knowledge of voters of the policy. Experimental analysis
thus seems to be an appropriate method to understand the signicance of these reasons.
Motivated by the Stockholm experience in 2006, only recently has the public acceptability
of Pigouvian like taxes been tested in a laboratory environment (Cherry et al., 2013, 2012;
Kallbekken et al., 2011). Cherry et al. (2012) designed an externality-game experiment
that includes treatments of a trial run with an ecient Pigouvian tax. They nd that the
experience of the trial run increases the acceptability of a tax, and that a positive experience
of a trial run can overcome misperception and biases about an incentive based mechanisms
tax policy. Yet unlike Stockholm, this evidence is not supported by what was observed with
the experience in Hong Kong. Another experiment conducted by Kallbekken et al. (2011)
found that a lack of understanding of the workings and eects of a Pigouvian tax instrument
does not inuence the opposition of such policies. So unlike the experimental designs of these
experiments where subjects are maximizing prots with the presence of an externality, the
experiment used in this chapter has subjects making cost-minimization decisions, which is
more consistent with what is experienced in the real world.
This chapter touches on most of these factors that contribute to the public acceptability.
But the chapter's focus is examining whether self-interest, distributional concerns, and the
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perceived eectiveness and eciency of a policy when equity eects are endogeneous, are
signicant factors for determining the acceptability of a congestion toll policy. Such results
will add to the literature and may highlight the factors that contribute (or not contribute)
to the public acceptability of a congestion toll.
4.3. Three-Player Bottleneck Congestion Game
The bottleneck congestion game is derived from the game-theoretical model presented
in Chapter 3 that emulates a three-player prisoner dilemma. In the game, all players have
the same origin and decide when to depart to reach their (same) destination knowing that
a bottleneck exists that restricts the arrival time so that a queue can develop. Introducing
congestion pricing in the game can minimize total social costs if the revenue is returned to
the participants (Levinson, 2005).
Each player has the discrete options of departing at one of four time slots: Very Early,
Early, On-time, or Late. If two (three) players depart at the same time there will be con-
gestion, and one (two) players will randomly arrive in the next (next and second to next)
time slot. Six arrival outcomes are then possible: Very Early, Early, On-time, Late, Really
Late, and Super Late. Players thus can depart at the same time slot, but because of the
bottleneck will not arrive in the same time slot. If two players depart at the same time slot
then randomly one will arrive at that time slot while the other incurs a journey delay and
arrives at the next time slot. For the situation where all three players depart at the same
time slot, then it is randomly determined that one player arrives at that time slot, another
player incurs a journey delay and arrives at the next time slot, and the third person arrives
two time slots later and incurs costs of being twice journey delayed. There exists 64 depar-
ture patterns with 20 distinct departure patterns if ignoring player identication. Players
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thus make cost-minimizing decisions and their costs (penalties) depend on their arrival time
and the amount of journey delays.
Congestion created by players departing at the same time imposes a negative externality
in the game and aects players that were never contributing to the congestion. Tolls are
prescribed to mitigate this negative externality and reduce overall social costs. Tolls are only
paid by a player that creates congestion. The congestion tolls are equal to the incremental
(marginal) external congestion cost created by a player that enters and departs in a specic
congestible scenario. It is the dierence between the incremental social cost of entering
a congestible scenario and the incremental private cost the user incurs by entering that
scenario. For example, assume two players depart Early and On-time. A third player that
also departs On-time increases the expected costs and imposes ex-ante an externality on
that original individual that departed On-time since there is now a chance of that individual
incurring a journey delay and arriving Late. The ecient toll is thus the incremental social
costs (increased expected time costs borne by the other two player(s)) generated by the
congestion from the third player's decision.
Out of the 64 possible departure patterns, there are 40 congestible scenarios when con-
sidering player identication and 16 congestible scenarios without considering player identi-
cation. Depending on the game's time-cost parameters, up to 16 non-zero valued tolls can
be imposed for the 16 congestible scenarios without considering player identication. Each
toll represents the externality that is incurred by the other player(s) by someone entering a
congestible scenario and aects the other players' expected costs (the sum of journey and
schedule delay costs). Please refer to Chapter 3 for the game-theoretical model and formal
framework of the three-player game and the derivation of ecient congestion tolls. The tolls
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in this experiment are imposed only when congestion is created; tolls are revenue-neutral
where toll revenue is redistributed lump-sum to all three players. The strategies and level of
ecient tolls of the game depend on each individual's time-cost parameters. This game can
be applied to where players have heterogeneous or homogeneous preferences. This chapter
focuses on the case where players have known homogeneous preferences. A trade-o of fair-
ness and eciency among players may be elicited from having homogeneous preferences since
subjects will observe and experience clear winners and losers from departure decisions
and resulting arrival outcomes.3
4.4. Experiment Design
The experiment is designed to elicit information to test the performance and acceptability
of ecient tolls. In the experiment, the objective of each participant is to minimize travel
costs. Participants are in groups of three and each participant decides when to depart while
facing a bottleneck.
The experiment follows a 2×2 design that varies two treatments: sequencing of cost
parameters (reference, low, and high costs) and whether a policy of congestion pricing (tolls)
occurs in the rst session of each round. The experiment consists of three rounds consisting
of three sessions each. Each session consists of four periods where participants decide when to
depart. Participants are randomly assigned into a group for each of the three rounds. After
the rst and second session (after the fourth and eighth period) of a round, a referendum vote
occurs on whether to approve or disapprove a policy that introduces revenue-neutral tolls
for the next 4-period session. A summary of the experiment is depicted in Table 4.1. The
experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
3See Chapter 3 for the Cheung (1983) boat tracker analogy.
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Table 4.1. Summary Of The Experiment
4.4.1. Experimental framework and parameters. Each round in Table 4.1 con-
tains dierent time-cost preference parameters that yield dierent theoretical predictions.
Parameters are based on the empirical estimates in Small (1982) and are homogeneous for
a group.4 Round 1 has parameters that are referred in this chapter as the reference cost
case. The treatment eect for ordering of time-costs preferences occurs in rounds 2 and
3. Subjects have either low time-cost preferences in Round 2 and then high time-cost
preferences in Round 3, or vice versa. Since subjects are making decisions over time, learn-
ing eects are likely. This treatment eect is then used to observe whether the ordering
of cost time-preferences matters when examining the performance and acceptability of the
congestion toll policy.
The second treatment eect is to test whether experience of the revenue-neutral pricing
policy matters when examining performance and acceptability of such a policy. Similar to
the experience in Stockholm, this is done by having a treatment where the rst session of
each round, as seen in Table 4.1, either have or do not have an institution with congestion
4Small (1982) empirically estimated time preferences by worker type, family size, and type of commuter.
Three of his estimates are employed in this experiment: all drivers drivers that drive alone and drivers
that drive alone, have a family and a white-collar job for our reference, low, and high time-cost parameter
cases, respectively. Small (1982) provides marginal rates of substitution of schedule arrivals by minutes of
travel time for dierent subgroups of commuters. A minute of travel time is equivalent to one minute of
journey delay. The values in the table were scaled up by four and rounded to get tractable parameter values
for the experiment.
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tolls before their rst referendum vote. This eect will allow us to examine hypotheses
related to how experience aects performance and acceptability of congestion tolls.
At the beginning of the experiment subjects are told that they are endowed with 400
laboratory tokens worth ten cents each. The time-cost preferences are thus measured in
laboratory tokens. Thus cost-minimization is the objective of all subjects. As mentioned
before, cost-minimization decisions in a context of congestion seem more consistent with real-
world scenarios as well as being more tractable with the theoretical transportation congestion
literature. Information on the toll values are disclosed before every decision is made. Subjects
are updated on their individual cost outcomes, total toll payments, and share of toll revenue
recycled at the end of every session and round. A general summary of individual and group
outcomes are disclosed at the end of every period.5
Each subject experiences six referendum votes. The votes occur after the rst and second
session of each round (see Table 4.1).6 Thus depending on the period and what treatment
they are randomly placed in, subjects vote either to implement, not implement, continue,
or dis-continue tolls for their group for the next four-period session.7 They should vote for
the policy if their welfare will improve from more reliable and lower cost outcomes. People
5Each subject was provided a handout that had a period by period table so that they can keep track of their
decisions and outcomes.
6I was cautious with the wording of the referendum vote in the experiment as to not inuence the voting
decisions of the subjects. Instead of describing the motivation of tolls of reducing congestion costs, rather
the wording was kept more general. By keeping the wording general of stating that only those that create
congestion are tolled and nothing to suggest welfare improvements, I did not want to prime subjects to vote
a certain way. Additionally, I believed that subjects would have correctly rejected the tolls because of the
additional negative welfare implications of creating congestion if the toll revenue was not redistributed. Thus
the design of having total redistribution of tolls provides the best-case of a congestion demand-management
policy. Real-world benet-cost analysis of such congestion policy would have to consider other parts that
aect the cost-benet analysis of the program such as administrative costs, distributional concerns, and
other alternatives to tolls.
7Such a design might make it dicult to make empirical cross-treatment comparisons since subjects are self-
selecting their own treatment of experiencing the policy of tolls. Thus there exist multiple paths a subject
can experience throughout the experiment on whether or not they participate with tolls. It is unlikely that
one subject will have the same experience of having tolls or no tolls in each session as another subject.
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should vote against the policy if they are averse to the possibility of paying tolls and/or
having to depart at an undesirable costly time.
4.4.2. Theoretical predictions. The predicted outcomes depend on the time-cost
parameters. Each parameter specication provide their own predicted outcomes. Table 4.2
summarizes the predicted Nash equilibria for the dierent cost parameters assuming no
revenue redistribution.8 Note that the reference and low-cost parameter cases yield no pure
strategy Nash equilibria when no tolls are in place; only mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
exist for these time-cost preferences.9 In all three cases with tolls, three players departing
separately at the earliest three time slots, veo (Very Early, Early, and On-time), is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium. In pure strategies, there are six possible sequences that this
departure scenario occurs with player identication. All players depart at dierent times
with this outcome, which results in no congestion and the lowest possible cost outcome for
the group. In addition to this departure sequence, the low-cost case has an additional Nash
equilibrium of eol (Early, On-time, and Late). Such a departure sequence yields the same
minimum-cost outcome as the Very Early, Early, and On-time departure sequence, but only
for the low-cost scenario.
Congestion tolls for each of the cost cases are depicted in Tables C.3.1 and C.3.2 in
the Appendix.10 The tolls act as a threat and are only paid by the players that create
the particular congestion. The values in Table C.3.2 also show the marginal (incremental)
8Recall that in the experiment revenue is redistributed at the end of stage. In my opinion, the uncertainty
of the level of tolls and the lag in redistribution makes the tolls more binding.
9Mixed-strategy Nash equilibria were calculated using the software Gambit (McKelvey et al., 2013). Numer-
ous mixed-strategy Nash equilibria exist for each time-cost case. This chapter reports only the symmetric
equilbria. The non-symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilbria can be made available by author upon request.
10After the experiment it was determined that the charges for the three-way congestion scenarios were
originally overvalued. Referring to Table 3.5 in Chapter 3, the tolls used for vvv, eee, ooo, and lll were




, 2L+ 2D, and 2L+ 2D, respectively. The error did not aect pure-strategy Nash
equilibria (assuming no toll revenue is redistributed.)
103
Table 4.2. Predicted Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria Solutions
No Tolls With Tolls (Optimal)
Parameters E D L # N.E. Solutions* # N.E. Solutions*
Reference 3 4 8 13 (4)** mixed N.E. 49 (12) veo
Low 2 4 4 52 (13) mixed N.E. 28 (7) veo, eol
High 5 4 12 1 eee 49 (12) veo
*Symmetric Mixed Nash equilibrium for reference cost case with no tolls: v = 19.82%, e =
80.18%, o = 0%, l = 0%; with tolls: v = 42.3%, e = 36%, o = 21.7%, l = 0%.. Symmetric
Mixed Nash equilibrium for low-cost case with no tolls: v = 19.38%, e = 68.58%, o =
7.8%, l = 4.23%; with tolls v = 31.83%, e = 34.20%, o = 25.67%, l = 8.3%. Symmetric
Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for high-cost case with tolls: v = 38.56%, e = 42.13%, o =
19.31, l = 0%.
**For count of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, the number in parentheses ignores player
identication.
external congestion cost a single player creates by entering in a particular congestion scenario.
This cost is the increased expected journey and schedule delay incurred by the other players.
For the three cost cases, the tolls should have a noticeable behavioral eect of the best
responses of the player when they assume that the other players depart Early and/or one
departs Early and the other On-time.
The socially optimal outcome of players departing at separate times is analogous to the
Chapter 2 two-route congestion game socially optimal outcome of three of the lowest value
of time players taking the slower uncongested route, Route B. Both outcomes minimize total
social costs. However, the social optimum in Chapter 2 is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium
while here it is not unique. Multiple pure-strategy equilibria exist and in mixed strategies
as well. Hence the equity eects in this experiment are unstable and endogenous while in
Chapter 2 they were exogenous and predicted to be stable.
Note in Table C.3.2 in the reference and low-cost cases that the optimal level of congestion
is zero. Zero congestion can be socially acceptable in some cases in the high-cost case. For
example, assume player 1 departs Very Early and player 2 departs On-time in the high-cost
case. If Player 2 departs early, then Player 1 would incur a cost of 12 and player 3 a cost
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of 0. But if Player 2 departs the same time as player 1, Very Early, and if Player 1 is
delayed to the Early time slot, then player 1 suers a journey delay cost of 4 and a schedule
delay cost of 5 (total cost of 9). Congestion at Very Early ex-ante actually reduced player
1's (expected) costs! So although congestion in the high-cost case creates journey delays,
congestion in the Very Early time period does not create positive marginal social costs thus
is socially acceptable and optimal only if it occurs in the Very Early time period. But the
optimal amount of congestion evaluated at the Nash equilibrium with tolls is no congestion
occurring across all cost-cases. Therefore congestion is still socially acceptable only when it
occurs in the Very Early time slot for the high-cost case.11
Tables C.1.1, C.1.2, and C.1.3 in the Appendix are the normal-form representation of
the games for each cost case, with and without tolls, for a given player. The expected costs
for each departure scenario is the sum of the expected journey delay and expected schedule
delay given the departure strategies of the other two players. Chapter 3 provides more
detail on how these values are created. The best response for every player is the departure
decision that minimizes expected costs (see Table 4.2) for equilibria for each cost case and
toll scenario. All games with no tolls represent a prisoner's dilemma where the decisions of
self-interested individuals lead to a sub-optimal group outcome that increases total group
costs.
The high-cost case best illustrates the prisoner's dilemma of the congestion game (refer to
Table C.1.3). Without tolls, risk-neutral individuals ought to depart early since this decision
minimizes expected individual costs at 29
3
and no other decision could make the individual
better o. Such an outcome represents a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium as reported
11Other time-cost parameter values may also result in some congestion being socially acceptable and even
socially optimal. Moreover, the real world will most denitely have some non-zero level of congestion be
socially acceptable and optimal.
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in Table 4.2. Yet if all depart Early, then randomly one person arrives early and incurs a
cost of 5, another is delayed to the On-time slot and incurs a cost of 4, while another person
is delayed twice, arrives Late, and incurs a cost of 20. This pure-strategy equilibrium leads
to a total group cost of 29 where individuals have a 33% probability of incurring the highest
individual cost of 20. But the group can be made better o if they have a departure pattern
of veo which achieves the lowest and optimal group cost of 15. Yet veo is not stable without
tolls and individuals have the incentive return to the strategy of departing Early.
In the high-cost case, consider an individual that deviates (assuming the other two players
depart Early) and instead of departing Early she departs Very Early. Such a deviation yields
an expected cost of 10 for the individual, which is half the amount of cost if the individual
ended up arriving Late, but 10 is greater than the expected cost of 29
3
from departing Early.
Moreover, departing Early allows a two-thirds chance to obtain a lower individual cost of 5
or 4 compared to the expected cost of 29
3
. As such, a Pareto improvement, based on arrival
outcomes, is possible if two of the three players deviate with one departing Very Early
and the other On-time. Yet the context and institution of the game from the randomness
of who actually gets congested and when they arrive does not allow for such coordination
to happen. However, when tolls are in place then individuals can cooperate and obtain the
ecient minimal-cost outcome of veo for the high-cost case. Like the high-cost case, a similar
story can be told regarding the prisoner's dilemma faced in the reference and low-cost cases
but with the presence of mixed strategies without tolls.
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4.5. Empirical Analysis
Using undergraduates from Colorado State University, 2880 total individual observations
and 940 group observations were collected.12 The average age was 19.3 with a third of the
subjects being female. Each subject participated in 3 groups, thus with 84 subjects there
were 84 total unique groups (28 for each cost scenario). Observations between institutions
with tolls and without tolls across all cost scenarios are not evenly split because of varied
populations across treatments and voting behaviors.13 Below is the empirical analysis of
the data collected from the experiment that examines group performance and voting behav-
ior. Inferences about the public acceptability of a policy must also include whether people
behaved according to theory.
4.5.1. Group performance and effectiveness of tolls. Group performance and
eciency improvements from tolls are examined by comparing outcomes of departure de-
cisions, total group costs, amount of journey delays occurred and likelihood of congestion,
likelihood a group achieves the optimal departure pattern (or the likelihood of not obtaining
a sub-optimal departure pattern like the high-cost case), and the dierence in an eciency
metric that measures a group's performance of a period compared to the optimal outcome.
The frequency of the 20 various departure patterns (ignoring player identication) reveals
the uncertain behavior of individuals. Tables C.1.4, C.1.5, and C.1.6 in the Appendix report
12Subjects were paid based on their performance with average earnings of $20. The no-policy-rst treatment
had 21 subjects in the reference-low-high cost sequence and 18 in the reference-high-low cost sequence.
The policy-rst treatment had 24 subjects in the reference-high-low cost sequence and 21 subjects in the
reference-low-high cost sequence.
13After completion of the experiment a bug in the z-Tree code was discovered and it aected two of the
treatments. The parameters for three of the subjects in two groups in round 2 in each treatment were not
correct. The error only aects the low and high-cost scenarios. Of the 1008 group observations which had
3024 individual observations, four groups with twelve observations each were dropped from the empirical
analysis. Future analysis will be conducted to see how this decision aects the outcomes of the nal round,
but I currently assume that there is no eect from the error in round 3.
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the group departure decisions for the each cost case for periods with and without tolls. The
frequencies reveal a variety of departure patterns that occurred, and most notably that the
presence of tolls created a greater dispersion of dierent departure patterns for a given cost
case. Note also in the high-cost case in Table C.1.6 that, as predicted by the Nash equilib-
ria predictions reported in Table 4.2, everyone appears to depart early with no tolls. The
frequency noticeably drops when tolls are in place. The presence of tolls appear to change
group behavior by allowing for greater dispersion in frequency of other departure patterns.
4.5.1.1. Question 1: Do revenue-neutral tolls reduce total group costs and improve e-
ciency? The presence of tolls appears to change group departure patterns, yet the question
is whether the change results in improvement in group welfare and eciency. Table C.1.7
reports average group costs by cost scenario and treatment type. It is exclusively in the
high-cost case that appears a noticeable dierence in average group costs between situations
with and without tolls.14 Improvements from the tolls appear to vary across the cost cases.
The eectiveness in the reduction of group costs from tolls are empirically estimated using
a random eects panel data model specication (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Since each
group is unique per cost setting and makes twelve group decisions over time, the random-
eects specication provides structure to these repeated decisions. The eect of tolls on
14Using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for each cost case to compare group costs with and without tolls yields
z-scores of 1.56, 3.43, 5.69, for the reference, low, and high-cost cases. Tolls have no statistically signicant
dierence on group costs for the reference cost case and have a 1% statistical signicant dierence for the
low and high-cost cases.
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group i total group costs (GroupCosti,t) for period t is represented in equations 9 and 10:
GroupCosti,t = β0 + β1Lowt + β2Hight + β3(Lowt ×Rd2t) + β4(Hight ×Rd2t)
+ β5(Referencet × Tollsi,t) + β6(Lowt × Tollsi,t) + β7(Hight × Tollsi,t)
+ β8(Tolls1stTrmti) + β9(Ref −High− LowTrmti)
+ β10(Tolls1sti ×Ref −High− Lowi) + εit
(9)
(10) εit = ηi + µit
where εit represents unobserved factors that inuence total group costs. As seen in equation
(10) this term has two components where µit represents the random unobserved inuences,
where the mean of µit is assumed to be zero and ηi reects the unobserved dierences among
the groups.
Equation (9) strictly uses binary independent variables and thus provides a basic method
of estimating the eectiveness of tolls by cost scenario. The interaction terms Lowt × Rd2t
and Hight × Rd2t are invariant variables that control for the design of the experiment
where subjects experienced the high and low-cost cases at either round two or three of
the experiment. The Tolls1stTrmt treatment variable represent whether groups started a
stage of a round with tolls (1=yes, 0=no), Ref−High−LowTrmt represents the ordering
treatment (1=yes, 0=no), and Tolls1st×Ref −High−Low is the interaction of the two
treatments.
In Equation 9, the eectiveness of the toll is β5 for the reference case, β6 for low-cost case,
and β7 for the high-cost case. The expected signs of these estimated coecients (marginal
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eects of tolls for a given cost scenario) regarding group costs are negative. This introduces
the Hypothesis 1a:
• Hypothesis 1a: For each cost scenario, tolls do not decrease group costs.
(H0 : β5 ≥ 0; H0 : β6 ≥ 0; H0 : β7 ≥ 0 when dependent variable is group costs)
As shown in the rst column of Table 4.3, tolls do reduce total group costs. But when
examining across all the cost cases in columns 2 and 3, only for the high-cost case is the
reduction in group costs signicantly dierent compared to without a toll (1% signicance).
Therefore just one of the three null hypotheses is rejected: tolls do not decrease group costs
in the high-cost case. Treatment eects of ordering of cost cases or having tolls occur in the
rst session of a round appear to not have any signicant eect on group cost outcomes.
However, instead of looking at group costs, another way of examining the welfare im-
provement is using a metric of eciency by comparing how a group did compared to the
optimal rate. Recall that the optimal group cost is the cost associated for when the group
separately depart at the three earliest time slots. Thus (1 − (GroupCosti,t − 9)/(51)),
(1 − (GroupCosti,t − 6)/(30)), (1 − (GroupCosti,t − 15)/(69)) provide a formula for e-
ciency percentages bounded by zero and one for the reference, low-cost, and high-cost cases,
respectively.15 Such a metric can allow for a normalized comparison across the three cost
cases.
In the Appendix, Figures C.1a, C.1b, and C.1c illustrate the average eciency per period
for the dierent cost scenarios with and without the presence of tolls. The Appendix also
shows the percentage frequency groups obtained the socially ecient outcome for each period
15The general formula for calculating group eciency is:
Efficiency = 1 − GroupCosti,t−LowestGroupCostPossibleHighestGroupCostPossible−LowestGroupCostPossible where the lowest group cost possible is
the optimal outcome and the highest group possible is self-explanatory and is associated with the outcome
where everyone departs late. It can be seen that the optimal outcome results in a zero numerator resulting
in 100% while the worst results in in an outcome of 1 resulting in 0%.
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in a round (see Figures C.2a, C.2b, and C.2c). Tolls in the high-cost case in Figure C.1c
appear to have the most noticeable eciency improvement. Tolls in the low-cost case in
Figure C.1b might have some improvement, but the lines in Table C.1a for the reference-
cost case do not suggest any dierence. One distinct observation for the high-cost case is
how all the outcomes with the exception of period 10 appear above 51.7% (the eciency
measurement for the Nash equilibrium when all players depart early). Indeed, as shown in
Table C.1.6 many groups in the high-cost case without tolls did play the Nash equilibrium,
but the average suggests that not all individuals behaved according to theoretical predictions
preventing eciency gains. Also, there are no noticeable improvements or learning in any of
the cost cases apparent when looking at the gures. To examine if eciency improves with
tolls, Hypothesis 1b is tested:
• Hypothesis 1b: For each cost-scenario, tolls do not increase eciency.
(H0 : β5 ≥ 0; H0 : β6 ≥ 0; H0 : β7 ≥ 0 when dependent variable is eciency)
Applying Equation 9 and random eects panel model specication, but with group e-
ciency as the dependent variable, Table 4.3 reports coecient estimates. The tolls appear
to have a signicant eect of improving eciency by roughly 2% across all cost cases. But
when examining the eect of the toll by each cost case, no statistically signicant eects are
observed for the reference or low-cost cases. And as expected from Figure C.1c, the high-cost
case had the largest eciency improvement of 3.3%. The results suggest that individuals to
not converge to the optimal departure pattern and that the eectiveness of tolls depend on
individuals' time-cost preferences. Similar to the tests of Hypothesis 1a, the null hypothesis
in Hypothesis 1b of tolls not increasing eciency is rejected just for the high-cost case (5%
signicance). Failure to reject both hypotheses from Hypothesis 1 for the reference and
111
Table 4.3. Estimates On Eectiveness Of Tolls On Group Costs And Eciency
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Group Cost Group Cost Group Cost Eciency Eciency Eciency
Tolls -0.9105∗ 0.0196∗∗
(0.4800) (0.0087)
High× Rd2 0.5041 1.6422 -0.0073 -0.0295
(0.8573) (1.2010) (0.0176) (0.0247)
Low× Rd2 -0.2376 -1.3807 0.0079 0.0307
(0.8817) (1.2203) (0.0181) (0.0251)
Low -4.9569∗∗∗ -4.4366∗∗∗ -0.0396∗∗ -0.0500∗∗∗
(0.8213) (0.9103) (0.0168) (0.0187)
High 7.6111∗∗∗ 7.0234∗∗∗ 0.0156 0.0270
(0.8889) (1.0021) (0.0182) (0.0206)
Reference× Tolls -0.0229 0.0352 0.0003 -0.0015
(0.7118) (0.7333) (0.0145) (0.0149)
Low× Tolls -0.6827 -0.6165 0.0228 0.0212
(0.7582) (0.7728) (0.0155) (0.0157)
High× Tolls -2.3634∗∗∗ -2.3246∗∗∗ 0.0343∗∗ 0.0332∗∗
(0.7280) (0.7359) (0.0148) (0.0150)
Tolls1st Trmt -0.2014 0.0078
(0.7533) (0.0155)
Ref-High-Low Trmt -1.0675 0.0236
(0.9887) (0.0204)
Tolls1st× Ref-High-Low -0.0847 -0.0034
(0.9969) (0.0205)
Constant 17.5020∗∗∗ 16.6329∗∗∗ 17.3092∗∗∗ 0.8420∗∗∗ 0.8504∗∗∗ 0.8354∗∗∗
(0.6431) (0.5337) (0.7758) (0.0068) (0.0109) (0.0160)
N 960 960 960 960 960 960
p-value 0.0579 0.0000 0.0000 0.0249 0.0003 0.0012
χ2 3.5971 414.5689 410.7500 5.0288 27.4093 29.0103
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
low-cost cases suggest the mixed Nash equilibria predictions and endogenous welfare eects
creates unstable outcomes (or at least the tolls make the outcomes in the high-cost case more
noticeably stable).
Answer to Research Question 1: Revenue-neutral tolls reduced group costs and improved
group welfare and eciency for the high-cost case (i.e., inexible scheduling preferences)
and not for the reference or low-cost cases.
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The observed improvement from the toll does suggest something about the economic sig-
nicant about the eects of the tolls. Keeping in mind that these are upper-bound welfare
estimates, tolls indeed provide eciency improvement depending on the cost case, but the
magnitude might not be enough when policymakers consider a benet-cost analysis of rec-
ommending such a policy. Moreover, voting behavior for each scenario ought to be consistent
with eciency improvements. Regardless, as will be seen in addressing the next research
questions, tolls had various specic performance improvements with group outcomes across
all cost cases that must also be considered. As expected, the result highlights the diculty
of examining outcomes when mixed strategies exist and welfare eects are endogenous.
4.5.1.2. Question 2: Do subjects behave according to theoretical predictions such that the
presence of revenue-neutral tolls reduce congestion and journey delays? The reduction in
journey delays, reduction in types of congestion, and the improvement in a group's coordi-
nation to achieve optimal departure patterns can explain the gains in group eciency for a
respective cost case.16 Equation 9 is again used to estimate the eect of tolls on the follow-
ing dependent variables: frequency of journey delays, whether congestion occurs, whether
three-way congestion occurs, whether two-way congestion occurs, whether a queue (player is
delayed without causing congestion) occurs, whether the social optimal (minimal cost) out-
come occurs, whether the departure pattern veo occurs, and whether the departure pattern
eee occurs. Equation 9 is again used to estimate the eect of tolls on the above performance
measures. The following hypotheses are tested:
16Using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for each cost case to compare journey delays of a group with and without
tolls yields z-scores of 1.68, 2.79, 4.74, for the reference, low-cost, and high-cost cases, respectively. Tolls
have a 10% statistically signicant dierence for the reference case while the low-cost and high-cost cases
have a 1% statistically signicant dierence.
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• Hypothesis 2a: For each cost-scenario, tolls do not reduce the frequency of journey delays.
(H0 : β5 ≥ 0; H0 : β6 ≥ 0; H0 : β7 ≥ 0; when dependent variable is number of journey
delays)
• Hypothesis 2b: For each cost-scenario, tolls do not change the probability of any type of
congestion occurring. (H0 : β5 = 0; H0 : β6 = 0; H0 : β7 = 0; when dependent variable is
whether congestion occurs)
• Hypothesis 2c: For each cost-scenario, tolls do not change the probability of three-way
congestion occurring. (H0 : β5 = 0; H0 : β6 = 0; H0 : β7 = 0; when dependent variable is
whether three-way congestion occurs)
• Hypothesis 2d: For each cost-scenario, tolls do not change the probability of two-way
congestion occurring. (H0 : β5 = 0; H0 : β6 = 0; H0 : β7 = 0; when dependent variable is
whether two-way congestion occurs)
• Hypothesis 2e: For each cost-scenario, tolls do not change the probability of a queue
developing. (H0 : β5 = 0; H0 : β6 = 0; H0 : β7 = 0; when dependent variable is whether a
queue occurs)
• Hypothesis 2f: For each cost-scenario, tolls do not change the probability of a groups
obtaining social optimal (lowest cost) departure decisions. (H0 : β5 = 0; H0 : β6 = 0;
H0 : β7 = 0; when dependent variable is whether a the social optimal departure pattern
occurs)
• Hypothesis 2g: For each cost-scenario, tolls do not change the probability of a groups
obtaining a veo departure pattern. (H0 : β5 = 0; H0 : β6 = 0; H0 : β7 = 0; when
dependent variable is whether a veo departure pattern occurs)
• Hypothesis 2h: For each cost-scenario, tolls do not change the probability of a groups
obtaining a eee departure pattern. (H0 : β5 = 0; H0 : β6 = 0; H0 : β7 = 0; when
dependent variable is whether a eee departure pattern occurs)
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Regression (1) in Table C.1.8 provides negative binomial estimates for frequency of jour-
ney delays by applying a random eects specication for Equation 9. The count data gen-
eration makes the negative binomial specication appropriate for estimating journey delays.
Looking at Hypothesis 2a, the null hypothesis of journey delays not being reduced from
tolls is rejected for the high (1% signicance) and low (5% signicance) cost cases when a
one-sided test is implemented. Journey delays are economically signicantly reduced more
in the high-cost case. This observation is helpful when thinking of costs that might occur
to parties outside of the three players. A reduction of congestion or cars cruising to nd
parking can have external benets like the reduction of accidents, reduction pollution and
other environmental benets. Such benets are not included in the costs of experiments but
should be considered by policymakers. Yet these benets are assumed to not be considered
when an individual votes since they are outside of the context of the experiment.
Estimating the likelihood of congestion outcomes and departure patterns using a logit
specication reveals that tolls do not absolutely guarantee a reduction in congestion nor
guarantees groups coordinating to and achieve socially optimal outcomes. Regressions (2)
through (5) in Table C.1.8 reports the logit coecient estimates of the likelihood of various
types of congestion occurring with and without tolls. Three-way congestion is when all
groups depart at the same time, two-way congestion is when only two subjects depart at
the same time, while a queue is a form of two-way congestion where one player departs at
the time immediately after the two-way congestion occurs.17 Any Congestion is if either
two-way or three-way congestion occurs. Tolls appear to reduce any type of congestion for
the low-cost case, yet only for the high-cost case do tolls reduce the likelihood of obtaining
17Recall that three-way congestion results in three total journey delays, two-way congestion results in one
journey delay, and a queue results in two journey delays.
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three-way congestion. This latter result is consistent with theoretical predictions for the
high-cost case (see Table 4.2). Furthermore, the estimates suggest that tolls increase the
likelihood of two-way congestion for the high-cost case despite the reduction of three-way
congestion. Tolls do reduce the likelihood of a queue developing in the reference cost case.
When these mixed outcomes are applied to the hypothesis tests, the majority of the null
hypotheses stated in Hypotheses 2b to 2e failed to be rejected. The most notable result is
from Hypothesis 2c where the likelihood of three-way congestion is reduced and is negative
at 1% signicance; it follows that tolls are forcing players to deviate from the no-toll pure-
strategy Nash equilibria, eee.
Table C.1.8 reports regressions (6) to (8) which estimate the logit coecients and likeli-
hood of achieving socially optimal departure patterns, the occurrence when a groups departs
veo, and if all depart early (eee). Again, a random eects panel model with a logit speci-
cation is used for these estimations. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the likelihood
of all individuals departing early increases in the high-cost case without tolls, and tolls re-
duce the likelihood of obtaining that outcome. Notice too that the likelihood of this same
undesirable departure pattern is reduced for the low-cost case. Further, tolls increase the
likelihood that veo is observed in the high-cost case. Tables C.1.5 and C.1.6 also support
the nding that the toll reduces everyone from all departing early in the low and high-cost
cases. Of the nine null hypotheses listed under Hypotheses 2f, 2g, and 2h, six cannot be
rejected. However, consistent with the eciency gains observed in the high-cost case, the
null hypothesis that tolls do not aect the probability of all group members departing early
is rejected at 1% signicance.
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Answer to research question 2: Improvements in measures of coordination from revenue-
neutral tolls varies and are mixed across time-cost preferences. Tolls appear to be most
helpful in improving outcomes when groups have high value of times.
The existence of endogenous welfare eects reveals that curbing congestion with a pricing
mechanism may not be straightforward. The varied welfare gains from tolls are noticeable
when observing the impacts on journey delays, type of congestion, and likelihood of certain
departure patterns. In the high-cost case, the signicant reduction of everyone departing
Early explains why tolls had a superior eect on that specic cost case. Congestion still
persisted with tolls across cost cases. Yet, although varied, the tolls did help coordination
and reduced types of congestion and journey delays. The experiment's referendum votes
ought to reveal that the high-cost case should be the most publicly acceptable of the three
cost cases since this improved total group welfare. The tolls should still be acceptable for the
reference and low-cost cases since tolls also had socially improving outcomes. Despite groups
not coordinating and converging to the minimal-cost level with tolls, a policymaker should
consider any third-party eects and environmental benets from the reduction of congestion
before advocating for congestion pricing unilaterally.
4.5.2. Public acceptability of tolls. Improved performance from revenue-neutral
tolls in the form of improved cooperation and coordination ought to result in more favorable
public acceptability when observing referendum voting approval, especially for the high-cost
case. Yet an individual's political worldview on role of government intervention and equality
might also dictate public acceptability. Moreover, the experimental treatment of having
previous experience with tolls may also inuence public acceptability. Subjects should have
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a better understanding of the policy from their prior experiences. The experimental data
can help determine voting behavior.
Generally, as seen in Table C.2.1 and when looking at all individuals in Table 4.4, despite
the enhanced performance in the high-cost case, no voting patterns across cost treatments
appear to exist. Recall each subject participated in three dierent groups were each group
had a referendum vote during the fth and ninth period of each round resulting in each
having six voting opportunities (see Table 4.1). The referendum vote passes 42-45% of the
time across the cost scenarios. Table C.2.1 shows that some groups approved or rejected
tolls unanimously. Seven subjects always voted in favor of tolls while fteen always rejected
the referendum. Such consistent individual voting and unanimous group voting might be
explained by idiosyncratic worldview preferences, experiences from the congestion game, or
a combination of both.
4.5.2.1. Question #3: Do individual worldviews strictly aect the public acceptability of
revenue-neutral tolls regardless of performance? Similar to Chapter 2, at the end of the
experiment participants answer a survey that elicits their worldviews. Statements from
Kahan et al. (2011) are used to measure an individual's worldview across two dimensions:
hierarchy-egalitarianism and individualism-communitarianism. Unlike Chapter 2, these were
the only beliefs elicited from the subjects (See Table C.2.2 in the Appendix for statements).
Six individuals statements (individualism-communitarianism) focus on the attitudes toward
social orderings that expect individuals to secure their own well-being without assistance or
interference from society versus those that assign society the obligation to secure collective
welfare and power to override competing individuals interest (Kahan et al., 2011). And
six hierarchical statements (hierarchy-egalitarianism) capture the attitudes toward social
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orderings that connect authority to stratied social roles based on highly conspicuous and
largely xed characters such as gender, race, and class (Kahan et al., 2011). Subjects
indicate the extent that they agree with each of the statements using a six-level Likert scale
which are translated to a score of 1 to 6 on their level of agreement (1 = strongly disagree
to 6 = strongly agree). The sum of scores for each set of statements places their views
on the respective hierarchy-egalitarianism and individualism-communitarianism spectrums
(6 to 36). These two worldview measures ought to assist in the examination of individual
voting behavior.
Figure C.3 illustrates the scores of all 84 individuals. Table 4.4 shows the amount of
people that t in specic worldview categories. Kahan et al. (2011) combines the two dimen-
sions and denes people that score above the median in both dimensions as Hierarchical-
Individualist and those that scored below the median in both dimensions as Egalitarian-
Communitarian. Following their denitions as well as the denitional extensions by Cherry
et al. (2013), subjects that scored in the top quartile of the Hierarchy and Individualism
measures are additionally dened as Hierarchical and Individualist, respectively, while those
that scored in the bottom quartile of each measure are dened as Egalitarian and Commu-
nitarian.18
Table 4.4 details the voting behavior of the dened individuals based on worldview and
their gender. Everyone appears to vote similarly and no noticeable pattern emerges on
acceptability of policies. Communitarian individuals ought to be more favorable to tolls
while Egalitarian individuals are argued to be against such incentive-based policies. Several
critics of congestion pricing argue that such policies are regressive and result in inequitable
18The Individualism measure has a mean of 24 and standard deviation of 4.4, and the 25th, 50th (median)
and 75th percentiles are 20.75, 24, and 26. The Hierachry measure has a mean of 18.3 and standard deviation
of 5.3 and the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles are 14, 18.5, 21.
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Table 4.4. Counts Of Individuals And Percentage Of Votes In Favor Of Ref-
erendum For Each Type Of Individual By Cost Scenario
Type of Individual N All Reference Low High
All 84 44% 45% 43% 43%
Hierarchical-Individualist 17 45% 53% 38% 44%
Egalitarian-Communitarian 17 37% 41% 32% 38%
Hierarchical 20 43% 48% 38% 43%
Egalitarian 19 41% 42% 47% 34%
Individualist 19 46% 50% 39% 47%
Communitarian 21 42% 38% 48% 40%
Male 56 45% 46% 45% 45%
Female 28 42% 45% 41% 39%
outcomes. These summary statistics do not show how an individual's or group performance
inuence voting decisions. An individual's desire of obtaining the optimal On-time time slot
rather than have an intervention where there will be clear winners and losers, may be more of
a factor in voting decisions than just strictly an individual's worldview. Such an egalitarian
concern appears to be reected in the high-cost case by the noticeably low acceptability of
34% by members that identify with the egalitarian worldview in Table 4.4.
Since each individual makes multiple votes, a rst step is to see if worldviews can predict
how individuals vote initially after just four periods. The rst vote ought to elicit the most
out of a person's worldview since this voting decision would rely most on heavily on a person's
idiosyncratic preferences that dictate their political worldviews. However, no such signicant
result was observed when the initial vote was examined in Chapter 2.
Unlike the previous estimates in the chapter that utilized a random eects approach, just
a logit specication is required when examining the rst vote and individual observations (84
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observations) are observed and not group observations. The following model is estimated:
(11) V otei,1 = β0 + β1(Tolls1stTrmti) + βn(BeliefMeasurei) + +µi
Explanatory variables specifying the type of individual by worldview (BeliefMeasurei) and
the treatment eect of tolls (Tolls1stTrmt) occurring in the rst four periods are used. Con-
trolling for the ordering treatment is not necessary since all individuals are in the reference
cost case. Using Equation 11, the following hypothesis is tested:
• Hypothesis 3a: For the rst vote, worldviews have no eect on voting behavior.
(H0 : βn = 0; for all belief measures)
In addition to grouping individuals by the Kahan et al. (2011) worldview measures, an
alternative is added to examine whether some common patterns on worldviews can be estab-
lished in the Likert-scale responses. Table C.2.2 summarizes the subjects responses as well
as dissects the full matrix of answers into its principal components and determines whether
political worldviews vary systematically.
There exists ve principal components of interest. The rst principal component ac-
counts 24% of the variation about the mean response and could be labeled agreement as a
Communitarian-Egalitarian agreement variable. The second principal component accounts
for 17% of the variation suggests that those that want the government to do more in advanc-
ing society's goals also think government intervenes too much. This component is labeled
quasi-dictator since it suggests that one thinks that government could be run more eec-
tively if they were in charge. The third principal component accounts for 13% of variation
and can be labeled as preference for equity concerns over discrimination concerns. The
fourth principal component can be labeled as overreaching government and can be thought
of as a view that government currently does too much (accounts for 10% of variation). The
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fth principal component which accounts for 8% of variation is labeled as a nanny state
worldview which measures an individuals distaste for current government intervention. The
ve components are incorporated in Equation 11 to add robustness for testing Hypothesis
3a.
Table C.2.3 shows four columns of logit coecient estimates of various specications of
worldviews. No model specication is statistically signicant nor are any of the coecients.
The fourth column in Table C.2.3 shows estimates of voting behavior of the rst of six
votes when incorporating the principal component analysis. And just like the worldview
characterizations, the model specication is not signicant nor are the coecients. The
statistical power of only observing the rst vote is obviously restrictive because of the small
sample size. As such, the null hypothesis of worldviews not contributing to initial voting
behavior fails to be rejected. This is consistent with the observation of Chapter 2 where
beliefs had no inuence on initial voting behavior. The dierence in this experiment is that
players experience the problem before their initial vote unlike Chapter 2 where players voted
before experiencing the congestion problem. However, experiencing just 4 periods may not
be enough for individuals to condently vote in favor of a congestion policy since they may
be still learning the problem and how the congestion policy works. But observing no eects
of worldviews on initial feelings of a toll policy is a surprising nding, and suggests that
individuals may need to understand the severity of a congestion problem before relying on
their beliefs.
Even though there is no robust inference on worldview behavior on the rst vote, an
examination on how worldview aects the other ve as well as the rst vote is necessary.
122
Equation 12 is used to estimate the likelihood of voting for the policy:
V otei,t = β0 + β1(Lowt ×Rd2t) + β2(Hight ×Rd2t) + β3Lowt + β4Hight + β5(Tolls1stTrmtt)
+ β6(Ref −High− LowTrmtt) + β7(Tolls1stt ×Ref −High− Lowt)
+ β8(2ndV oteinRoundt) + βn(BeliefMeasurei) + ηi + µit
(12)
Equation 12 uses similar controls as in the previous equations, but an additional control,
2ndV oteinRoundt, is used to indicate if the vote is the second of two votes of the round.19 The
marginal eect of the worldview variable tells us how much worldviews aect the likelihood
of voting for all six votes controlling for the design of the experiment. The hypothesis that
is tested is:
• Hypothesis 3b: For the all votes, worldviews have no eect on voting behavior.
(H0 : βn = 0; for all belief measures)
Table C.2.4 reports logit coecient estimates with a random eects specication on the
eects of worldviews on the likelihood of voting for the policy. The model is specied
similarly to the models estimating the eectiveness of tolls on performance with the exception
of the inclusion of a control for the timing of the second vote in each session. Similar to
the examination of just the rst vote, no statistical statistical inferences can be made on
the Kahan et al. (2011) worldview measures. Yet note in the fourth column in Table C.2.4
that despite the model lacking statistical signicance, the nanny state variable does have
statistical signicance and has an expected negative eect on public acceptability. And
19An obvious endogeneity problem exists in the current equation since individuals get to vote for their own
treatment. To try to tease out the learning and experience eects, several other specications were considered
than Equation 12 including linear and non-linear measures of an individual's share of the total costs of the
previous session or period and a group's average eciency of the previous session or period. Specifying an
appropriate instrumental variable for the complex design of the experiment proved dicult. Estimates from
Equation 12 are reported instead of the other specications to suggest that there are no satisfying robust
patterns or results to report on how worldviews aect voting.
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despite its superior performance, there is no clear increase in public acceptability for the high-
cost case. These results suggest that experience in the game itself, and not just worldviews,
probably can better explain voting behavior in the experiment.
Thus for almost all the worldview measures, the null hypothesis in Hypothesis 3b fails to
be rejected expect when the principal components are used. And it is just the nanny state
component that is rejected with 5% signicance. The results from testing Hypotheses 3a and
3b suggest that the congestion game created no robust pattern of outcomes for individuals
to condently vote for or against a policy. However, despite the noise, those individuals that
with high nanny state measures prefer the randomness from the bottleneck and are less
likely to prefer government intervening and implementing a congestion pricing policy.
Answer to research question 3: No robust inferences can be made that can predict an indi-
vidual's likelihood of voting for a revenue-neutral incentive-based policy based on worldviews:
attitudes on hierarchy-egalitarianism and individualism-communitarianism.
Recall that the experiment's votes are without real-world context. Subjects might vote
dierently in a real referendum vote if they had more emotional feelings and attachments
such as the proposal of tolls of a regularly driven road or parking spaces, knowledge of a
local politician's support or disapproval of tolls, or exemptions of a particular groups from
tolling. The results may also suggest that without context and in a controlled environment
that worldviews can not solely predict the public acceptability of incentive-based policies.
4.6. Conclusion
Congestion creates social costs, and the objective of incentive-based mechanisms like
congestion pricing is to improve social welfare. Using a simplied version of a congestion
124
problem, eciency improvements from revenue-neutral tolls are observed in a laboratory en-
vironment when welfare eects are endogenous. The observed improvements from congestion
tolls appear to depend on the individual schedule delay penalties relative to the individual's
cost of traveling (journey delay). When schedule delay costs are relatively high, the results
suggest that individuals do deviate away from sub-optimal group departure patterns to lower
cost departure patterns.
An examination of voting behavior yielded mixed outcomes and no strong patterns of
the acceptability of congestion tolls. The eciency improvements are not directly related to
public acceptability of such policy. When comparing the performance of tolls on dierent
time-cost preferences cases, the relatively superior performance of tolls in one cost case did
not yield increased acceptability for that cost case. the results found that political worldviews
do not solely predict acceptability of tolls. Yet our principal component analysis showed that
some predictions can still be made.
The conduction of this experiment provides many lessons learned. One lesson is that
the revenue-neutral aspect of the game with having lump-sum redistribution of the tolls is
a concern in this small-group environment. The perception of full redistribution of tolls
by the subjects may make the tolls no longer eective. A second lesson is that there was
no measure of risk taking since some individuals may prefer the randomness of the bottle-
neck. Future experiments using this three-player game should measure risk preferences using
measures from Holt and Laury (2002). A third lesson is that observing eectiveness with
mixed strategies is dicult, and even more dicult when subjects can vote for treatment
eects. Future experiments should follow designs similar to Chapter 2 and not have sub-
jects experience multiple cost cases. Furthermore, mixed strategies would be best examined
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over multiple iterations without voting interruptions (or at least not have votes determining
the next immediate institutional environment). The last lesson is that future experiments
examining voting acceptably should already have possible instrumental variable(s) specied
before conducting an experiment.
The above results provide an upper-bound of welfare improvements since it is assumes
a 100% pass-through of revenue back to all individuals. Any up-front xed costs or admin-
istrative costs will likely decrease welfare improvements. However, policymakers ought to
consider third-party environmental or other benets from the reduction of congestion. Thus
a policymaker's benet-cost analysis must consider these additional costs and benets as
well as be aware that the performance of congestion tolls depend on time-cost preferences.
Moreover, the acceptability of the policy may be driven more by loss aversion and not nec-
essarily worldviews. Altogether, this chapter and the design of the experiment revealed that
observing the eectiveness and acceptability of a congestion policy when welfare eects are
endogenous is an ambitious endeavor. As seen in Chapter 2, policymakers would have an




Urban congestion is widely reported as a growing problem that creates many external
costs. Congestion pricing is seen as an ecient solution in urban areas and has been successful
in some places like London, Stockholm, and Singapore. In many other areas, however,
congestion pricing proposals are sometimes considered but abandoned. Equity and fairness
concerns, as well as the uncertainty of congestion pricing programs, are often blamed for the
lack of public acceptability and political feasibility of congestion pricing policies. However,
the experience in Stockholm of voters overcoming their initial aversion of congestion pricing
after experiencing a trial run of the policy is encouraging for environmental economists
advocating for incentive-based mechanisms to mitigate environmental problems.
The experience in Stockholm, and the lack of widespread implementation of congestion
pricing despite the growing external costs stemming from congestion, raises three primary
research questions. Does experience of congestion pricing predict acceptability or do per-
sonal traits predict acceptability? What makes congestion pricing eective and why would
anyone be opposed to such an eciency-enhancing policy? What motivates an individual
to want to opt in or opt out of a congestion pricing policy when equity eects are endoge-
nously determined? These questions were examined theoretically and/or empirically using
laboratory experiments.
Chapter 2 examines how the combination of personal beliefs and experience (accustoma-
tion of problem and policy and the welfare eect of the policy) aect the evolution of accept-
ability. Data is generated using a laboratory experiment where the policy has inequitable
aects and users have three votes: before being accustomed to the congestion problem, after
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being accustomed to the congestion problem, and then after being accustomed to the policy
and disclosure of the nature of the welfare impact from congestion pricing. Voting measures
the acceptability of a policy, and the design of the experiment make all votes incentive com-
patible. The experimental design best emulates the Stockholm experience. Unlike Chapters
3 and 4, the welfare eects that generate inequities among users are imposed exogenously.
The hypotheses tested the eectiveness of the toll policy and addressed the primary research
question of what determines the acceptability of congestion pricing: experience versus beliefs.
A survey at the end of the experiment collected demographic information as well as
responses to sensitive questions that determines their worldview (Kahan et al., 2011), feelings
toward the environment measured on the New Ecological Paradigm scale, altruism (Kotchen
and Moore, 2007), and political ideology. A probit model estimated the likelihood of voting
over the course of the experiment and the relationship between these measures of beliefs
and accustomation. This model was also estimated by sub-samples based on the theoretical
predictions of the welfare eects of individuals. Surprisingly, across all samples, neither
beliefs nor the the redistribution rate of the policy were signicant in determining initial
acceptability of congestion pricing. Only after being accustomed to the problem did certain
beliefs inuence acceptability, suggesting that some individuals rely on his or her worldviews
in determining the severity of the congestion problem. This result is consistent with the
need of having a sympathetic local environment that is identied by Ison and Rye (2005)
as an issue inuencing the implementation of congestion pricing. Similar to the situation in
Stockholm, experience appeared to matter. An additional nding showed that accustomation
and the nature of the experience matter the most to those individuals with intermediate
value of times and are likely to be made worse o by incentivizing them to use an inferior
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substitute. This group may be sympathetic of the need of a congestion pricing policy, but
would oppose congestion pricing mostly based on self-interest. Although beliefs matter,
policymakers may be averse to introducing congestion pricing fearing a groups of individuals
made worse o from the policies (i.e., individuals with intermediate value of time preferences)
may make the majority of their constituents and threaten any successful implementation of
an eciency-improving policy. Self-interested equity concerns matter.
Chapters 3 and 4 examine a congestion problem where, unlike the problem in Chapter 2,
the equity eects are endogenously determined. And unlike Chapter 2, users make departure
decisions to use the same route that has a bottleneck rather than make route-choices in a two-
route network. Chapter 3 formally develops a three-player bottleneck congestion game and
examines the ex-ante and ex-post strategies and welfare eects with and without congestion
pricing. The model is a discretized version of the basic bottleneck model and illustrates the
tradeo between schedule delay and travel time. By expanding to three players, the model
where individuals make simultaneous departure decisions can predict pure-strategy Nash
equilibria with and without congestion pricing, but equilibria also exist in mixed strategies.
Congestion tolls help facilitate departure times to avoid congestion. The game endogenously
creates winners and losers, depending on the departure time of individuals. The model
can show that people can be incentivized to make socially inferior decisions when a majority
of the toll revenues are redistributed. Individuals have an incentive to select departure
times that increase the congestion pricing charge of the other individuals, thus compensating
themselves for making a socially poor decision. The game represents a prisoner's dilemma
and a situation where some individuals might nd the ex-ante randomness of the bottleneck
sorting mechanism preferable and more equitable than a congestion pricing mechanism.
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Chapter 4 examines the theoretical model developed in Chapter 3 under dierent cost
settings and institutional structures. The experimental design tests what motivates users
to opt in or opt out of a congestion policy. Similar to Chapter 2, demographics and world-
view measures from Kahan et al. (2011) are matched to voting behavior. The other belief
measures from Chapter 2 were not collected. Several hypotheses on the eectiveness and
acceptability of congestion pricing were tested. Unlike Chapter 2, since equilibria exist in
mixed strategies, the eectiveness of the pricing policy for the various cost scenarios was dif-
cult to examine, the results, however, show that congestion pricing was most eective when
homogeneous users had high schedule delay costs. Estimates on predicting voting behavior
yielded mixed outcomes, and when a principal component analysis was applied on belief
measures, some signicant predictions could be made. The lack of robust results suggest
that congestion pricing policies can be contentious when inequities are endogenously deter-
mined. The data did not show an evolution of voting behavior after dierent accustomation
and group experiences where individuals voted for the eciency-enhancing policy.
Although eciency improving, congestion pricing may be hindered by the inequitable
eects it creates; this is true whether these eects are exogenous or endogenous. Policy-
makers are recommended to take special care of understanding what the ex-ante and ex-post
outcomes of congestion pricing are and to be able to identify the magnitude of the welfare
eects of the various populations aected by the policy. Moreover, some populations will be
sensitive to how toll revenue is redistributed. Beliefs matter in determining acceptability, but
only after being accustomed to a congestion problem. Surprisingly, the expectations based
on the denitions were not observed in the laboratory. For example, those with strong anti-
government-intervention views were not shown to initially oppose congestion pricing. This
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body of research displayed that carefully implemented trial or pilot programs could positively
aect the likelihood of making congestion pricing programs permanent, and that, in addition
to welfare predictions on individuals' travel time preferences, individual characteristics and
beliefs aect attitudes toward congestion pricing policies.
Future research needs to be conducted to measure the validity of the worldview measures
in relationship to market outcomes. Moreover, the experimental design in Chapter 2 provides
multiple opportunities to examine dierent contexts of the congestion problem. Several mod-
ications are suggested for future research where there is a third option for abstaining from
voting and/or having a monetary cost for a vote. Further research in this eld will provide
a better understanding of the dierence between worldview and self-interest motivations for
acceptability of congestion pricing. Equity concerns on the outcomes of congestion pricing
have heavily been cited as barriers to implementation, but understanding the perceptions of
these concerns may allow for more eective communication to introducing successful policies.
Such ndings may also improve the likelihood of implementing Pigouvian policies that deal
with environmental problems such as climate change.
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Supplementary Material For Chapter 2
A.1. Supplementary Theory Tables For Two-Route Congestion Game
Table A.1. User Equilibria Predictions
Predicted eect of toll on users' costs








12 (Route A) 145 - 120 = 25 -21.3% -16.0%
11 (Route A) 135- 110 = 25 -20.5% -14.7%
10 (Route A) 125 - 100 = 25 -19.5% -13.2%
4 (Route B) 65 - 40 = 25 -6.3% +9.5%
3 (Route B) 55 - 30 = 25 -15.0% +6.0%
2 (Route B) 45 - 20 = 25 -32.5% -1.0%
Note: All six individuals use Route A with no toll; with a toll the three
lower value of time individuals switch to Route B.
A.2. Cultural Worldview, NEP, Altruism, And Political Ideology
Statements
Similar cultural worldview measures as Kahan et al. (2011) were used. These two sets of
questions are shown below.
People in our society often disagree about how far to let individuals go in making deci-
sions for themselves. How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of these statements?
[strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree,
strongly agree; items prexed by 'S' were reversed coded]
IINTRSTS. The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives.
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SHARM. Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting them-
selves.
IPROTECT. It's not the government's business to try to protect people from themselves.
IPRIVACY. The government should stop telling people how to live their lives.
SPROTECT. The government should do more to advance society's goals, even if that means
limiting the freedom and choices of individuals.
SLIMCHOI. Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don't
get in the way of what's good for society.
People in our society often disagree about issues of equality and discrimination. How
strongly do you agree or disagree with each of these statements? [strongly disagree, mod-
erately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree; items
prexed by 'E' were reversed coded]
HEQUAL. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.
EWEALTH. Our society would be better o if the distribution of wealth was more equal.
ERADEQ. We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites
and people of color, and men and women.
EDISCRIM. Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society.
HREVDIS2. It seems like minority groups don't want equal rights, they want special rights
just for them.
HFEMININ. Society as a whole has become too soft.
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Similar beliefs of New Ecological Paradigm (NEP), Schwartz altruism measures as Kotchen
and Moore (2007) were used. These statements are shown below.
People in our society often disagree about issues on how human actions aect the envi-
ronment. How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of these statements? [strongly
disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree; items prexed in "Na" were reversed coded]
HuCRISIS. The so-called "ecological crisis" facing humankind has been greatly
exaggerated. NaLIMITED. The earth is like a spaceship with limited room and resources.
NaMAJOR. If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major eco-
logical catastrophe.
HuCOPE. The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern in-
dustrial nations.
NaABUSE. Humans are severely abusing the environment.
People in our society often disagree about issues regarding altruism. How strongly do
you agree or disagree with each of these statements? [strongly disagree, disagree, neutral,
agree, strongly agree; items prexed in "A" were reversed coded]
SCONTRIB. Contributions to community organizations rarely improve the lives of others.
SRESPONSI. The individual alone is responsible for his or her well-being in life.
ADUTY. It is my duty to help other people when they are unable to help themselves.
SPROVIDE. My responsibility is to provide only for my family and myself.
AACTIONS. My personal actions can greatly improve the well-being of people I don't know.
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Questions of political ideology followed the phrasing and possible responses used by
Gallup, Inc. [very liberal, liberal, moderate, conservative, very conservative]
ConservECON. Thinking about economic issues, would you say your views on economic
issues are 
ConservSOC. Thinking about social issues, would you say your views on social issues are 
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A.3. Summary Statistics  Decision Trees of Voting Behavior By Sample
Below are the voting decision trees for various samples. The rst value is the number of
observations, the second value is the percentage of the entire sample making that sequence
of voting decision(s), and the third value is the percentage making the voting decision of the
























































































































































































































Figure A.6. Decision Tree For Sub-Sample  100% Redistribution Treatment




































Figure A.7. Decision Tree For Sub-Sample  100% Redistribution Treatment






































Figure A.8. Decision Tree For Sub-Sample  40% Redistribution Treatment



































Figure A.9. Decision Tree For Sub-Sample  40% Redistribution Treatment
And Disclosure Of Ranked Grouped Information Treatment
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A.4. Experiment Instructions (100% Redistribution)
Instructions
You are about to participate in an experiment on decision making. Please read these in-
structions carefully. You will earn money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment. Your payo will depend on your choices and the choices of other participants.
All transactions in this experiment will be done in tokens, with 1 token = $0.06.
During the entire experiment communication of any kind is strictly prohibited. Com-
munication between participants will lead to your exclusion from the experiment and the
forfeiture of all earnings. Please raise your hand if you have any questions and a member of
the research team will come to you and answer your questions privately. Also, please turn
o your cell phones!
Note you must complete the entire experiment to be eligible to be paid. The experiment
will last roughly 60 minutes.
Summary of the Experiment
As shown in Table 1 you will participate in three independent stages; each stage consists
of 10 independent periods making the experiment 30 periods long. You will also participate
in three referendum votes. You will rst start the experiment with a referendum vote before
starting Stage 1. Only one of the three 10-period stages will count towards your earnings.
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The votes are important. One of the three votes will be used to determine the nature
of the third stage. Before we explain the votes and the toll, we rst introduce how the
experiment works.
Basic Overview
You and the other participants will be randomly assigned to groups of six (you will stay
in the same group of 6 for the entire experiment). In each period you and the other group
members must decide individually which route you will like to take to get from the same
origin to the same destination. Each person has the option of one of two routes: Route A
or Route B:
For Route A, the amount of time it takes to arrive at your destination depends on the
amount of trac. The amount of trac on Route A is equal to the number of people in your
group using this route. Travel time on Route A is higher with more trac and lower with
less trac. The travel time for Route B is always constant and does not depend on trac
in Route A or Route B.
Consider Table 2: if, for example, three people use Route A, the travel time of those
three is 7 minutes per person, and if four people use Route A, then the travel time of those
four is 8 minutes per person. In both cases, the other three or two users of Route B have a
travel time of 12 minutes per person.
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Determining your payos
Your payos are calculated using the following:
• Value of time: Each group member has a value of travel time (= your cost of
time), which is measured in tokens per minute.
• Per-period endowment: Each group member starts with an amount of tokens at
the beginning of each period.
Each group member's value of time and per-period endowment will not change in the
course of the experiment. Your value of time and per-period endowments will be dierent
from those of the other members in your group. In each period your value of time and your
per-period endowment as well as the value of times of other members of your group will be
shown on the top of your computer screen.
Your travel cost is equal to the time it takes to reach the destination multiplied by your
value of time. For example, if it takes you 10 minutes to reach the destination and your
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value of time is 5 tokens per minute then your travel costs are 50 tokens (10 x 5 = 50). This
travel cost will be subtracted from your per-period endowment to obtain your earnings for
that period. For example, if your period endowment is 60 tokens and your travel costs are
50 tokens, then you earned 10 tokens for that period. Your nal earnings will be your total
earnings from all periods in one of the three stages. The stage that will determine your nal
earnings will be randomly chosen at the end of the experiment.
At the end of each period you will be provided feedback on which route you took, your
travel time, travel time cost, your earnings for the period, the number of people using Route
A, and, if applicable, the implications from the payment and collection of toll revenue, which
will be explained later. After each decision you will have the option to see a summary of
your previous decisions.
What will you see on your screen?
Figure 2 is a screenshot of what you will see before you make your route choice decision.
As you can see, the top box shows your endowment, your value of time, and the value of
times of other members of your group. The table in the center shows the same information
as Table 2 except that there are additional columns that show your calculated travel time
costs for both routes by multiplying your value of time with the number of minutes for each
possible outcome.
152
The Toll for using Route A
In Stage 2 and potentially in Stage 3 anyone using Route A will pay a toll that will be
displayed on the computer screen before a route decision is made. The toll will be the same
for everyone that is using Route A and will be the same throughout the experiment. The toll
will be an additional cost to your travel costs. However, 100% of the collected toll revenues
for a period will be redistributed back in equal shares to everyone in your group including
those that use Route B. That is, your share of the toll revenues is equal to all of the total
toll revenue divided by six (number of people in your group). The size of your share depends
on the amount of people using Route A. In a stage with a toll the information in the center
table in Figure 2 will be exactly the same. Please remember that the size and redistribution
of the toll will also impact your per-period costs and resulting earnings.
How is the size of the toll determined? As was shown in Table 2, each additional user of
Route A increases the travel time for everyone else using Route A. For example, the travel
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time for everybody when three people use Route A is 7 minutes per person. If instead four
people use Route A, then the fourth person increases the travel time for each of the original
three people from 7 minutes per person to 8 minutes per person (and this fourth person also
has a travel time of 8 minutes). In other words, by choosing Route A instead of Route B,
this individual increases the total travel time of those three people in Route A by 3 minutes
(1 minute each).
With the toll in place, each user who chooses Route A faces now the increased total
travel costs they impose on the other users of Route A. The purpose of the toll is to get
some people to their destination faster, and the toll is charged like a fee for this service. The
toll reduces the number of users in Route A, reducing the travel time of users already in
Route A. Based on the group's average value of time, the size of the toll is set to optimize
the use of Route A.
Voting
As shown in Table 1 above (copied from page 1), Stage 1 will not have a toll and Stage
2 will have a toll. Whether Stage 3 will have a toll is based on how your group votes. In
each of the three votes your group will be voting on whether to impose tolls for Stage 3. You
will not learn your group's voting outcomes until after the third and nal vote. The vote
that counts will be determined randomly at the conclusion of the third referendum vote; so
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each one of the three votes can be decisive with a 1/3 chance. In the case of a 3-3 tie in the
decisive referendum vote, the tiebreaker will be randomly determined using a deck of cards.
At the end of the experiment, the stage that will determine your monetary earnings will also
be chosen through a similar random process.
You will start the experiment with the rst referendum vote. You will see your value
of time, your per-period endowment, and the group's value of time distribution for the 30-
period experiment before you cast your rst vote. We suggest you refer to Table 2 for your
possible travel time outcomes before you cast your rst vote.
Are there any questions?
Practice Problems
Please use the following information to answer the following practice problems:
(Values used are only for these practice problems)
Your value of time = 8 tokens/minute Your period endowment = 90 tokens
For questions 1-4 assume that there are no tolls
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1) If 4 people including you take Route A, what is your total travel time?
minutes. How much travel cost would you incur? tokens. What would be your
earnings for this period? tokens.
2) What would your travel time be if you instead chose Route B? minutes.
What would your travel cost be for choosing Route B? tokens. What would be your
earnings for this period? tokens.
3) True or False? Without tolls my travel cost using Route B depends on the number of
users on Route A. .
4) If you are the 5th person entering Route A, how much will the per-person travel time
increase for the other Route A users? minute(s) per person. By how much will
aggregate total travel time of that group of 4 Route A users increase? minutes.
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APPENDIX B
Supplementary Material For Chapter 3
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mecc = MAX(1.5D − 1.5E), 0)












0.5E + 1.5D + L
mecc = MAX(1.5D + L − 0.5E), 0)













mecc = 1.5(D + L)
(f) Creating a Queue
(On-Time)
ool
*Note the relative sizes of boxes representing mecc within gures d, c, and f are not drawn to scale. The
mecc created by second departure is much larger. Figures B.1a, B.1b, and B.1c represent a player entering
a queuing scenario for congestion scenarios evv, ooe, and oee, respectively (mecc = 0) .
Figures B.1d, B.1e, B.1f represent a player creating a queuing scenario and mecc (mecc ≥ 0) for congestion
scenarios vve, eeo, and ool, respectively.
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Figure B.2. Cost Curves For Each Departure Time
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B.2. Table of Nomenclature
Table B.2.1. Table of Nomenclature
Variable Description
ti Individual departure time




v; v Very early departure time; very early arrival time
e; e Early departure time; early arrival time
o; o On-time departure time; on-time arrival time
l; l Late departure time; late arrival time
r Really late arrival time
s Super late arrival time
dt Time of player's journey delay
ε(dt) Expected journey delay
Qt Standing queue at time t
At Total departure at time t
C(dt) Expected costs from a journey delay
Si Schedule delay
ta Player's departure time
to Player's desired arrival time
C(Si) Cost of a schedule delay
θ(Si) Expected cost of a schedule delay
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B.3. Corrigendum to Micro-foundations of Congestion and Pricing: A
Game Theory Perspective
The following are corrections to Levinson (2005) and not the full text of the corrigendum.
In December 2014, the corrigendum co-authored with David Levinson was sent to the editor
of Transportation Research A: Policy and Practice.
In reviewing and extending Micro-foundations of Congestion and Pricing: A Game The-
ory Perspective Levinson [2005], Nicholas Janusch identied several errors in the original
manuscript due to a spreadsheet error. The following are corrections to Levinson [2005]:
The original author regrets the error.
• p700: Probabilities in Table 10 for Player A departing Late (l) given Players B and
C departing Early and Late (el) are incorrect. P (r) = 0.5 not 0 for this scenario.
• p700: In the sentence To illustrate the gains from pricing, for instance, in the case:
E = 3 ,D= 1, L = 4, the unpriced equilibrium solution eee has a total cost of 10,
compared with the priced equilibria of eoo, oeo, ooe which have a total cost of 7.
The total cost is 8 not 7 (3 + 0 + 1 + 4 = 8).
• p701 Corrections to several predicted pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) reported
in Table 11 using this paper's three-player game methodology. Notice that unlike
Table 11, many of the corrected PSNE with congestion pricing shown below have
departure patterns where players depart at separate times. These corrected results
are more consistent with the objective of congestion pricing. (#,#,# = E,D,L)
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0, 0, 0 64 all 64 all 0
0, 1, 0 24 veo, ..., vel ,..., vol, ..., eol , ... 24 veo, ..., vel ,..., vol, ..., eol , ... 0
0, 0, 1 16 vvv, vve, ..., vvo, ..., vee, ..., veo, ... 16 vvv, vve, ..., vvo, ..., vee, ..., veo, ... 0
0, 1, 1 6 veo, ... 6 veo, ... 0
1, 0, 0 8 ooo, lll, ool, ... , oll, ... 8 ooo, lll, ool, ..., oll, ... 0
1, 1, 0 7 ooo, ool, ..., oll, ... 9 oll, ..., eol, ... 1
1, 0, 1 5 ooo, eee, eoo, ... 10 eee, eeo, ..., eol, ... 2
1, 1, 1 9 eol, ..., eoo, ... 6 eol, ... 2
3, 1, 4 1 eee 6 eol, ... 7
4, 0, 3 2 ooo, eee 10 eee, eoo, ..., eol, ... 7
4, 1, 3 4 ooo, eoo, ... 6 eol, ... 7
3, 0, 4 1 eee 13 eee, eeo, ..., eoo, ..., eol, ... 7
Corrections in Bold. Note: Column 1 gives the penalty for arriving early, suering journey delay, or arriving late. The characterization





Supplementary Material For Chapter 4
C.1. Tables And Figures Of Timing Decisions
Table C.1.1. Expected Total Costs With And Without Tolls With Reference
Case Parameters (E = 3, D = 4, L = 8) And Given Departure Strategies,
Three-player Game
(a) Reference Cost Case: Expected Total Costs Without Tolls
Player B v v v v e e e o o l
Player C v e o l e o l o l l
Player A
v 7 6.5 6.5 6.5 6* 6 6 6 6 6
e 4 3.5 3* 3 23/3 3.5* 3.5 3* 3* 3
o 0* 0* 6 0* 12 6 0* 12 6 0*
l 8 8 8 14 8 8 14 20 14 20
*indicates best response cost-minimizing strategy given other players' departure
decisions.
(b) Reference Cost Case: Expected Total Costs With Tolls
Player B v v v v e e e o o l
Player C v e o l e o l o l l
Player A
v 9 8 7 7 6* 6* 6 6 6 6
e 4 4 3* 3 17 16 4 3* 3* 3
o 0* 0* 12 0* 12 12 0* 36 24 0*
l 8 8 8 20 8 8 20 20 20 44
*indicates best response cost-minimizing strategy given other players' departure
decisions.
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Table C.1.2. Expected Total Costs With And Without Tolls With Low Case
Parameters (E = 2, D = 4, L = 4) And Given Departure Strategies, Three-
player Game
(a) Low-Cost Case: Expected Total Costs Without Tolls
Player B v v v v e e e o o l
Player C v e o l e o l o l l
Player A
v 6 5 5 5 4* 4 4 4 4 4
e 4 3 2* 2 6 3* 3 2* 2* 2
o 0* 0* 4 0* 8 4 0* 8 4 0*
l 4 4 4 8 4* 4 8 12 8 12
*indicates best response cost-minimizing strategy given other players' departure
decisions.
(b) Low-Cost Case: Expected Total Costs With Tolls
Player B v v v v e e e o o l
Player C v e o l e o l o l l
Player A
v 10 8 6 6 4* 4* 4 4 4 4
e 4 4 2* 2 14 12 4 2* 2* 2
o 0* 0* 8 0* 8 8 0* 24 16 0*
l 4 4 4 12 4* 4* 12 12 12 28
*indicates best response cost-minimizing strategy given other players' departure
decisions.
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Table C.1.3. Expected Total Costs With And Without Tolls With High
Case Parameters (E = 5, D = 4, L = 12) And Given Departure Strategies,
Three-player Game
(a) High-Cost Case: Expected Total Costs Without Tolls
Player B v v v v e e e o o l
Player C v e o l e o l o l l
Player A
v 9 9.5 9.5 9.5 10 10 10 10 10 10
e 4 4.5 5* 5 29/3* 4.5* 4.5 5* 5* 5
o 0* 0* 8 0* 16 8 0* 16 8 0*
l 12 12 12 20 12 12 20 28 20 28
*indicates best response cost-minimizing strategy given other players' departure
decisions.
(b) High-Cost Case: Expected Total Costs With Tolls
Player B v v v v e e e o o l
Player C v e o l e o l o l l
Player A
v 9 9.5 9.5 9.5 10* 10* 10 10 10 10
e 4 4.5 5* 5 19 20 4.5 5* 5* 5
o 0* 0* 16 0* 16 16 0* 48 32 0*
l 12 12 12 28 12 12 28 28 28 60
*indicates best response cost-minimizing strategy given other players' departure
decisions.
Table C.1.4. Departure Frequencies: Reference Cost Case
(a) All Treatments  Without Tolls
Player B v e o l e v
176 obs. Player C v e o l o l
Player A
v 0 16 6 0 41 -
e 5 13 28 0 - 1
o 3 45 11 0 - 1
l 0 2 3 0 2 -
(b) All Treatments  With Tolls
Player B v e o l e v
160 obs. Player C v e o l o l
Player A
v 2 12 16 1 34 -
e 11 12 10 0 - 7
o 12 15 10 0 - 4
l 1 5 2 0 6 -
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Table C.1.5. Departure Frequencies: Low-Cost Case
(a) All Treatments  Without Tolls
Player B v e o l e v
172 obs. Player C v e o l o l
Player A
v 1 34 15 0 29 -
e 3 19 28 0 - 1
o 1 40 2 0 - 1
l 0 2 1 0 2 -
(b) All Treatments  With Tolls
Player B v e o l e v
140 obs. Player C v e o l o l
Player A
v 1 9 12 0 26 -
e 10 5 14 0 - 8
o 12 19 5 1 - 1
l 3 2 0 0 12 -
Table C.1.6. Departure Frequencies: High-Cost Case
(a) All Treatments  Without Tolls
Player B v e o l e v
164 obs. Player C v e o l o l
Player A
v 0 11 4 0 23 -
e 1 40 23 0 - 1
o 0 50 7 0 - 0
l 0 3 0 0 1 -
(b) All Treatments  With Tolls
Player B v e o l e v
148 obs. Player C v e o l o l
Player A
v 0 23 11 0 33 -
e 4 8 26 0 - 0
o 6 28 7 0 - 0
l 0 1 0 0 1 -
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Table C.1.7. Average Group Cost Comparison With And Without Tolls By
Experimental Treatment
(a) Reference Cost Case: Average Group Costs And Group Eciency
Reference Cost Scenario (Lowest Group Cost  9)
Treatment w/o tolls w/ tolls
No Policy First  Ref-High-Low 17.3 (85%) 16.4 (85%)
No Policy First  Ref-Low-High 17.5 (84%) 17.9 (86%)
Policy First  Ref-High-Low 15.1 (83%) 15.5 (83%)
Policy First  Ref-Low-High 16.2 (86%) 17.2 (84%)
All Treatments 16.7 (85%) 16.5 (85%)
(b) Low-Cost Case: Average Group Costs And Group Eciency
Low-Cost Scenario (Lowest Cost  6)
Treatment w/o tolls w/ tolls
No Policy First  Ref-High-Low 11.4 (82%) 11.0 (83%)
No Policy First  Ref-Low-High 12.1 (80%) 10.5 (85%)
Policy First  Ref-High-Low 11.8 (81%) 11.3 (82%)
Policy First  Ref-Low-High 10.3 (86%) 10.7 (85%)
All Treatments 11.6 (81%) 10.9 (84%)
(c) High-Cost Case: Average Group Costs And Group Eciency
High-Cost Scenario (Lowest Group Cost  15)
Treatment w/o tolls w/ tolls
No Policy First  Ref-High-Low 24.1 (87%) 22.7 (89%)
No Policy First  Ref-Low-High 24.1 (87%) 21.2 (91%)
Policy First  Ref-High-Low 25.8 (84%) 21.8 (90%)
Policy First  Ref-Low-High 23.6 (88%) 22.7 (89%)
All Treatments 24.5 (86%) 22.1 (90%)
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Table C.1.8. Negative Binomial Coecient Random Eects Estimates Of Journey Delays and Logit Coecients
Estimates Of Particular Type Of Congestion Occurring And Of Specic Group Departure Patterns
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Journey Delay Any Congestion 3-way Congestion 2-Way Congestion Queue Lowest Cost veo eee
High*Rd2 0.0624 0.2004 0.5450 -0.1498 -0.4950 -0.4374 -0.4473 -0.0157
(0.1521) (0.4889) (0.5569) (0.3545) (0.3904) (0.5080) (0.4813) (0.6589)
Low*Rd2 -0.1295 -0.0518 -0.7274 0.2448 0.0813 0.1190 -0.2916 0.1643
(0.1626) (0.4781) (0.6230) (0.3633) (0.4077) (0.5014) (0.4944) (0.7377)
Low 0.0499 0.3787 0.2254 0.1971 -0.2929 -0.3877 -0.3761 0.3758
(0.1196) (0.3677) (0.4538) (0.2807) (0.2917) (0.3764) (0.3630) (0.5196)
High 0.2488∗ 0.5737 0.6998 -0.1184 0.3606 -0.4214 -0.4041 1.4201∗∗∗
(0.1270) (0.4161) (0.4515) (0.3027) (0.3289) (0.4307) (0.4115) (0.5474)
Reference*Tolls -0.0946 -0.2225 0.1972 -0.2813 -0.5969∗∗ -0.1861 -0.1234 0.0536
(0.1065) (0.2812) (0.3633) (0.2394) (0.2800) (0.3005) (0.2958) (0.4622)
Low*Tolls -0.2060∗ -0.7029∗∗ -0.4900 -0.3833 -0.1353 0.5100 0.2684 -1.2073∗∗
(0.1149) (0.3051) (0.4298) (0.2575) (0.2922) (0.3191) (0.3351) (0.5657)
High*Tolls -0.3507∗∗∗ -0.4295 -1.2650∗∗∗ 0.4957∗∗ -0.4365 0.4982 0.5423∗ -1.6950∗∗∗
(0.1008) (0.3190) (0.3527) (0.2465) (0.2712) (0.3272) (0.3228) (0.4398)
Tolls1st Trmt -0.0491 -0.0722 -0.0279 -0.0750 -0.3031 -0.0139 -0.2908 0.2051
(0.0990) (0.3004) (0.3681) (0.2251) (0.2549) (0.3140) (0.3085) (0.4342)
Ref-High-Low Trmt 0.0112 0.1508 -0.3211 0.2379 0.3938 -0.0196 -0.1677 0.4991
(0.1269) (0.3954) (0.4714) (0.2924) (0.3171) (0.4124) (0.3909) (0.5768)
Tolls1st*Ref-Low-High -0.0449 -0.2783 -0.0899 -0.1150 0.1055 0.3925 0.6767∗ -0.7580
(0.1286) (0.4022) (0.4819) (0.2964) (0.3261) (0.4180) (0.4052) (0.5622)
Constant 16.0698 1.1481∗∗∗ -1.7950∗∗∗ 0.3877∗ -1.0030∗∗∗ -1.3433∗∗∗ -1.2101∗∗∗ -2.8649∗∗∗
(132.7705) (0.3067) (0.3662) (0.2310) (0.2553) (0.3196) (0.3026) (0.4796)
N 960 960 960 960 960 960 960 960
p-value 0.0004 0.0742 0.0049 0.2637 0.0675 0.4317 0.3856 0.0002
χ2 31.9360 17.0079 25.2358 12.3284 17.3221 10.1011 10.6479 33.4501
Standard errors in parentheses




(a) Average Group Eciency With And Without Tolls By
Period For Reference Cost Case
(b) Average Group Eciency With And Without Tolls By
Period For Low-Cost Case
(c) Average Group Eciency With And Without Tolls By
Period For High-Cost Case
Figure C.1. Average Group Eciency With And Without Tolls By Period
And Cost Case
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(a) Percentage Of Groups In Reference Cost Scenario Ob-
taining Socially Ecient Departure Pattern
(b) Percentage Of Groups In Low-Cost Scenario Obtaining
Socially Ecient Departure Pattern
(c) Percentage Of Groups In High-Cost Scenario Obtaining
Socially Ecient Departure Pattern
Figure C.2. Percentage Frequencies Of Groups Obtaining Socially Ecient
Departure Patterns
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C.2. Tables And Figures From Voting Analysis
Table C.2.1. Frequency Of Total Group Votes By Cost Case And Period Of
A Group's Round
Reference Low High
Period 5th 9th 5th 9th 5th 9th
3 votes 1 (4%) 2 (7%) 4 (15%) 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 2 (8%)
2 votes 13 (46%) 9 (32%) 7 (27%) 10 (38%) 8 (31%) 10 (38%)
1 vote 7 (25%) 16 (57%) 12 (46%) 12 (46%) 12 (46%) 12 (46%)
0 vote 7 (25%) 1 (4%) 3 (12%) 3 (12%) 4 (15%) 2 (8%)
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Table C.2.2. Worldview Questions (1 = Strongly Disagree; 6 = Strongly Agree) And Principal Component Analysis
Mean
Principal Componentsa,b
Statement Denition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1
The government interferes far too much in our
everyday lives.
4.04 -0.36 -0.22 0.12 0.42 -0.12 -0.24 0.36 0.03 0.25 0.33 0.50 -0.08
(1.15)a
2
Sometimes government needs to make laws that
keep people from hurting themselves.
3.80 0.20 0.35 -0.06 0.44 -0.16 0.43 0.12 -0.46 -0.36 0.24 0.07 0.02
(1.35)
3
It's not the government's business to try to
protect people from themselves.
3.52 -0.21 -0.18 -0.06 -0.001 0.83 0.17 -0.25 -0.14 -0.16 0.26 0.16 0.00
(1.19)
4
The government should stop telling people how
to live their lives.
4.30 -0.26 -0.24 0.04 0.63 0.05 0.24 -0.05 0.30 -0.11 -0.44 -0.33 0.11
(1.18)
5
The government should do more to advance
society's goals, even if that means limiting the
freedom and choices of individuals.
2.45 0.29 0.40 0.20 0.05 0.34 0.09 0.24 0.20 0.12 -0.48 0.49 0.03
(1.27)
6
Government should put limits on the choices
individuals can make so they don't get in the
way of what's good for society.
2.61 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.27 -0.58 0.09 0.17 -0.17 0.28 -0.39 -0.02
(1.11)
7
We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in
this country.
2.61 -0.31 0.33 0.30 -0.06 0.13 0.28 0.16 -0.22 0.61 0.09 -0.39 0.04
(1.25)
8
Our society would be better if the distribution
of wealth was more equal.
3.58 0.25 -0.36 0.55 -0.05 -0.07 0.04 -0.09 -0.17 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.67
(1.52)
9
We need to dramatically reduce inequalities
between the rich and the poor, whites and
people of color, and men and women.
3.95 0.34 -0.37 0.44 0.02 0.00 0.21 -0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.71
(1.41)
10
Discrimination against minorities is still a very
serious problem in our society.
4.17 0.40 -0.04 -0.27 0.11 0.00 0.34 -0.08 0.54 0.35 0.45 -0.02 0.13
(1.36)
11
It seems like minority groups don't want equal
rights, they want special rights just for them.
2.83 -0.31 0.11 0.33 -0.33 -0.09 0.29 0.30 0.46 -0.48 0.21 0.00 0.01
(1.36)
12 Society as a whole has become too soft.
3.57 -0.19 0.34 0.30 0.13 -0.21 -0.03 -0.78 0.15 0.04 0.07 0.24 0.10
(1.48)
Percent Variation 0.24 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01
Eigenvalue 2.87 2.07 1.53 1.17 0.98 0.76 0.70 0.61 0.48 0.43 0.31 0.12
aNumbers in parentheses are standard deviations.




Table C.2.3. Logit Coecient Estimates Of Individual Worldview Eects
On The First Of Six Votes
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1st Vote 1st Vote 1st Vote 1st Vote 1st Vote
Tolls1st Trmt -0.4631 -0.4554 -0.4969 -0.4982 -0.4310























Constant -0.2551 -0.1448 -0.2526 -0.3229 -0.0749
(0.3679) (0.3757) (0.3785) (0.4178) (0.3344)
N 84 84 84 84 84
p-value 0.5001 0.7274 0.5195 0.7494 0.4745
χ2 2.3653 1.3073 2.2638 2.6784 5.5575
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.2.4. Logit Coecient Estimates On The Eects Of Worldview On
Voting Behavior
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Vote Vote Vote Vote
Low× Rd2 0.6309 0.6233 0.6321 0.6383
(0.5425) (0.5426) (0.5424) (0.5429)
High× Rd2 0.2142 0.2081 0.2133 0.2133
(0.5344) (0.5344) (0.5345) (0.5342)
Low -0.1282 -0.1281 -0.1283 -0.1286
(0.3582) (0.3580) (0.3583) (0.3588)
High -0.0717 -0.0717 -0.0717 -0.0713
(0.3787) (0.3787) (0.3787) (0.3777)
Policy1st Trmt 0.4807 0.4772 0.4266 0.5894
(0.5756) (0.5740) (0.5789) (0.5581)
Ref-High-Low Trmt 0.0095 -0.0222 -0.1241 0.1478
(0.6437) (0.6443) (0.6716) (0.6471)
Policy1st× Ref-High-Low -0.9317 -0.9603 -0.8564 -0.9471
(0.7885) (0.7891) (0.7981) (0.7705)
2nd Vote in Round 0.1191 0.1191 0.1191 0.1192























Constant -0.3398 -0.2495 -0.1392 -0.4785
(0.4853) (0.5183) (0.5785) (0.4874)
N 480 480 480 480
p-value 0.5889 0.7404 0.8218 0.4111
χ2 6.5224 6.8404 7.5146 13.4848
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure C.3. Correlation Of Worldview Scores
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C.3. Tolls Used
Table C.3.1. Tolls For A Three-player Game
Congestion Scenario Toll = ISC − IPC Toll Symbol
vvv MAX(2D − 2E, 0) τα
vve MAX(1.5D − 1.5E, 0) τβ
vvo MAX(0.5D − 0.5E, 0) τδ
vee MAX(0.5D − 0.5E, 0) τδ







voo 0.5L+ 0.5D τµ
eeo MAX(1.5D + L− 0.5E, 0) τε
eel MAX(0.5D − 0.5E, 0) τδ
eoo 0.5L+ 0.5D τµ
vll 0.5L+ 0.5D τµ
ooo 2L+ 2D τλ
ell 0.5L+ 0.5D τµ
ool 1.5L+ 1.5D τσ
oll 0.5L+ 0.5D τµ
lll 2L+ 2D τλ
Table C.3.2. Tolls For The Experiment's Three Cost Parameter Scenarios:




Scenario(s) Reference Low High
τα vvv 2 4 0
τβ vve 1.5 3 0
τδ vvo, vee, vvl, eel 0.5 1 0
τΘ eee 28/3 8 28/3
τε eeo 13 9 15.5
τλ ooo, lll 24 16 32
τσ ool 18 12 24
τµ voo, eoo, vll, ell, oll 6 4 8
C.4. Cultural Worldview Measures
We used similar cultural world view measures as Kahan et al. (2011). These questions
are shown below.
175
People in our society often disagree about how far to let individuals go in making deci-
sions for themselves. How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of these statements?
[strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree,
strongly agree; items prexed by 'S' were reversed coded]
IINTRSTS. The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives.
SHARM. Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting them-
selves.
IPROTECT. It's not the government's business to try to protect people from themselves.
IPRIVACY. The government should stop telling people how to live their lives.
SPROTECT. The government should do more to advance society's goals, even if that means
limiting the freedom and choices of individuals.
SLIMCHOI. Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don't
get in the way of what's good for society.
People in our society often disagree about issues of equality and discrimination. How
strongly do you agree or disagree with each of these statements? [strongly disagree, mod-
erately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree; items
prexed by 'E' were reversed coded]
HEQUAL. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.
EWEALTH. Our society would be better o if the distribution of wealth was more equal.
ERADEQ. We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites
and people of color, and men and women.
EDISCRIM. Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society.
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HREVDIS2. It seems like minority groups don't want equal rights, they want special rights
just for them.
HFEMININ. Society as a whole has become too soft.
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C.5. Experiment Instructions (No Policy First)
Instructions
You are about to participate in an experiment on decision making in markets. Please
read these instructions carefully. You will earn money, which will be paid to you in cash at
the end of the experiment. Your payo will depend on your choices and the choices of other
participants. All transactions in this market will be done in tokens, with 1 token = $0.10.
During the entire experiment communication of any kind is strictly prohibited. Com-
munication between participants will lead to your exclusion from the experiment and the
forfeiture of all earnings. Please raise your hand if you have any questions and a member of
the research team will come to you and answer your questions privately. Also, please silent
your cell phones to minimize disruption during the experiment.
Market Sessions
The experiment consists of a series of market sessions of four period sets. You and the
other participants will be randomly assigned to groups of three. In each market session,
you and the other people in your group will be deciding when to depart to reach the same
destination that has a bottleneck. This bottleneck restricts people to arriving only one-at-
a-time.
You have the option to depart Very Early, Early, On-time, or Late. In the case that two
people happen to decide to depart at the same time, then it is determined randomly that
one of the two people arrives at their intended time while the other person is bumped and
arrives at the next time slot and incurs an extra cost of being Delayed.
Further, if it so happens that all three depart at the same time, then again it is randomly
determined that one of the three people will arrive at their intended time. A second person
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will thus incur a cost of being delayed and be bumped and arrive at the next time slot. The
third person will then be bumped twice and arrive two slots after their intended time of
departure and incur the delay costs of being twice Delayed.
You and the other two members in your group will start with 400 tokens at the beginning
of the experiment and will be assigned a set of values that represent how much costs you
will receive for being Delayed and for the time you arrive: Very Early, Early, On-time, Late,
Really Late, and Super Late. An On-time arrival results in no costs unless you are delayed
into that time slot. Based on the arrival cost values and cost of a Delay, you will decide
when to depart.
Here are some examples of what can happen (*denotes arrivals that were randomly
determined and italics denote players that were delayed):
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You and the other members in your group will see a screen like this (Note that in the
actual experiment you will see numbers instead of Xs):
On this screen you have the option to select whether to depart Very Early, Early, On-time,
or Late. Your payo will be the sum of any cost of being Delayed and the cost associated
to your arrival time. These costs will be subtracted from your initial endowment. Your
objective is to obtain the least amount of costs. (Note: you will only be paid after you
complete all market sessions for this laboratory experiment.)
Voting
After a market session of four periods, you and the other participants will face a refer-
endum that presents a decision to implement a policy. The policy is explained below. Each
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person will have the option to vote either for or against the policy. The option that receives
the majority of votes in your group will be applied to the next market session of four periods.
At the conclusion of that market session, you and the other members will face the same
referendum. Again, people in your group will vote for either for or against the policy and
the option that receives the majority of votes will be applied to the next market session.
This will conclude the rst of three rounds.
Second and Third Rounds
After the rst round of market sessions where you are in the same group of 3, you will
be randomly assigned to another group of 3 and begin a new round. You will be provided
dierent cost values of being delayed and when you arrive. You and the other members of the
group will repeat the same decision making process as the rst round where you participate
in 3 sessions where a referendum vote will occur after the rst and second sessions.
For the third round, you are once again randomly assigned to another group of 3. And
again, you are given new cost values for being delayed and when you arrive. These cost
values are once again the same for all members in your group. And the process of the third
round is the same as the rst and second rounds.
A summary of the experiment
The Policy
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The referendum will present the option of voting for or against a policy option.
The experimenter will propose a policy for the next 4-period market session. The policy
can impose up to 8 dierent tolls associated for the 16 possible congestion scenarios. The
tolls will ONLY BE IMPOSED on those members of the group that depart at the same time.
In other words, players that do not create congestion will not have to pay a toll. All toll
revenue is collected by the experimenter and then redistributed equally to all members of
the group at the end of the 4-period market session.
The above is a list of all possible tolls. (Note that the value of the above α, β, δ, ε, λ, σ,
θ, and µ token tolls will be known to the group and will be shown on your screen before
you make both your voting and departing decisions.) Notice that the tolls depend on your
departure decision and not your arrival decision and that it is only those players that depart
at the same time (in bold) that pay the associated toll.
Depending on your session, some tolls will be relatively higher or lower than others with
some possibly equaling zero. Also notice that some tolls are the same for dierent congestion
scenarios. Again, tolls will only be incurred to users that create a congestible scenario. For
example, an α token toll will be imposed on all members of the group that depart Very Early
(the VVV congestion scenario). And if two people depart Early with the other departing
Very Early (the EEV congestion scenario) then a δ token toll will be imposed on only those
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members of the group that departed Early. All toll revenue is collected by the experimenter
and then redistributed equally after a market session.
A vote of AGAINST: A vote of Against the Policy introduces no changes to the basic
market, which will work as described above and as experienced in the rst market session.
A vote of FOR: A vote of For the Policy adds the associated α, β, δ, ε, λ, σ, θ, and µ
token toll to those members of the group that depart at the same time. If group members
depart at dierent times, then no tolls will be paid. Tolls are collected by the experimenter
and then are redistributed equally to all members of your group at the end of the 4-period
market session
If the policy passes then you and the other members will see a screen like this when
you are making your departure decisions (Note that in the actual experiment you will see
numbers instead of Xs and $$s).
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Payo
At the conclusion of the nal market session in the third round, your total costs including
any adjustments from any redistribution of toll revenue from each market round are added
together and are deducted from your initial endowment to obtain your total payos.
Are there any questions?
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Practice Problems
Please use the following information to answer the following seven questions:
Departure Decisions: (Very Early, Early, On-time, Late)
Possible Arrival Outcomes: (Very Early, Early, On-time, Late, Really Late, Super Late)
Costs:
Very Early: 2 x $E Early: $E On-time: $0 (zero)
Late: $L Really Late: 2 x $L Super Late: 3 x $L
Delay cost: $D Delay cost for being twice delayed: 2 x $D
For questions 1-4 assume that there are no tolls
1) True or False If one person departs Early and you and another person both decide to
depart On-time, there is a 100% chance that you will arrive On-time and not incur a Delay
cost.
If False, what percentage chance do you have of arriving Late?
2) True or False If one person departs Early and you and another person both decide to
depart On-time and you end up arriving On-time, you will incur a Delay cost.
3) If Person 1 departs Early, Person 2 departs On-time, and Person 3 departs Late, then
when do they arrive and what are their total costs? Please use the information provided to
ll out the table.
Costs:
Very Early: 2 x $E Early: $E On-time: $0 (zero)
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Late: $L Really Late: 2 x $L Super Late: 3 x $L
Delay cost: $D Delay cost for being twice delayed: 2 x $D
4) If all three people decided to depart On-time what are their respective total costs?
Please use the information provided.
5) Now assume that the experimenter's policy has passed and that congestion tolls are
now in eect:
If Person 1 departs Early, and Person 2 and Person 3 depart On-time, then when do
they arrive and what are their total costs? Note that it has been randomly determined
that person 2 arrives On-time. (Note: when looking at the table of tolls, the rst two of the
three letters of a congestion scenario is interpreted as the individuals that are creating the
congestion.)
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6) True or False At least one person will pay a toll if they all depart at separate times.
7) If a person incurred 12 tokens in costs but the experimenter collected 15 tokens in toll
revenue, how much is individually redistributed to the other people in the group?
What are the person's adjusted token costs?
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